In this experiment, 5 adult volunteers were told to attend to one of two tones delivered through headphones. The tones were randomly delivered but one occurred 85% of the time (the ‘frequent, non-target tone’) and the other occurred 15% of the time (the ‘rare, target tone’). The subjects were to notice, remember, and count the target tone. Measures were taken during five periods: pre-hypnosis, entering hypnosis, deep hypnosis, leaving hypnosis, and post-hypnosis.
Some subjects had extensive hypnosis experience prior to the experiment; others had little.
The EEG P300 wave was sensitive to condition. Latency of P300 was significantly shorter in deep hypnosis compared with other periods. Higher amplitude of P300 also occurred during deep hypnosis compared with other periods. (Notes taken from secondary reference, Ericksonian Newsletter.)
Elter-Nodvin, Sabette; Lynch, Gregory; Nash, Michael R. (1993, October). Is primary process mentation a feature of hypnotic responding?. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington Heights, IL.
NOTES: It is difficult to measure primary process; usually measures from Rorschach are used. Recently Steven Lynn and Ken Bowers have done interesting work.
From literary criticism, we took the newer method of lexical pattern analysis–like a fingerprint (e.g. of Shakespeare’s language). Wanted to determine whether there are differences between High and Low hypnotizables; or a difference in waking and hypnotic state. Martindale has a measure based on a lexical dictionary.
In Martindale’s method, you take a long verbal sample, transcribe it into computer text file (response to TAT cards, and 3 tasks like–“Imagine you are ascending a spiral staircase and see someone at the top; describe what you see”); then do word count.

Farvolden, Peter; Bowers, Kenneth S.; Woody, Erik Z. (1993, October). Hypnotic amnesia: Avoiding the ‘Intentional Loop’. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington Heights, IL.

The social cognitive view is that Ss actively try to forget and fool themselves, making an attributional error. Davidson & Bowers say (in neo-dissociation theory) the information is temporarily unconscious–like forgetting a friend’s name at a cocktail party. Executive initiative, effort, and control are bypassed.
We used heart rate as indicator of cognitive effort. For highs there should be little increase in heart rate. 20 lows and 20 highs who passed amnesia item on Waterloo-C were used. Post-experimentally we asked them what they were doing following the suggestion of amnesia, and had judges evaluate the degree of effort.

Gruzelier, John; Warren, Kristen (1993). Neuropsychological evidence of reductions on left frontal tests with hypnosis. Psychological Medicine, 23, 93-101.

Individuals with high and low susceptibility to hypnosis were compared in a baseline condition and after instructions of hypnosis on tests of anterior left and right hemispheric functions of word fluency to letter categories, word fluency to semantic categories, design fluency and bilateral finger tapping dexterity. With hypnosis high susceptibles showed a reduction in word generation to letter categories, no significant change in word generation to semantic categories, an improvement in design fluency, and bilateral reductions in finger tapping dexterity. Low susceptibles showed the opposite changes except for the improvement in design fluency. These results, together with correlational results, were interpreted as evidence of central inhibitory processes, particularly of the left hemisphere, in response to instructions of hypnosis in high susceptibles.

The authors discussion of their study includes the following statements. “The main result of the study was the differential influence of instructions of hypnosis on high and low susceptibles for word fluency to letter designated categories, as distinct from semantic categories, and design fluency” (p. 98).
“The absence of effects of hypnosis on word generation to semantic categories (left fronto-temporoparietal) versus letter categories (left frontal) has a bearing on evoked potential evidence (Gruzelier et al. 1987). Bilateral comparisons at temporal lobe and central locations showed that high susceptibles were characterized by asymmetric changes in evoked potential amplitude (N116 component) with hypnosis. Activity at the central electrodes was compatible with a left-to-right hemispheric shift of function, but this was not the case at the temporal electrodes. Instead of an inhibition of left temporal activity with hypnosis activation was maintained. Maintenance of activity in the left temporal lobe follows consideration of the fact that hypnosis requires sustained attention to the voice of the hypnotist, which is predominantly a left temporal function” (p. 99).
“The absence of differences in the pre-hypnotic condition between high and low susceptibles indicates that hemisphericity _per se_ may not be a factor that characterizes susceptibility. The fact that lateral differences were found in some experiments (e.g. Gruzelier et al. 1984; Gruzelier & Brow, 1985) but not others (e.g. Cikurel & Gruzelier, 1990; McCormack & Gruzelier, 1993) may indicate that such effects, when apparent, were secondary to another factor such as cognitive flexibility as conceptualized by Crawford (1989)” (p. 99).

Laidlaw, Tannis M. (1993). Hypnosis and attention deficits after closed head injury. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 31, 97-111.

In a controlled study of patients attending a concussion clinic because of ongoing postconcussion symptoms, attention deficits were recorded in the head-injured group for the aspects of alertness, assessed by the Continuous Performance Test (CPT), and processing capacity, assessed by a version of the Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT). Selective attention was intact. Hypnotizability was assessed by the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (HGSHS:A), with normal means and standard deviations found in both the concussed and control groups. There was a significant correlation, however, between HGSHS:A scores and PASAT scores in the concussed group only. The results of this preliminary study suggest that slower processing capacity after a closed head injury may predict higher hypnotizability and that hypnosis could be an appropriate rehabilitation technique for these patients who present with postconcussion symptoms.

Greenwald, Anthony G. (1992). New Look 3: Unconscious cognition reclaimed. American Psychologist, 47, 766-779.

Recent research has established several empirical results that are widely agreed to merit description in terms of unconscious cognition. These findings come from experiments that use indirect tests for immediate or long- term residues of barely perceptible, perceptible-but-unattended, or attended-but-forgotten events. Importantly, these well-established phenomena–insofar as they occur without initially involving focal attention–are limited to relatively minor cognitive feats. Unconscious cognition is now solidly established in empirical research, but it appears to be intellectually much simpler than the sophisticated agency portrayed in psychoanalytic theory. The strengthened position of unconscious cognitive phenomena can be related to their fit with the developing neural network (connectionist) theoretical framework in psychology.

Hilgard, Ernest R. (1992). Dissociation and theories of hypnosis. In Fromm, Erika; Nash, Michael R. (Ed.), Contemporary hypnosis research (pp. 69-101). New York: Guilford Press.

[These Notes were made from a prepublication copy and the pagination for quotes added later.]
The author reviews the history of dissociation theory, the hidden observer, and the credible-skeptical arguments regarding hypnosis. He briefly summarizes alternative theories about hypnosis, and asserts that we can turn aside from debate by examining the common topic studied, the “domain of hypnosis” or what happens when hypnotist, with consent of subject, attempts to induce hypnosis through conventional procedures: production of hallucinations, contractions, paralyses, age regression, analgesia, posthypnotic amnesia, etc. Even if one disagrees about the nature of these phenomena or the appropriate explanatory concepts, one can agree on the area to be investigated.
The author notes that one never sees these behaviors in the same situation, in any other context. They are distinguishable from other phenomena like meditation, highway hypnosis, responses to a persuasive leader, and even some waking suggestions by several delimiting factors:
1. Hypnosis is not simply a response to suggestion, because that kind of response occurs in other situations. Suggestions can be divided into personal and impersonal (Hull, 1933); and suggestibility can be divided into primary and secondary (Eysenck & Furneaux, 1945). Primary suggestibility includes responses to waking suggestion (e.g. postural sway) that correlate with hypnotizability; secondary suggestibility involves responses to waking suggestion that do not correlate with primary suggestibility. Hypnotizability does not correlate with social suggestibility (i.e. gullibility or conformity) (Burns & Hammer, 1970; Moore, 1964); nor does it correlate with placebo response (McGlashan, Evans, & Orne, 1979).
2. Test-retest correlations are approximately +.70 between scores on hypnotizability scales with and without formal inductions. Thus, responses to the type of suggestion on hypnotizability scales–even when in the waking context–belong within the domain of hypnosis. The individual differences in responsivity to items on hypnotizability scales persist over time (Piccione, Hilgard, & Zimbardo, 1989: r = .64 for 10 years test- retest, .82 for 15 years, and .71 for 25 years, on Stanford Form A); and this persistence is observed in twin studies as well (Morgan, 1973; Morgan, Hilgard, & Davert, 1970).
3. Additional evidence of coherence of the domain comes from reports of hypnotized Subjects about their phenomenological experience.
Hilgard’s discussion of the executive and monitoring functions within hypnosis place his theory within the area of cognitive psychology. He presents a theory of a central regulating mechanism, with a hierarchy of subsystems that may be activated (and once activated may continue with some autonomy). When autonomous action occurs, the conscious representation of the control system may recede. Furthermore, the hypnotist’s suggestions may alter the relationships within the hierarchy of subsystems and may also influence the executive functions. He gives as a common example, when a bilingual person talks in one language, the other language is temporarily inhibited.
There are a number of concepts or positions in the history of psychology that relate to Hilgard’s theory of hierarchical control with executive and subsystems:
1. ‘Cognitive structure’ (Edward Tolman, 1932; 1938; Kurt Lewin, 1935). There may be communication problems between cognitive structures.
2. ‘Habit family hierarchy’ (Clark Hull, 1934). Habits are organized in a preferential system, so that if one is blocked the next is activated.
3. ‘Cell assemblies’ (Hebb, 1949; 1975), which are a physiological counterpart of the ‘hidden observer’ phenomenon.
4. ‘Roles’ (Sarbin & Coe, 1972) may be considered cognitive substructures.
5. ‘Cognitive networks’ (Blum, Geiwitz, & Stewart, 1967) serve similar functions.
6. ‘Images’ and ‘plans’ (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) provide for control of thought and action and have some kind of hierarchy.
7. ‘Subordinate ego-structures’ (Gill & Brenman, 1959) with a dominant ego; or the ego-apparatuses in a ‘conflict-free ego sphere’ (Hartmann, 1958).
In hypnosis, central executive functions may be shared between hypnotist and Subject. Hilgard gives extensive examples of varying degrees of split in the executive control system.
“It can be argued that, except for relinquishing control over the subsystems that are specifically dissociated from control by suggestion, and the readiness for relinquishing control, the central executive functions have not been much modified in hypnosis. In superficial hypnosis, these mild dissociations can occur through waking suggestions, with little alteration of the general state of consciousness. When varied suggestions to a talented hypnotic subject have cumulative effects, as in suggestions of relaxation and detachment from the environment, the more general features of the hypnotic state begin to appear. A more massive dissociation, so far as the executive is concerned, may be the consequence of the summing up of many specific subsystems for which control has been relinquished. Such an interpretation permits hypnosis as a state to be a relative matter, the specific dissociations being identifiable, but the general state being a matter of how many specific dissociations are operative and how pervasive they are. Only when they are sufficiently pervasive is it appropriate to speak of a change of state” (p. 96).
Hilgard also discusses the monitoring function extensively, relating it to trance logic and contrasting it with the waking state. Less of the usual monitor is retained when the hypnotic involvement is greater, as in deep hypnosis, or when the subject becomes more deeply engrossed in an activated system that has been aroused. He also relates the monitoring function to the Hidden Observer phenomenon.

Kihlstrom, John F.; Barnhardt, Terrence M.; Tataryn, Douglas J. (1992). The psychological unconscious. American Psychologist, 47, 788-791.

In response to Greenwald’s article on contemporary research on unconscious mental processes, the authors address three issues: (a) the independence of much recent research and theory from psychodynamic formulations; (b) the broad sweep of the psychological unconscious, including implicit perception, memory, thought, learning, and emotion; and (c) the possibility that the analytic power of unconscious processing may depend both on the manner in which mental contents are rendered unconscious and the manner in which they are to be processed.

Lewicki, Pawel; Hill, Thomas; Czyzewska, Maria (1992). Nonconscious acquisition of information. American Psychologist, 47, 796-801.

The authors review and summarize evidence for the process of acquisition of information outside of conscious awareness (covariations, nonconscious indirect and interactive inferences, self-perpetuation of procedural knowledge). Data indicate that as compared with consciously controlled cognition, the nonconscious information – acquisition processes are not only much faster but are also structurally more sophisticated, in that they are capable of efficient processing of multidimensional and interactive relations between variables. Those mechanisms of non- conscious acquisition of information provide a major channel for the development of procedural knowledge that is indispensable for such important aspects of cognitive functioning as encoding and interpretation of stimuli and the triggering of emotional reactions.

Loftus, Elizabeth F.; Klinger, Mark R. (1992). Is the unconscious smart or dumb?. American Psychologist, 47, 761-765.
How sophisticated is unconscious cognition? This is one of the most fundamental questions about the unconscious that has been posed by research psychologists over the past century. Anthony Greenwald takes a contemporary look at this classical problem and concludes that unconscious cognition is severely limited in its analytic capability. In response, other leading scholars agree that the reality of unconscious processes is no longer questionable. Although there is some disagreement about just how sophisticated these processes are, the consensus is that exciting times are ahead for both research and theory concerning the mental processes involved in unconscious cognition.

Hasher, L.; Stoltzfus, E. R.; Zacks, R. T.; Rypma, B. (1991). Age and inhibition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 17 (1), 163-169.

Two experiments assess adult age differences in the extent of inhibition or negative priming generated in a selective-attention task. Younger adults consistently demonstrated negative priming effects; they were slower to name a letter on a current trial that had served as a distractor on the previous trial relative to one that had not occurred on the previous trial. Whether or not inhibition dissipated when the response to stimulus interval was lengthened from 500 ms in Experiment 1 to 1,200 ms in Experiment 2 depended upon whether young subjects were aware of the patterns across trial types. Older adults did not show inhibition at either interval. The age effects are interpreted within the Hasher-Zacks (1988) framework, which proposes inhibition as a central mechanism determining the contents of working memory and consequently influencing a wide array of cognitive functions.

Bartis, Scott P.; Zamansky, Harold S. (1990). Cognitive strategies in hypnosis: Toward resolving the hypnotic conflict. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 38, 168-182.

Two experiments were carried out to assess the relative contributions of dissociation and absorption as cognitive strategies employed by high and low hypnotizability Ss in responding successfully to hypnotic suggestions. Of special interest was the manner in which Ss deal with conflicting information typically inherent in hypnotic suggestions. In the first experiment, Ss rated their attentional focus and the involuntariness of their experience after responding to a number of hypnotic suggestions administered in the usual manner. In the second experiment, the level of conflict was varied by instructing some Ss to imagine a circumstance that was congruent and other Ss to imagine a circumstance that was incongruent with the suggested behavioral response. The results of the 2 experiments were consistent in suggesting that, depending upon the nature of the hypnotic suggestion, high hypnotizability Ss are able to employ dissociation or absorption in order to respond successfully. Low hypnotizability Ss, on the other hand, seem to be relatively ineffective dissociators. When the structure of the hypnotic suggestion precludes the use of absorption, the performance of low hypnotizables deteriorates.

Burgess, Cheryl A.; Du Breuil, Susan C.; Jones, Bill; Spanos, Nicholas P. (1990-91). Compliance and the modification of hypnotizability. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 10 (4), 293-304.

This study compared compliance-induced reporting bias in subjects who attained high hypnotizability scores following skill training and subjects who obtained equivalent scores without benefit of skill training (naturals). Low hypnotizables in one condition were administered the Carleton Skills Training Package and later posttested for hypnotizability. Control subjects were posttested without benefit of skill training. As in previous studies, skill-trained subjects attained substantially higher posttest hypnotizability scores than controls. In a final session, skill trained subjects, untrained naturals matched against the skill trained subjects on hypnotizability scores, and low hypnotizable controls were tested in a suggested deafness paradigm designed to assess compliant responding. Skill-trained subjects and matched naturals reported significantly greater suggested deafness than did the controls. However, only theory matched naturals exhibited significant levels of compliance-induced reporting bias. These findings indicate that skill- trained subjects exhibit no more compliant responding than do natural high hypnotizables.

Fellows, Brian J. (1990). Current theories of hypnosis: A critical overview. British Journal of Experimental and Clinical Hypnosis, 7, 81-92.

The present state of theory in hypnosis is reviewed and observations are made concerning future prospects. The state- non-state issue continues to dominate theoretical debate, although no satisfactory reply has yet been made to T. X. Barber’s criticisms of the ‘hypnotic trance’ concept. The impact of social-psychological theory has been considerable and the results of Spanos’s hypnotic training programme could have significant implications for our understanding of hypnosis. Future theorizing should see a move towards a more integrated sociocognitive approach. Neodissociation theory has generally not fulfilled its early promise and is encumbered with the ‘hidden observer’ concept. The role of imaginative processes continues to be a dominant theme in hypnosis theory, although the relatively small correlation between imaginative and hypnotic abilities remains a problem. The links between hypnosis, sleep and relaxation deserve further research, although, as theories of hypnosis, their scope seems limited. Suggestibility and role enactment theories have shown few signs of development in recent years. Theoretical problems over the interpretation of hypnosis need to be more widely recognized and the use of question-begging terminology curtailed. One advantage of the imagination hypothesis is that it provides a bridge, or a point of convergence, between state and non-state approaches (Spanos & Barber, 1974). It also handles certain hypnotic phenomena very well. For example, the known facts of age regression can be readily interpreted, together with the oddities of age progression and past life regression, as imaginative reconstructions (Barber, 1979). However, other phenomena, such as amnesia and analgesia, are less easily explained.

Freeman, William B., Jr.; Kessler, Marc; Vigne, Jeffery (1990). Random number generation, absorption, and hypnotizability: A brief communication. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 38, 10-16.

Graham and Evans (1977) found that a measure of random number generation (RNG) was related to hypnotizability. In 2 studies, the relationship between hypnotizability and Graham and Evans’ RNG (1977) index was examined. In Study 1 Evans’ (1981) measures of controlled and automatic absorption were also evaluated. In Study 1 no relationship was found between the measures of absorption or RNG and hypnotizability. Since Study 1 was carried out primarily to evaluate methods for modifying hypnotizability, Study 2 was designed to evaluate RNG measure directly. Study 2 found no consistent relationship between RNG and hypnotizability, or between RNG and measures of the experience of hypnotic depth and nonvolition.

Gil, Karen M.; Williams, David A.; Keefe, Francis J.; Beckham, Jean C. (1990). The relationship of negative thoughts to pain and psychological distress. Behavior Therapy, 21 (3), 349-362.

Examined the degree to which negative thoughts during flare-ups of pain are related to pain and psychological distress in 3 pain populations: sickle cell disease, rheumatoid arthritis, and chronic pain. 185 adults completed the Inventory of Negative Thoughts in Response to Pain (INTRP), a pain rating scale, the SCL-90 (revised), and a coping strategies questionnaire. Factor analysis of the INTRP revealed 3 factors: Negative Self-Statements, Negative Social Cognitions, and Self-Blame. High scorers on Negative Self-Statement and Negative Social Cognitions reported more severe pain and psychological distress. Ss with chronic daily pain had more frequent negative thoughts during flare-ups than those having intermittent pain secondary to sickle cell disease or rheumatoid arthritis. The INTRP appears to have adequate internal consistency and construct validity

Heyneman, Nicholas E. (1990). The role of imagery in hypnosis: An information processing approach. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 38 (1), 39-59.

Imagery is widely agreed to be an important component of hypnosis. The theoretical framework from which to conceptualize the role of imagery in hypnosis, however, has remained controversial. A model is presented which attempts to reconceptualize hypnotic imaginal processing in terms of current theory and research in cognitive psychology and psychophysiology. This model draws from a propositional approach to imagery (e.g. Pylyshyn, 1973), particularly as adapted by Lang’s (1979) bioinformational theory. It is argued that the hypnotic image is fundamentally more complex than simple iconic mental representation, containing instead both stimulus and response components. It is proposed that the critical properties of the hypnotic image are not the stimulus components or propositions which give rise to the experience of the image but instead are response propositions which are associated with overt behavior. Processing of these response propositions is conceptualized as a negative feedback system between the brain and effector site. Some preliminary sources of support as well as implications and research suggested by this model are discussed.

The author notes that the brain does not store a kind of “photograph,” but rather stores “meanings” (Anderson, 1978); and that images actually represent response processes, as observable in physiological concomitants (Lang, 1977).
The hypnotic suggestion that a Subject’s arm is being pulled up into the air by a large helium balloon is represented by two separate propositions: “There is a helium balloon tied to your arm” (a stimulus proposition) and “Your arm is moving up into the air” (a response proposition). According to Peter Lang (1979), an image is not a mental stimulus to which a response is made, but is in itself an active response process, accompanied by physiological activity. Verbal instructions to a Subject determine whether they will access stimulus propositions or response propositions. “Lang et al. (1980) found that only those Ss given response training coupled with response proposition scripts showed significant physiological arousal. These Ss were presumably better able to access and process that portion of the propositional network which controls visceral and motoric responding” (p. 46).
This author proposes that cognitive processing of a hypnotic image involves (internal) responding, and that ‘responsive propositions’ provide the basis for understanding the function of imagery in hypnosis, and are more important to hypnotic imagery than stimulus propositions. “In other words, the experience of a visual image and thus the vividness or controllability of that image is not critical for hypnosis. What is important to note is that the hypnotic behavior is not a response to a visual image but is instead a function of the processing of the image itself (cf. Lang, 1979)” (pp. 47-48).
In explaining how an image might facilitate amplification of a subtle response (such as in arm levitation), the author suggests that physiological and external feedback systems are involved–principally a neural feedback loop between brain and target organ (in this case, arm muscles). “Efferent signals, which are activated by processing response propositions, initiate the overt behavior while afferent signals feed back to the brain and modulate further input tot he effector system. The process progressively reduces the mismatch between the image instructions and behavior until the hypnotic task is completed” (p. 48). The feedback loop “provides information on the discrepancy between desired behavior and actual behavior: e = Bd-Ba, where e = error, Bd = desired behavior, and Ba= actual behavior (Arbib, 1972). The error signal generated by this discrepancy modifies the efferent output so as to eventually approximate e = 0” (p. 49). The author notes that this complex process of physiological feedback may be “augmented by external feedback such as modified verbal instructions or vocal intonations of the hypnotist and self-observation by S” (p. 49).
The author’s model is summarized as: “1. The context, setting, and expectations implied by being hypnotized as well as the wording of the hypnotic suggestions provides S with: (a) explicit or implicit instructions to use imagery, (b) repetitious wording which may increase the probability of fully accessing the relevant propositions, and (c) instructions that task completion is expected. This may function to increase the probability that the deep structure of the response propositions will be processed. 2. The hypnotic suggestion proper is composed of stimulus and response propositions embedded within a propositional network. 3. Stimulus propositions give rise to the phenomenological characteristics or the percept- like experience of the image but may be unimportant in determining hypnotic behavior. 4. Processing of the response propositions includes an active response. This response process is facilitated by S’s expectation to become actively involved in the imagined scene. Response propositions are the critical features of hypnotic imagery. 5. During hypnosis, the propositional network may be systematically modified by physiological or external feedback regarding the relative progress of the behavior toward task completion. This processing of response propositions is conceptualized as a negative feedback system. Efferent signals are delivered to the appropriate effector site while afferent signals feed back to the brain in order to modify further neural input, functioning to reduce the error between image and behavior. While the initial feedback is probably physiological, additional feedback may be obtained from the hypnotist’s instructions and S’s self-observations. 6. If stimulus propositions are simultaneously accessed, S experiences an image” (p. 51).

Kihlstrom, John F.; McConkey, K. M. (1990). William James and hypnosis: A centennial reflection. Psychological Science, 1, 174-178.

For William James, hypnosis was both an experimental technique for creating divisions of consciousness, and a laboratory model of naturally occurring disorders of awareness. James’ treatment of consciousness in hypnosis presages contemporary interests in dissociation and implicit cognition, and underscores the role of the self in conscious mental life. At the same time, James recognized the complexity of hypnosis as an interpersonal process. In the end, James’ views suggest how a rapprochement between the cognitive and social approaches to hypnosis might be achieved.

Kunzendorf, Robert G.; Jesses, Michael; Dupille, Leonard; Butler, William (1990-91). Subliminal activation of intrapsychic conflicts: Subconscious realms of mind vs subconscious processes of mentation. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 10, 117-128.

Cognitive-state monitoring theory asserts that people perceive subliminal stimulation without self-consciously monitoring its external innervation (as opposed to central innervation). Thus monitoring theory predicts that subconsciously perceived discord, in the absence of any ‘external location’ cues, should be misinterpreted as centrally generated discord and should disrupt self-generated behavior. Consistent with this prediction, mathematical problem-solving in the current experiment was disrupted after mathematically competitive males repeatedly heard the subliminal message IT’S WRONG TO CRUSH DADDY stereophonically localized in the middle of their heads–but not after they repeatedly heard this subliminal ‘Oedipal’ message binaurally localized on one side of their heads. A subliminal message binaurally localized on one side of the self should not interfere with problem-solving behavior _because, even though the message’s external innervation is not self-consciously ‘monitored,’ its external location is inferable from subconscious cues._
Monitoring theory asserts that subliminal [perceptions] of ‘unmonitored’ messages are unaccompanied by any self-consciousness that one is perceiving them (rather than imaging them), and that subliminal or ‘unmonitored’ messages of distress are mistaken for self-generated distress.
Disruption by the ‘internal’ subliminal word WRONG seems to us consistent with the fact that disruption was limited to mathematically competent males.
Indeed, ‘repression’ itself is a mode of processing fearful information: a mode in which subjects suspend their self-awareness that they are perceiving fearful stimulation, as research by Kunzendorf and McLaughlin has demonstrated. This selective suspension of monitoring provides immediate relief from fearful stimuli, Freudian or otherwise, but it does so at the risk of turning self-conscious fear into subconscious anxiety (into consciously lingering fear without a self consciously perceived source). No subconscious realm full of lurking fears is implicated in this ‘unmonitored’ mode of self-protection. All that is implicated is an unconscious storehouse of potentially fearful memories–potentially fearful but sensationless memories, which can be ‘suppressed’ from conscious sensory representation or ‘constructed’ into conscious memory images or ‘subconsciously represented’ as unself-consciously imaged sensations.

Martin, Maryanne (1990). On the induction of mood. Clinical Psychology Review, 10, 669-697.

Increasing interest in the relation between emotion and cognition has led to the development of a range of laboratory methods for inducing temporary mood states. Sixteen such techniques are reviewed and compared on a range of factors including success rate, the possibility of demand effects, the intensity of the induced mood, and the range of different moods that can be induced. Three different cognitive models (self- schema theory, semantic network theory, and fragmentation theory) which have been successfully used to describe long-term mood states, such as clinical depression, are elaborated to describe the process of temporary mood induction. Finally, the use of mood induction is contrasted with alternative methods (such as the study of patients suffering from depression) for investigating emotion.

Blum, Gerald S. (1989). A computer model for unconscious spread of anxiety-linked inhibition in cognitive networks. Behavioral Science, 34, 16-45.

Unconscious inhibitory processes, triggered by a potential anxiety reaction, are reviewed in the context of an emerging rapprochement between psychodynamic and cognitive approaches in experimental psychology. Conditions underlying spread of inhibitory action to other cognitive networks are first explored in three tachistoscopic experiments utilizing words posthypnotically tied to a potential anxiety, pleasure, or neutral reaction. Response times of subjects, instructed to ignore those words while naming pictures or solving anagrams as quickly as possible, reveal a highly differentiated pattern of circumstances governing likelihood of inhibitory spread from anxiety-linked words to target stimuli. Next a computer model is constructed to simulate cognitive processes from onset of display to eventual response, and the model is then tested for its fit to the empirical data. Finally, an illustrative study shows that a subset of computer- generated predictions for spread of inhibitory action is verifiable experimentally.

Edelson, Jeffrey; Fitzpatrick, Jody L. (1989). A comparison of cognitive-behavioral and hypnotic treatments of chronic pain. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 45, 316-323.

27 male chronic pain patients were assigned to 1 of 3 treatment groups: hypnosis, cognitive-behavioral, and attention control. Hypnosis and cognitive-behavioral treatments were identical, with the exception of the hypnotic induction. Scores on the McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ) and a measure of the overt motor behavior element of chronic pain were collected at pretreatment, posttreatment, and follow-up intervals. Analyses showed significant increases in activity and decreases in pain intensity for the cognitive-behavioral treatment. Changes for the hypnosis treatment were noted only on the MPQ. Changes for both groups were sustained on the 1-mo follow-up. Findings generally support the superiority of the cognitive-behavioral treatment on behavior measures and its equivalence to hypnosis on subjective measures.

Jupp, J. J.; Collins, J. K.; Walker, W. L. (1989). Relationships between behavioural responsiveness to hypnotic suggestions and estimates of hypnotic depth following 11 sequential instances of hypnosis. Australian Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 17, 93-98

Behavioral responsiveness to suggestions was assessed in an initial hypnosis session, and hypnotic depth was assessed in this session, followed by 10 weekly standardized hypnotic experiences. Correlations were calculated between behavioral responsiveness, initial and subsequent depth estimates, and between successive trance depth estimates. Levels of trance depth estimates were found to increase through weeks 1 to 11. Significant positive correlations were found between behavioral responsiveness scores and trance depth estimates to the fourth week but not beyond. Significant positive relations were found between successive estimates of trance depth except for the correlation between estimates for the fourth and fifth weeks. These results are discussed in terms of the estimates of trance depth being attributions from self-observations of behavioral responsiveness to hypnotic suggestions.

Matheson, George; Shu, Karen L.; Bart, Catherine (1989). A validation study of a short-form hypnotic-experience questionnaire and its relationship to hypnotizability. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 32, 17-26.

Investigated the validity of a 16-item scale inquiring about hypnotic experience, drawn from the Hypnotic Experience Questionnaire developed by Kelly (1985) to measure components of hypnotic experience. We administered the HEQ-S and the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility: Form A (HGSHS:A) to 198 students. Factor analysis of the scale produced three stable principal components accounting for 70% of the data variance: Dissociation/Altered State (DAS), Rapport (RAP), and Relaxation (REL). Subscales representing these three factors and a composite measure, “General Depth,” were constructed. Subscale correlations with HGSHS:A scores were highest for the DAS subscale (.69) and lowest for REL (.41). Applications of the HEQ-S in clinical and research use are considered.
Using the phenomenological studies and theories of J. R. Hilgard (1979) and Shor (1962), Kelly (1985) constructed the Hypnotic Experience Questionnaire (HEQ), a 47- item scale designed to demonstrate the existence of five factors of the hypnotic experience. These factors included dissociation/altered state, relaxation, rapport, visual imagery, and a negatively correlated factor of cognitive rumination measuring the amount of anxious self-reflective, and interfering thought. A composite scale, General Depth, was also derived to provide a summary measure of the subjective quality of the hypnotic experience. The HEQ was developed as a research instrument.
The HEQ-S was administered immediately after Ss completed the Harvard response record. Items were responded to on a 5-point Likert scale ranging form one (No, none or not at all) to 5 (Yes, a great deal, or almost completely).

de Groh, Margaret (1989). Correlates of hypnotic susceptibility. In Spanos, Nicholas P.; Chaves, John F. (Ed.), Hypnosis: The cognitive-behavioral perspective (pp. 32-63). Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.

The author describes a non-linear relationship between imagery and hypnotizability and between absorption and hypnotizability. People good at imagery may be high or low on hypnotizability scales; the same is true for people high on absorption trait. However, people low on those traits generally are low on measured hypnotizability.

Cross, W. P.; Spanos, Nicholas P. (1988-89). The effects of imagery vividness and receptivity on skill training induced enhancements in hypnotic susceptibility. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 8, 89-103.

This article is cited by Spanos & Flynn (1989) as indicating that high hypnotizability requires imaginative skills that some people do not possess in sufficient degrees.

De Pascalis, Vilfredo; Silveri, Alessandra; Palumbo, Giovanni (1988). EEG asymmetry during covert mental activity and its relationship with hypnotizability. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 36, 38-52.

Parietal-occipital EEG was recorded bilaterally while 20 high and 20 low hypnotizable Ss performed, in the eyes-closed condition, 2 covert right-hemisphere tasks (visual long-term memory and fantasy) and 2 covert left-hemisphere tasks (multiplication and verbal long-term memory). Ss were not, however, hypnotized during any aspect of the psychophysiological testing. After each task, Ss rated orally their degree of involvement in the tasks. The integrated amplitude alpha, the alpha density, and the alpha ratio as a measure of hemispheric asymmetry, were evaluated. Finally, the proportion of relatively greater right activation periods during right-hemisphere tasks minus the analogous proportion during left-hemisphere tasks was used as index of hemispheric specificity. The high hypnotizable Ss showed significantly higher alpha amplitude than the low hypnotizables; the alpha amplitude was correlated with hypnotizability, while the alpha density was not. The alpha amplitude of the right hemisphere during right- hemisphere tasks was significantly lower than the same amplitude during left-hemisphere tasks, while no significant differences related to task-type were detected in the left hemisphere. The pattern of task-effect on alpha ratio scores was the same as that on alpha amplitudes. Verbal and multiplication ratings were related to the alpha ratio, imaginative- visual memory ratings were not. No differences in hemispheric specificity between high and low hypnotizable Ss were found to exist, and no relationship between hypnotizability and hemispheric specificity was observed.

The authors review the literature on differences between the two hemispheres’ involvement during hemisphere-specialized tasks. The ratio between left- and right- hemisphere alpha amplitudes has been shown to be a reliable measure of hemisphere lateralization as a function of task demands (Amochaev & Salamy, 1979).
They also review the literature on EEG asymmetry and hypnotizability. Most investigations used tasks with a problem solving component, whereas this study used “a covert numeric task and other covert self-generated tasks in which the range of cognitive activities resembled natural thinking” (p. 40).
Purposes of this research were “to investigate whether (a) the amount of alpha in EEG is correlated with hypnotizability, (b) high hypnotizable Ss would reveal higher hemispheric specificities during covert mental tasks than low hypnotizable Ss, and (c) verbal-numeric tasks involve more left-hemisphere activation and imaginative-visual tasks more right-hemisphere activation” (p. 40).
The subjects were 40 women (from an original pool of 71), aged 19-23, with no previous experience using hypnosis. To minimize the possible effects of expectation, hypnosis was not mentioned in the invitation to participate in research. All subjects were tested first with the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, then with the Stanford Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (SHSS:C). The SHSS:C was used to select 20 high hypnotizables (defined as having a score 1 standard deviation above the group mean of 6.51) and 20 low hypnotizables (with scores 1 standard deviation below the group mean). The mean score for highs was 10.05 (S.D. = .88) and mean score for lows was 2.75 (S.D. = 1.49).
Although subjects were selected on the basis of their measured hypnotizability, hypnosis was not used during the investigation’s psychophysiological testing. However, they were required to relax and keep eyes closed during trials on the tasks. After each trial, the subjects rated their involvement in the task.
Tasks used for this research were: 1. Visual long-term memory. Ss were asked to recall from memory pictures, places, faces, or visual scenes that were in a movie, but not scenes with a negative content. 2. Fantasy. Ss were requested to fantasize about something new that they like (nothing from past experience, and nothing sexual). 3. Multiplication. Ss were asked to multiply 2 serially, as, 2 x 2 = 4, x 2 – 8, etc., and to do it verbally without visual representation. 4. Verbal long-term memory. Ss were requested to think of some poem, speech, or other verbal material that they could recall from memory, and to repeat it mentally, to themselves.
Results can be summarized as follows.
Hypnotizability correlated .38 and .35 with right alpha amplitude and left alpha amplitude during baseline (statistically significant).
There was a significant association between alpha density and hypnotizability, when the group was divided at the median on density. (Alpha density = the time periods in which the alpha was present over the 6-second epochs accumulated during each 1-minute period which preceded the tasks). This association may be seen in the Table that follows:
SHSS:C Alpha Density Low High
+ 6 13
– 14 7
Chi Square = 3.61, p <.05 There was a significant interaction between type of task (verbal-numeric, imaginative-visual memory) and hemisphere, which was attributable to changes in alpha amplitudes in right hemisphere, according to tasks. "Alpha amplitude of the right hemisphere during right-hemisphere tasks was significantly lower than during left- hemisphere tasks, while no significant differences were detected in the left hemisphere as a result of the differences between left- and right-hemisphere tasks" (p. 44) Alpha ratio = (Right-hemisphere alpha - Left-hemisphere alpha) / (Right- hemisphere alpha + Left-hemisphere alpha) exhibited the same pattern as for alpha amplitudes. The ANOVA 2 (high/low) x 2 (right tasks/left tasks) repeated measures on alpha ratio revealed a significant main effect for tasks, and a significant interaction between right-left tasks and hypnotizability. "During right-hemisphere tasks there were no significant differences (p <.5) [sic] in alpha ratio between high and low hypnotizable groups, while during the multiplication task, the low hypnotizable Ss evidenced a higher mean alpha ratio (p <.05) than the high hypnotizable group (.08 & .04, respectively); identical ratios were found during verbal tasks" (p. 45). Task involvement was expected to be positively related with left-hemisphere tasks, but negatively related to right-hemisphere tasks (i.e. greater subjective involvement in the task would be associated with more negative alpha ratios, showing a bias towards right- hemisphere activation. "Verbal ratings were substantially related to alpha ratios (rho = 0.82; p <.01), and multiplication ratings moderately related to alpha ratios (rho = 0.31; p <.05); visual memory and fantasy ratings were not related to alpha ratios (r = -.04 & r = - .18, respectively)" (p. 45). Hemispheric specificity was defined as the proportion of greater relative right- hemisphere activation periods during right-hemisphere tasks minus the analogous proportion during left-hemisphere tasks. The authors did an analysis to "verify whether the task rating moderates the hemispheric specificity (i.e., the level of subjective involvement in a task is related to the level of hemispheric lateralization, while S is carrying it out)" (p. 46). They concluded that hypnotizability (SHSS:C) is not significantly related to Ss' hemispheric specificity. In the discussion, the authors present a Table summarizing the results of similar investigations. They mention that the alpha-hypnotizability relationship may depend on which alpha variable is taken into account, or whether eyes-open/closed is varied. They conclude that the different methodological procedures render any comparison of results across studies very difficult. They note that there was a significant correlation between alpha amplitude and hypnotizability even though Ss did not know in advance that hypnosis would be part of the experiment (the hypothesis proposed by Dumas, 1977, to account for this type of correlation). "One possible explanation of these data might lie in a different level of arousal in the high and low hypnotizable Ss: the high hypnotizable Ss might have been simply more relaxed than the lows. "Nevertheless, his explanation must be taken with caution. The study of Paskewitz and M. T. Orne (1973), in fact, pointed out that in dark-adapted Ss, the relaxation condition does not produce increases of alpha activity. In a further study, contrary to previous reports, M. T. Orne and Paskewitz (1974) also found that a reduction in alpha activity is not a necessary consequence of apprehension or heightened arousal. Thus, it is not yet clear whether a decrease in anxiety tends to cause an increase in alpha density and vice versa" (p. 48). 1988 Dywan, Jane (1988). The imagery factor in hypnotic hypermnesia. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 36, 312-326. Week-long repeated recall attempts were used as baseline against which to assess the effects of hypnosis on the recall of pictures. Hypnosis increased errors for all Ss but especially for high hypnotizables. In Experiment 1, dividing Ss on the basis of imagery ability had the same effect on recall as dividing them on the basis of hypnotic ability. In Experiment 2, imagery ability was found to interact with hypnosis in mediating the level of error during waking trials. Results do not support the claim that hypnosis enhances recall, but they do suggest that further study is needed to clarify the role that imagery ability plays in recall patterns over time. NOTES Author reviews research indicating that introduction of confident errors is a reliable finding in hypnosis-memory research, and notes that the role of imagery ability has not as yet been examined even though imagery is viewed as important to memory functioning. She also reviews the imagery- hypnotizability correlation literature. EXPERIMENT 1 involved 54 Ss screened by Harvard Scale and SHSS:C, divided into highs (7-12) and lows (1-6) by SHSS:C. Stimuli were 60 black and white line drawings. There were 3 baseline trials in the lab; Ss were then given 6 envelopes, each containing a 60 blank item recall sheet, and asked to complete one each day and return it via campus mail. (When unable to recall more items, they were asked to draw a line under the last item recalled and then use "educated guesses." ) After a week of repeated recalls, Ss in the hypnosis condition were told they would be able to 'see' the slides appear before them; in the task motivating condition Ss were informed about such things as context dependent recall, the importance of focused attention, and the importance of good recall for forensic investigations. Results were analyzed for increase in recall over the cumulative number of correct items recalled. Neither hypnotizability nor visual imagery ability influenced the cumulative baseline measures. High hypnotizable Ss produced a small but significantly greater increase in new, correct information during hypnosis than other Ss, but also made 3 times as many errors. Dividing Ss by imagery score produced similar results. That is, people with very good imaging ability reacted in the same manner as the highly hypnotizable Ss: in hypnosis they increased the number of items they were willing to call a memory but also increased the number of errors. EXPERIMENT 2 differed from Experiment 1 in that Ss were selected for hypnotic ability and imagery ability so that both would be adequately represented. (The high hypnotizable - low visual imagery group is a group that hasn't been represented much in earlier research, and the author notes that those Ss are rather difficult to locate. ) The task motivation condition was not used, based on results of Experiment 1. Ss who were low on hypnotizability and imagery ability served as the controls. Ss were told that they could be either in a hypnosis condition or a control condition but actually all Ss received a hypnotic induction. (This is like the London- Fuhrer, 1961, research design, which goes on the assumption that low hypnotizables do not enter into hypnosis even though they are exposed to an induction. Thus, hypnotic effects are not assumed for lows in the hypnotic condition and they become "controls.") Results of correct and error recall over the baseline week were analyzed. There was no difference in correct recall as a function of hypnotic ability or visual imagery ability. However, there was a main effect for visual imagery ability and for hypnotizability, and a significant interaction between trials, for cumulative errors over the baseline week. Effects of hypnosis were weaker than in Experiment 1 but followed same pattern. Those Ss most likely to have been hypnotized (highs) produced slightly more correct information than lows, and showed a greater increase in errors than lows. However high and low visualizers did not differ in response to hypnosis for correct information or for errors. Since there was an interaction between hypnotic ability and visual imagery ability for error rate during waking trials, the author tested for the interaction during hypnosis. Using a 2 x 2 ANOVA with new errors as the dependent measure; no interaction was found. Hypnotic ability was therefore responsible for determining Ss' responses in the hypnosis condition. Author attributes the effect to being hypnotized rather than to individual differences in hypnotizability or to context effects. DISCUSSION includes the author's delineation of differences between the two experiments that might explain differences in results. The increase in errors that was observed may be due to increased fluency in producing items under hypnosis (Sheehan & Tilden, 1984, 1986) or to a shift in reporting criterion (e.g., M. T. Orne, Soskis, Dinges, & E. C. Orne, 1984). "Both high and low hypnotizable Ss produced more memories in the task- motivating condition, and low hypnotizables are not totally immune from the effect in the hypnotic context. What the report-criterion hypothesis does not explain is the reason why the memory reports of high hypnotizable Ss are differentially affected by task demands (e.g., task-motivating instructions versus hypnosis in Experiment 1) nor why hypnotized Ss so often seem surprised by the ease with which information seems to be 'recalled' during hypnosis . An alternative hypothesis is that being hypnotized results in a shift to a more imagistic style of information processing. The enhanced vividness of items generated during the retrieval process may convince Ss that these items must have been part of the original stimulus presentation (Dywan, 1985). "Whatever the mechanisms might be, it is clear that the hypnotic effect is the result of an interaction between contextual factors and pre-existing characteristics of the individual. Moreover, these same mechanisms would likely be at work when hypnosis is actually used in the forensic situation, where the pressure to retrieve information could be more acute than what can be mustered in the experimental context. This should cause some concern because the differential increase in errors did not occur only for the relatively small proportion of Ss who were very high in hypnotic ability. The 'high' hypnotizable group in these experiments consisted of Ss of moderate to high levels of hypnotic ability and so the results can be generalized to at least one-half the population" (p. 323). "In summary, it would seem that any pressure for Ss to increase their recall-- whether it be repeated trials, task-motivating instructions, or hypnotic suggestion--results in higher levels of output and lower levels of accuracy. Repeated recall attempts lead to increases in recall and in errors. Some Ss (viz., those with high levels of hypnotic ability and low levels of imagery ability) are particularly prone to producing false-positive responses over the course of repeated recall attempts. When Ss are pressed to recall more information, they all try to do so by increasing their output and this increased output is usually accompanied by an increase in error. When hypnosis is introduced, however, those Ss who are hypnotizable show a differential increase in output. The amount of new correct information retrieved by hypnotized Ss is small and not a highly reliable phenomenon. The increase in errors that occurs in the recall of hypnotized individuals, however, is a substantial and highly reliable effect. Irrespective of how many errors were made as a function of repeated recall attempts, hypnosis can be counted on to increase errors over and above the increases in errors that occur when Ss are not hypnotized. Further work is needed to identify the mechanisms involved in the hypnotic distortion of recall. The role that imagery ability might have in the context of waking and hypnotic recall has not been resolved and this also presents an interesting problem for future study" (pp. 323-324).