Fine, C. G. (1988). Thoughts on the cognitive perceptual substrates of multiple personality disorder. Dissociation, 1, 5-10.

Although MPD [multiple personality disorder] patients typically present to treatment with affective symptoms, trauma-related information is originally encoded in the patients’ perceptions and mediated by their cognitions. This paper describes the dysfunctional assumptive and perceptual categories that form the building blocks of MPD patients’ distorted experiences. Perceptual shifting techniques and cognitive reframing will consequently be the recommended interventions prior to therapeutic abreactive work.

Gabel, Stewart (1988). The right hemisphere in imagery, hypnosis, rapid eye movement sleep, and dreaming: Empirical studies and tentative conclusions. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 176, 323-331.

Reviews studies that have addressed the issue of whether there is an increased activation or efficiency of right-hemispheric processes during imagery, hypnosis, REM sleep, and dreaming. Evidence strongly supports the notion of increased right- hemispheric activation in simple imaginal or visual states during usual consciousness. There are also studies supporting this view of REM sleep, dreaming, and hypnotic phenomena. It is concluded, however, that the lack of adequate studies, contradictory or negative findings, and moderating variables (e.g., task difficulty, cognitive style) make it difficult to draw definitive conclusions concerning right-hemispheric processes.

Gorassini, Donald R.; Hooper, Cynthia L.; Kitching, Kathleen J. (1988). The active participation of highly susceptible hypnotic subjects in generating their hypnotic experiences. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 7 (3), 215-226.

Hypnotized individuals have traditionally been considered to be detached from the control of their own suggested behavior. We tested this and the alternative notion that hypnotized subjects attempt to self-generate the experiences (i.e., mainly of involuntariness) as well as produce the behaviors thought to be prototypical of high hypnotic ability. In an experimental investigation, highly susceptible hypnotic subjects were found to engage in the kind of imaginative activity that would be expected of individuals who were attempting deliberately to generate their experiences of involuntariness; they engaged as actively in imagery-generation as did subjects who were specifically instructed to imagine during suggested responding, and they experienced as much involuntariness as subjects in whom suggested movements were produced by an external physical force. The implications of these findings for the neodissociation and social psychological theories of hypnotic responding are discussed.

Friedman, Howard; Taub, Harvey A.; Sturr, Joseph F.; Monty, Richard A. (1987). Visual information processing speed in hypnotized and nonhypnotized subjects. Journal of General Psychology, 114 (4), 363-372.

Using a backward-masking paradigm with a bias-free and ceiling-free psychophysical task, we tested hypnotized and control subjects for speed of visual information processing. Approximately half of each group received visual imagery suggestions in an attempt to influence attention. Imagery produced no significant differential effect. Although an absence of a hypnotizability-performance relationship was in keeping with findings of a previous study, those subjects in the present study who performed under hypnosis were, as a group, significantly superior to the other subjects in speed of information processing.

Geiselman, R. Edward; Machlovitz, Helen (1987). Hypnosis memory recall: Implications for forensic use. American Journal of Forensic Psychology, 1, 37-47.

Examines 38 major published experiments (1930-1985) on hypnosis memory recall. Concludes that differences in experimental methodology significantly predict the success versus failure of hypnosis aided recall and remarks that, “Even if forensic hypnosis aids in the solution of only a small percentage of cases, it is still a valuable tool from the perspective of law enforcement.” As Tarasoff has balanced the right of the victim to enjoy protection from violence with the patient-litigant’s right to confidentiality, so too does the increased acceptance of hypnotically induced testimony go toward redressing in part the uneven balance between the slender compensations afforded the innocent victim of violent crime and the multiple constitutional protections and indemnities enjoyed by criminal perpetrators in our judicial system.

Gfeller, Jeffrey D.; Lynn, Steven Jay; Pribble, W. Eric (1987). Enhancing hypnotic susceptibility: Interpersonal and rapport factors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52 (3), 586-595.

This research supported the hypothesis that hypnosis can be thought of as a set of potentially modifiable social-cognitive skills and attitudes. A low-interpersonal- training treatment devised by Gorassini and Spanos (1986) was compared with a treatment designed to modify not only cognitive factors but also to augment rapport with the trainer and diminish resistance to responding (high-interpersonal training). Fifty percent of the initially unhypnotizable subjects in the high-interpersonal condition tested as being highly susceptible to hypnosis (high susceptibles) at posttest on the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (Shor & Orne, 1962); 25% of the unhypnotizable subjects in the low-interpersonal condition responded comparably. Eighty-three percent of the medium- susceptibility (medium susceptibles) subjects tested as being highly susceptible at posttest in both conditions. Practice-alone control subjects’ performance was stable across testings. The study was the first to demonstrate that treatment gains generalize to a battery of novel, demanding, suggestions (generalization index) that have been found to differentiate highly susceptible subjects from unhypnotizable simulating subjects. The importance of rapport was evidenced by the finding that rapport ratings paralleled group differences in hypnotic responding and that rapport correlated substantially with susceptibility scores at posttest and with the generalization index. Whereas initial hypnotizability scores correlated significantly with retest susceptibility scores, initial hypnotizability failed to correlate significantly with the generalization index.

On p. 593 one could get the impression that S’s feelings of rapport may result from success in the hypnotic experience.

Jacobs, Sharon B.; Salzberg, Herman C. (1987). The effects of posthypnotic performance-enhancing instructions on cognitive-motor performance. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 35, 41-50.

The effects of performance-enhancing instructions on a cognitive-motor task (typing) was assessed using 3 groups: hypnosis and control groups with performance-enhancing instructions, and a control group without instructions. Unlike previous hypnosis research, the performance-enhancing instructions were given after substantial learning had occurred. Results indicated that posthypnotic performance- enhancing instructions, or performance-enhancing instructions alone, did not have a facilitative effect on performance. The results also suggested potential negative performance effects following hypnotic induction, depending on Ss’ initial typing ability. The implications of these findings are discussed.

The research investigated whether hypnotic suggestions could influence various factors thought to inhibit peak performance by increasing confidence, increasing motivation, and decreasing performance anxiety. 84 undergraduates of varying levels of typing ability were recruited, not mentioning in advance that the research involved hypnosis (in order to avoid selection bias). The experimental materials included a modified version of the Apple Typing Tutor program, which measures words per minute (WPM), key strokes missed (KM), and net words per minute (NWPM, which was obtained by subtracting 2 (KM) from WPM). These measures were obtained for the average of every 9 paragraphs.
Subjects received nine practice sessions and then were assigned to Experimental or Control group based on NWPM and sex. The hypnosis group received the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C, minus suggestions for drowsiness, sleepiness, or posthypnotic amnesia. Additional suggestions for performance enhancement were introduced. The control group watched a film. The average of every nine paragraphs was used.
The analyses of variance for dependent measures revealed no significant effects except for one interaction effect that actually was in the unexpected or wrong direction. That effect appeared to be spurious as it was due to extreme errors produced by one subject.
“Only speed of typing (WPM) changed from pre to posttreatment, and this effect interacted with ability level. Post hoc analyses (Scheffe) indicated that beginner typists became less proficient, intermediate typists did not change, and advanced typists became more proficient” (p. 46).
Hypnotizability on SHSS:C did not correlate with change on NWPM.
A 3 x 3 x 2 ANOVA indicated a significant change over time on KM. “Although no change occurred from pretreatment to posttreatment, there was a decrease in errors at follow-up. There was also a significant Group x Level x Time interaction for KM (F = 2.57, p < .05). This was accounted for by post hoc analyses showing that hypnotized beginner Ss changed over time, while control beginner Ss did not. Hypnotized Ss made significantly more errors following hypnosis than at pretreatment or follow-up" (p. 46). "There was a significant main effect for time on NWPM. ... The Ss' overall typing performance decreased from pretreatment to posttreatment, but increased at follow-up. Only the advanced Ss demonstrated significant improvement between pretreatment and follow-up. "There was also a significant interaction between time and ability level on WPM. ... beginner Ss typed significantly slower at posttreatment than at pretreatment or follow- up" (p. 47). In their Discussion, the authors note that the outcomes of their investigation are consonant with results obtained by other investigators studying hypnosis effects on skills (Arnold, 1971; Edmonston & Marks, 1967). In contrast, earlier studies on reaction time demonstrated that either motivational instructions and/or alert hypnotic inductions improved performance (e.g. Ham & Edmonston, 1971; Rader, 1972). They raise the question whether Ss' relaxation following hypnosis may have slowed response time and canceled the effects of motivating instructions. "When looking at all groups combined, Ss did not improve between pretreatment and posttreatment. At follow-up, however, Ss showed significant improvement on two out of the three measures. This suggests that learning had occurred, but that temporary inhibitory factors such as S restlessness and indifference observed by Es may have affected performance at posttreatment. The length of the task (90 minutes in one sitting) may have been responsible for the fatigue and boredom that seemed to set in. It is probable that the performance-enhancing instructions were not potent enough to counteract these effects. At follow-up (which took much less time) fatigue and boredom were apparently absent, hence typing improved. In addition, other factors may have affected performance (e.g., anxiety, lack of motivation). The data indicate that Ss of different ability levels responded differently over time. "The results of the present study cast doubt on the utility of hypnosis in improving performance on a cognitive-motor task. Although there are many anecdotal reports of hypnosis improving performance, research studies indicate that hypnosis, with motivational instructions, is effective only in improving reaction time and not more complex measures of performance. This apparent inconsistency may be explained by considering the level of motivation of participants. It is likely that a person requesting hypnosis to help improve performance is more motivated than experimental Ss" (p. 48). Kihlstrom, John F. (1987). The cognitive unconscious. Science, 237, 1445-1452. Contemporary research in cognitive psychology reveals the impact of nonconscious mental structures and processes on the individual's conscious experience, thought, and action. Research on perceptual-cognitive and motoric skills indicates that they are automatized through experience, and thus rendered unconscious. In addition, research on subliminal perception, implicit memory, and hypnosis indicates that events can affect mental functions even though they cannot be consciously perceived or remembered. These findings suggest a tripartite division of the cognitive unconscious into truly unconscious mental processes operating on knowledge structures that may themselves be preconscious or subconscious Subjects low and medium in hypnotic susceptibility were administered cognitive strategy and instructional set information and also practiced responding to test suggestions in order to enhance susceptibility. Those in one modification treatment received this information both from the experimenter and by observing a videotaped female model who responded successfully to suggestions and reported on the cognitive strategies she used to do so. Those in a second modification treatment received the information and practice but were not exposed to the model. Low and medium susceptibles in a third condition (practice alone) received a hypnotic induction procedure and practice suggestions but neither modification information nor modeling. No-treatment controls performed a filler task. All subjects were posttested on two different susceptibility scales. Information plus modeling produced significantly greater increments on all objective and subjective indices of susceptibility on both posttests than did practice- alone or control treatments. Susceptibility increments in the information without model treatment always fell between those of the model and practice-alone treatments. In the modeling treatment, over half of the initial low susceptibles and over two thirds of the initial medium susceptibles scored as high susceptibles on both posttests. These findings provide strong support for a social-cognitive skill formulation of hypnotic susceptibility. Laurence, Jean-Roch; Nadon, Robert (1986). Reports of hypnotic depth: Are they more than mere words?. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 34, 215-233. The empirical work relating hypnotizability, the hypnotic situation, and the reports of hypnotic depth is reviewed and evaluated. Asking Ss to assess their hypnotic depth is a complex task involving the interaction of experiential, cognitive, and contextual variables. Accordingly, future experimental work should take into account this multidimensionality; phenomenological, situational, cognitive, and motivational factors implicated in verbal reports should be explored in terms of their respective relationships with both hypnotizability and self-ratings of hypnotic depth. More sophistication in the experimental inquiries of hypnotic depth is required in order to further our understanding of the cognitive and affective structures underlying the hypnotic experience. NOTES In past years, hypnotic susceptibility and hypnotic depth were regarded as the same thing, and depth was inferred from responses to test suggestions on hypnotizability scales (e.g. Davis & Husband, 1931; LeCron, 1953). There has been little investigation of the relationship between Subjects' subjective experiences and reported "depth." Research suggests that "hypnotic depth reports are usually significantly higher for Ss who have undergone a hypnotic treatment than for those who have received task-motivation (Ham & Spanos, 1974; Spanos & Barber, 1968; Spanos, Stam, D'Eon, Pawlak, & Radtke-Bodorik, 1980); imagination-control; or relaxation-control instructions (Connors & Sheehan, 1978; Gilbert & Barber, 1972; Spanos & Barber, 1968; Spanos, Radtke-Bodorik, & Stam, 1980, Experiment 2)" (pp. 217-218). Others have found that changes in inward experiencing (e.g. feelings of unreality, a sense of disappearance of body parts) could not be attributed simply to sitting quietly with the eyes closed (Barber & Calverley, 1979). [A footnote on p. 218 indicates some studies didn't find this difference between a hypnosis group and a task-motivation control group.] When Ss are asked to estimate subjective depth after having experienced hypnotizability test items, they are likely to infer depth from whether or not they passed the items (and indeed, early scales promoted that assumption). Reports of subjective depth taken before rather than after the test items still correlate with overall hypnotizability score, though not to as high a degree (E. R. Hilgard & Tart, 1966; Tart, 1970). Although usually depth estimates correlate with hypnotizability in the .50 to .75 range (Perry & Laurence, 1980), the correlations were obtained in the hypnotic context, and Ss may use their own behaviors as one determinant of their estimated depth. From another line of study it is observed that Ss' subjective depth may be at variance with behavioral performance on hypnosis scales (Bowers, 1981). High hypnotizables judge their own depth from their performance on cognitive items (e.g. amnesia, hallucinations) while mediums and lows judge their own performance based on their responses to motor items and challenge items (Kihlstrom, 1981). In one experiment on amnesia, it appeared that Ss did not judge their own depth by how well they did on the amnesia task (Spanos, Stam, D'Eon, Pawlak, and Radtke-Bodorik, 1980). "M. T. Orne (1966, 1980) has emphasized that although it is necessary to operationalize S's responses to hypnotic suggestions, behavioral concomitants are only valid if they accurately reflect subjective alterations in an individual's experience" (p. 221). "The social-psychological approach (see Barber, 1969; Radtke & Spanos, 1981, 1982; Spanos, 1982; Wagstaff, 1981) rejects the notion of hypnotic depth as an indicator of a unique state. These authors argue that the reports of having been hypnotized reflect attributions made by Ss when confronted with a hypnotic context. ... Bem (1972) and Kelley (1972) have emphasized the idea that the more ambiguous an experience is, the more a person is likely to base his or her judgment primarily on available external information" (p. 222). In this case, defining the situation as involving "hypnosis" is one of the most potent predictors of Ss' reports of subjective experience (Spanos, Radtke- Bodorik, and Stam, 1980). Other variables that influence subjective depth estimates are the wording of the hypnotizability scale, expectancy, and information provided directly or indirectly. Oh the other hand, McCord (1961) found that his patients had widely disparate expectations for how they thought they would feel when hypnotized, so expectancy as a predictor would not necessarily determine specific experience. Direct experimental work on predicting response to hypnosis test items from expectancies (Council, Kirsch, Vickery, & Carlson, 1983; Kirsch, Council, & Vickery, 1984) suggests that expectations may predict test response when people are given a cognitive skill type of induction, but not when given a 'typical trance' type of induction. Also, another study from that laboratory (Council & Kirsch, 1983) established that only when expectancies are assessed after an induction (but before the test items) do they effectively predict hypnotic behaviors. The present authors express the view that these results are difficult to account for on the basis of social psychology theories that weight heavily the role of expectancy in generating hypnotic response. When Ss are permitted to use several different descriptors for their experience (being hypnotized, experiencing the effects, being absorbed, and responding to the suggestions), most Ss rated their own experiences as nonhypnotic (Radtke & Spanos, 1982). This was particularly true for medium hypnotizable Ss. Thus, unidimensional scales purporting to measure "depth" actually force Ss to interpret their multi-aspect experience in terms of the investigator's frame of reference, in this case "hypnotic depth." Nevertheless, the highly hypnotizable Ss were the least likely to be swayed from their self description of being "deep" when offered alternative ways of describing their experience. This is concordant with results reported earlier by Barber et al. (1968). "The attribution literature may provide clues as to why most highly hypnotizability Ss retain their high ratings of experienced depth when confronted with situational manipulations. Self-perception theory strictly applies when Ss' experiences are ambiguous, forcing them to fall back on contextual factors to make self-appraisals. The relationship between expectancies, absorption, effect of scale wording, and hypnotizability scores suggest, however, that high hypnotizable Ss do not rely heavily on contextual factors when assessing their levels of hypnotic depth. Most of these Ss maintain their reports of altered experiences, even when situational determinants are changed (Harackiewicz, 1979; Kihlstrom, 1984; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973). Thus, the hypnotizability by depth scale interaction found by Radtke and Spanos (1981) may suggest that experiences reported by high hypnotizable S are _not_ inherently ambiguous. Accordingly, self-perception theory may not apply to them" (pp.226-227). In their Discussion, the authors state, "Several studies have attempted to relate personal, real-life events to the experience of hypnosis. A number of studies (e.g., As, 1963; Field, 1965; Shor et al., 1962; Wilson & Barber, 1982) have shown that absorption, tolerance of unusual experiences, automaticity, compulsion, and trust are related to the capacity to be hypnotized. Other studies (Bowers & Brenneman, 1981; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974; Van Nuys, 1973) have shown that certain variants of attention are also related to hypnotizability. Extensive work by J. R. Hilgard (1970, 1979) has shown that patterns of personal development relate to hypnotizability in adult life. If appears then that hypnotizable individuals bring a host of experiences and abilities with them to the hypnotic context. It makes intuitive sense which is supported by the available empirical data, that a complex interaction among these experiences and abilities, the hypnotic context, and hypnotic responsiveness is implicated in Ss' assessments of their hypnotic depth. Studies are needed in which all of these potential determinants of hypnotic depth reports are taken into account. Only then will a clearer picture of their respective importance emerge" (p. 228). 1986 Lynn, Steven Jay; Rhue, Judith W. (1986). The fantasy-prone person: Hypnosis, imagination, and creativity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 404-408. Experimenters selected subjects who ranged along the continuum of fantasy proneness and assessed hypnotizability, absorption, vividness of mental imagery (QMI; Sheehan, 1967), response to waking suggestion (Creative Imagination Scale), creativity, and social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe). Fantasy-proneness was evaluated with the Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings (Wilson & Barber, 1981). Strong support was secured for J. R. Hilgard's construct of imaginative involvement and Wilson and Barber's contention that fantasy prone persons can be distinguished from others in terms of fantasy and related cognitive processes. Fantasizers were found to outscore subjects in both comparison groups on all of the measures of fantasy, imagination, and creativity, with social desirability used as a covariate. Low fantasy-prone subjects were no less creative or less responsive to hypnosis than their medium fantasy-prone counterparts. Madigan, R. J.; Bollenbach, A. K. (1986). The effects of induced mood on irrational thoughts and views of the world. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 10 (5), 547-562. Sixty college students participated in an experiment concerning the influence of somatic mood induction statements on measurements of irrationality as defined by Ellis. Subjects were randomly assigned to depression, elation, and neutral mood induction groups. There were significant differences between groups on mood and irrationality. Results are discussed in terms of the Ellis and Beck cognitive models of depression, the Isen cognitive loop model, and the relationship between irrationality and depression. This study added irrational thinking as defined by Ellis to the growing list of cognitions that have been manipulated by mood, and it supports a body of findings that demonstrate the reciprocal influence of cognition and mood in depression. The study also has implications for the Beck and Ellis hypothesis that cognitions are the dominant causes of depression. Markus, Hazel; Nurius, Paula (1986). Possible selves. American Psychologist, 41 (9), 954-969. The concept of possible selves is introduced to complement current conceptions of self-knowledge. Possible selves represent individuals' ideas of what they might become, what they would like to become, and what they are afraid of becoming, and thus provide a conceptual link between cognition and motivation. Possible selves are the cognitive components of hopes, fears, goals, and threats, and they give the specific self- relevant form, meaning, organization, and direction to these dynamics. Possible selves are important, first, because they function as incentives for future behavior (i.e., they are selves to be approached or avoided) and second, because they provide an evaluative and interpretive context for the current view of self. A discussion of the nature and function of possible selves is followed by an exploration of their role in addressing several persistent problems, including the stability and malleability of the self, the unity of the self, self- distortion, and the relationship between the self-concept and behavior 1985 Acosta, Enrique; Crawford, Helen J. (1985). Iconic memory and hypnotizability: Processing speed, skill or strategy differences?. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 33, 236-245. The purported relationship between hypnotizability and speed of information transfer from iconic to short-term memory was studied in a comparison of 12 low and 12 high hypnotizable Ss. As in Ingram, Saccuzzo, McNeill, and McDonald (1979), high hypnotizable Ss showed less interference from a visual mask in the report of a briefly presented item than did low hypnotizable Ss when the mask delays were predictable. When the delay of the mask could not be anticipated, however, differences between high and low hypnotizable Ss disappeared. It is suggested that differences in information processing related to hypnotizability may be due to differences in strategy, skills, or other factors, rather than underlying information processing speed. NOTES Hypnosis may require concentrative or selective attention, which usually is measured by self-report (e.g. Absorption) or by experimental measures. Several investigations indicate that high hypnotizable people are better than low hypnotizables at focusing on a task and ignoring extraneous information (Brown, Crawford, Smith, Leu, & Brock, 1983; Graham & Evans, 1977; Karlin, 1979; Miller, 1975; Wallace, 1979; Wallace, Garrett, & Anstadt, 1974; Wallace, Knight, & Garrett, 1976). One way to study attentional processes is through the effect of presenting a mask (e.g. $$$$$) shortly after presenting a stimulus (e.g. ABCDE). Ingram (1979) found that highs had faster information processing, but that might be due to anticipation bias associated with the method of limits employed. This study uses both an ascending method of limits, like Ingram, and a condition in which the mask delays were presented randomly within another block of trials. RESULTS "While the present study replicated Ingram et al.'s (1979) findings when an ascending method of limits was used (the same used by Ingram et al.) differences were not found in processing when ISIs were presented randomly. Thus, these results suggest that high and low hypnotizable Ss do not differ in their information transmission rates, but rather they may differ in other aspects which mediate performance in this task" (pp. 241- 242). "Several lines of evidence point towards strategy or skill differences between high and low hypnotizable Ss as a possible explanation for the present findings. First, it was found that when Ss could anticipate the mask delay (the ascending condition), high hypnotizable Ss outperformed the low hypnotizables. When this anticipation was controlled, as in the random condition, the two groups did not differ when the data were scored by serial position. When the data were scored by a free recall scheme, there was a nonsignificant trend for high hypnotizable Ss to score higher than did the low hypnotizables. This trend suggests that high hypnotizable Ss may be more willing to guess, and to guess more accurately than low hypnotizables, when they have partial information about a letter, and/or they may have greater skill in perceiving incomplete information. The latter suggestion finds indirect support from Crawford (1981) who reported that high hypnotizable Ss can process fragmented stimuli (Gestalt Closure tests, see Thurstone & Jeffrey, 1966), significantly better than can low hypnotizables. High imagers have been shown also to perform significantly better than low imagers in Gestalt Closure tasks (Ernest, 1980). At a speculative level, given that recent research has suggested that iconic memory may be a right hemisphere phenomenon (e.g. Cohen, 1976, but also see DiLollo, 1981), and high hypnotizable Ss outperform low hypnotizables on certain right hemisphere tasks (e.g. Crawford, 1981), it may be asked if the trends found with the free recall scoring scheme in the present study might be a reflection of differential right hemisphere processing. Such a hypothesis could be investigated in future research by comparing the performance of high and low hypnotizable Ss, as possibly moderated by visuo-spatial ability, for stimuli presented to the left versus the right visual hemifield (Ernest, 1983). "A second set of evidence in favor of strategy differences was found in Saccuzzo et al. (1982) which was published after the data for the present experiment were collected. In the Saccuzzo et al. (1982) paper, which was an extension and replication of Ingram et al. (1979), the same mask delay was used throughout a 10-trial block. The order of the blocks (i.e., the mask delays) was random. Thus, while S did not know which mask delay was used in the first trial of a block, the remaining 9 trials were the same and could be anticipated. During the first session, high hypnotizable Ss outperformed the low hypnotizables, but these differences disappeared on the second testing session. These results suggest that practice may have affected performance, rather than any underlying information processing speed differences" (pp. 242-243). Kerry Buhk; Rhue, Judith; Henry, Stephanie; Lynn, Steven Jay (1985, November). Fantasy proneness: Are their word associations richer?. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Asheville, NC. NOTES Experimenters screened 7000 students to get 6 samples of fantasy prone Ss (top 2.4% on Wilson and Barber's ICMI). They found less association between fantasy proneness and hypnotizability than did Wilson and Barber. They had fantasizers hallucinate a second cup next to a first styrofoam cup. Results were that 87% of High fantasizers, < 50% Medium fantasizers, < 25% Low fantasizers could do it, but they didn't describe seeing the hallucinated cup "as real as real" as Wilson and Barber said they did. Experimenters were concerned about context effects (expectancy) because the Creativity and Fantasy Proneness tests were run proximal in time, so they separated in time the administration of Fantasy Prone and Creativity tests and also looked at word associations. 23 High and 20 Low fantasy prone students selected by ICMI, which was administered to Subjects 18 mos before the creativity study. At the time of the creativity study, Ss were informed they were randomly picked. There were two 90' sessions, counterbalanced. Sessions: 1. Hallucinate image of R.A. and of styrofoam cup. Other tests were administered for intelligence and personality: Shipley-Hartford, MMPI, Crowne-Marlowe, etc. 2. Creativity tests (Revised Art Scale, Hilgard's Alternate Uses; story production which was scored on detail, imagery and fantasy and on imagery nouns.) Results of this study which was independent of context (i.e. the tests being correlated were administered independently of each other, separated by time). 1. Fantasizers were more creative than low fantasizers on both Creativity Scales. 2. Fantasizers show more divergent thinking on Hilgard Alternate Uses test, but relationship between fantasy proneness and creativity were not strong, r = .30. 3. Fantasizers and non fantasizers did not differ on the story measures! This diverges from Wilson and Barber's results. Fantasizers may have more vivid images, but storytelling does not capture that. 1985 Geiselman, R. Edward; Fisher, Ronald P.; MacKinnon, David P.; Holland, Heidi L. (1985). Eyewitness memory enhancement in the police interview: Cognitive retrieval mnemonics versus hypnosis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 70, 401-412. Compared effectiveness of three interview procedures for optimizing eyewitness memory performance: (a) the 'cognitive interview" based on memory-retrieval mnemonics from current memory theory, (b) the presently controversial hypnosis interview, and (c) the standard (control) police interview. Both the cognitive and hypnosis procedures elicited a significantly greater number of correct items of information from the Ss than did the standard interview. This result, which held even for the most critical facts from the films, was most pronounced for crime scenarios in which the density of events was high. The number of incorrect items of information generated did not differ across the three interview conditions. The observed memory enhancement was interpreted in terms of the memory-guidance techniques common to both the cognitive and hypnosis interviews. Neither differential questioning, time nor heightened subject or interviewer motivation could explain the results Kelly, Paul James (1985, November). The relationship between hypnotic ability and hypnotic experience (Dissertation). Dissertation Abstracts International, 46 (5), 1690-B. This study investigated the relationship between four types of hypnotic experience and hypnotic ability. The types of experiences were: dissociation, the experience of involuntariness, altered state effects, such as perceptual alterations and diminished reality sense rapport, transference-like involvement with the hypnotist, and relaxation. A 47-item scale, the Hypnotic Experience Questionnaire was developed to measure types of hypnotic experience. It was given to 484 subjects and then to a subsample of 272 students. When the scale was factored, four stable factors emerged: Nonconscious /Trance, Rapport, Relaxation, and Cognitive Rumination. A Group Profile Scale was also developed to measure students and when it was factor analyzed four factors were extracted: Hallucinations and Fantasies, Amnesias and Post-Hypnotic Compulsions, Motor Inhibition, and Direct Motor Suggestion. "Two statistical approaches were used to investigate the connections between hypnotic ability and hypnotic experience . Canonical analysis was used to identify the main relationships between hypnotic ability and hypnotic experience and factor analysis was used to explore the relationship among measures of hypnotizability and hypnotic experience. Two canonical variates from the canonical analysis were significant. The first variate was characterized by a dissociative-imaginative involvement process, and the second variate tapped a rapport-social compliance process. "When 25 variables, representing components of hypnotic ability and hypnotic experience, were factored, five factors were extracted. Imaginative Involvement, Ideomotor Response, Rapport, Cognitive Inhibition, and Relaxation. The results of the factor analysis suggested that dissociative experience and altered state experience are related to hypnotic ability but rapport and relaxation are not. "The results of study, taken as a whole, suggest that relaxation and rapport may happen in the hypnotic situation, but neither experience is related to the condition of being hypnotized in any essential way. The results suggest that the hypnotic condition is characterized by dissociative experience, altered state experience, and by successful performance on hypnotic ability tasks. From a theoretical point of view, the results strongly supported Hilgard's theory, partially supported Shor's theory, and failed to support Edmonston's theory" (p. 1690). 1984 Bakker, Dirk J. (1984). The brain as a dependent variable. Journal of Clinical Neuropsychology, 6, 1-16. The mainstream of neuropsychological research and practice has been devoted to the impact of the brain as an independent variable on behavior as a dependent variable. Evidence is currently available to make clear that the order of causation may be reversed: Behavioral changes can have a durable impact on the brain. The results of extensive research indicate that a large number of neuroanatomical, neurophysiological, neurochemical, and neuropsychological parameters of the animal brain can be modified through environmental manipulation, sensory experience, and systematic training. Some evidence is available to show that psychological stimulation has certain effects on the physiology of the human brain. For instance, hemisphere-specific stimulation through the presentation of words flashed in a visual hemifield appears to modify the electrophysiological activity of the contralateral hemisphere in dyslexic children and to affect their subsequent reading performance. Neuropsychology may profit from paying more attention to the ecology of the human brain. NOTES An 18th Century anatomist in Italy, Malacarne, demonstrated increased cerebellar folds in the brains of trained (vs. untrained) dogs and birds. His approach to neuroanatomy was not continued because psychology has been more concerned with innate traits of the individual, and because of philosophical rationalism (citing Walsh, 1981). Until very recently, scientists have viewed the brain as "structurally insensitive to environmental experience" (p. 3). Now we have evidence that animal brains are modifiable by experience, in gross morphology, fine (synapse) morphology, and neurochemicals. "Rich environments [for rats] ... produce heavier and thicker cerebral cortices and callosal connections (Walsh, 1981), larger cortex/subcortex weight ratios, larger cell bodies and nuclei (Walsh, 1981), and higher metabolic activity as suggested by increased RNA/DNA ratios (Rosenzweig, Bennett, & Diamond, 1972)" (p. 4). Enrichment leads to more extensive dendritic fields (occipital and temporal cortex, some hippocampal regions); this implies that each neuron has more synapses. Researchers have found large Purkinje-cell bodies and many dendrites in richly educated monkeys. "Some evidence is available to show that 'preventive' and 'therapeutic' environments positively affect behavioral performances of brain-lesioned animals. However, knowledge about the brain mechanisms which underly these effects is, as yet, lacking" (p. 6). Rats that were handled during the first 21 days of life exhibited different brain lateralization from rats that were not (Denenberg, cited by Marx, 1983). Those stimulated early stored memories mainly in the right hemisphere. The author also reviews evidence that human brains are psychologically modifiable. Children with astigmatism generate weakened cortical response to visual stimulation (Freeman & Thibos, 1973), because they experience difficulty in processing some visual-spatial patterns. People who have visual-field defects due to brain damage can improve in vision when forced to make eye movements toward lighted targets flashed in the blind areas (Zihl, 1981). Bakker theorizes that hemispheric control of reading shifts from right to left during the learning-to-read process of normal readers; at least some aspects of reading are successively mediated by the right hemisphere at age 6 and by the left hemisphere at age 8, according to electrophysiological data in a longitudinal study (Licht, Bakker, Kok, & Bouma, 1983). He thinks P-type dyslexia results from continuing to rely on right- hemispheric strategies, leading to slow reading with fragmentation errors and repetitions. L-type dyslexia results from prematurely adopting a left-hemispheric strategy, i.e. at the very beginning of the learning process, making child insensitive to the perceptual features of script with consequent substantive errors such as omissions and additions. Thus, P- type dyslexics presumably show functional overdevelopment of the right hemisphere and L-types of the left hemisphere. Treatment would involve specific stimulation of the hemisphere that they are ignoring. He presents data suggesting that "some electrophysiological parameters of the cerebral hemispheres can be modified in dyslexic children through hemisphere-specific stimulation and loading, and that these modifications may induce better reading" (p. 12). Kelly, Paul James (1984, December). The relationship between hypnotic ability and hypnotic experience. Newsletter of Division 30, Psychological Hypnosis, of the American Psychological Association, 5. This study investigated the relationship between four types of hypnotic experience and hypnotic ability. The types of experience were: dissociation, the experience of involuntariness; altered state effects, such as perceptual alterations and diminished reality sense; rapport, transference-like involvement with the hypnotist; and relaxation. A sample of 230 students was given the HGSHS:A, a group version of the SHSS:C, and the Hypnotic Experience Questionnaire (Kelly, 1984), a 47-item multidimensional scale of hypnotic experience. Items were taken from these tests to form 11 hypnotic ability variables (Positive Hallucinations, Dreams and Regressions, Post- Hypnotic Compulsions, Amnesia (HGSHS:A), Amnesia (SHSS:C), Arm Rigidity, Arm Immobilization, Other Motor Inhibitions, Head Falling, Moving Hands Together, and Hand Lowering). Fourteen hypnotic experience variables were also formed (Generalized Dissociative Effects, Dissociative Inhibition, Trance, Unawareness, Transference-like Involvement, Trust, Friendliness, Physical Relaxation, Mental Relaxation, Imagery Presence, Imagery Vividness, Imagery Detail, Self Consciousness, and Analytic Thoughts). The 25 variables were intercorrelated and factored with principal axis factoring. Five factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted and rotated to varimax criteria. These factors, which accounted for 54.4 percent of the variance, were called: Imaginative Involvement, Ideomotor Response, Rapport, Cognitive Inhibition, and Relaxation. Hypnotic ability variables loaded significantly on three of the factors (Imaginative Involvement, Ideomotor Response, and Cognitive Inhibition) and these three factors also tapped some aspect of altered state experience and/or dissociative experience. It was concluded therefore that dissociative experience and altered state experience are related to hypnotic ability. The remaining two factors, Rapport and Relaxation, showed significant loadings only for rapport variables and relaxation variables, respectively. Neither of these two factors were related to any of the traditional measures of hypnotic ability or to the experience of dissociative effects or altered state effects. The results of this study suggest that rapport and relaxation may happen in the hypnotic situation but neither experience is related to the condition of being hypnotized in any essential way. The hypnotic condition is characterized by dissociative experience, altered state experience, and by successful performance on hypnotic ability tasks. The results also raise questions about Edmonston's (1981) theory that relaxation is the essence of hypnotic responsiveness. The finding that the experience of relaxation is unrelated to hypnotic ability is more congruent with Hilgard's (1977) view that relaxation is a nonhypnotic process. NOTES This is an abstract of an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Waterloo, 1984. It won the American Psychological Association Division 30 award for Best Student Paper at the 1984 APA Convention. Lynn, Steven Jay; Nash, Michael R.; Rhue, Judith W., Frauman, David C.; Sweeney, Carol A. (1984). Nonvolition, expectancies, and hypnotic rapport. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 93 (3), 295-303. Prior to hypnosis, subjects were informed either that hypnotizable subjects can resist motoric suggestions or that such control does not characterize good hypnotic subjects. During hypnosis, susceptible and simulating subjects received countering suggestions involving inhibiting suggestion-related movements. Susceptible subjects' responses were found to be sensitive to prehypnotic normative information. There was a corresponding tendency for reports of involuntariness to be sensitive to the expectancy manipulation. Furthermore, subjects were able to feel deeply hypnotized and to rate themselves as good subjects yet concomitantly experience themselves as in control over their actions when normative information supported this attribution. Reports of suggestion-related sensations but not imaginative involvement were associated with movements in response to countersuggestion. Simulators were unable to fake susceptibles' reports of sensations and involuntariness. However, for all subjects, movements paralleled expectancies about appropriate response, supporting the hypothesis that involuntary experiences are sensitive to the broad expectational context and are mediated by active cognitive processes. Also, rapport with the hypnotist was found to be a factor. Susceptible subjects with highly positive rapport resolved hypnotic conflict, in part, by achieving a compromise between meeting normative expectations and complying with the hypnotist's counterdemand. 1983 Council, James R.; Kirsch, Irving; Vickery, Anne R.; Carlson, Dawn (1983). 'Trance' versus 'skill' hypnotic inductions: The effects of credibility, expectancy, and experimenter modeling. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 31 (3), 432-440. A hypnotic induction procedure based on social learning principles (skill induction) was compared with a traditional eye-fixation/relaxation trance induction, a highly credible placebo induction, and a no-induction base-rate control. The trance induction surpassed the skill induction only on the Field Inventory, a measure of hypnotic depth that contains items corresponding to suggestions contained in the trance induction. Experimenter modeling was not found to enhance the effectiveness of the skill induction. Skill and trance inductions elicited slightly higher behavioral scores on the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale: Form C than did the placebo induction. However, this difference was not obtained on other measures of hypnotic responsibility and depth. Significant correlations were found between expectancy, absorption, and responsiveness on all dependent measures. Multiple regression analyses indicated that the relationship between absorption and responsivity was mediated by expectancy. The results are interpreted as supporting the hypotheses that hypnotic responses are elicited by the expectancy for their occurrence and that induction procedures are a means of increasing subjects' expectancies for hypnotic responses. NOTES Trance induction resulted in a higher score on subjective experiences (cognitive & perceptual distortions) but not higher suggestibility scores than cognitive- behavioral skill induction. 2) Trance and cognitive-behavioral inductions got slightly higher scores in suggestibility than placebo biofeedback induction. 3) All inductions did better than a "no induction" control group on subjective and behavioral indices of hypnosis. One of the goals of this research was to examine the contribution of experimenter modeling to the behavioral skill induction that "trains the subject in hypnosis skills and requires the subject's conscious cooperation in learning cognitive strategies that will enhance hypnotic responsivity" (p. 432). Another goal was to assess the contribution of "a subject's expectancies for the occurrence of behaviors perceived as being involuntary" (p. 433). A third goal was to determine whether congruence between a subject's beliefs about hypnosis and the rationale for a particular induction would increase expectancy. Two different skill inductions were employed (one with, one without a model). Subjects were asked to predict their performance, based on a description of the induction that they would receive. The contributions of credibility and expectancy were assessed using a highly credible placebo (pseudo biofeedback of EEG theta rhythm). The investigation used only subjects who had never experienced hypnosis. Independent variables included Rotter's (1966) Internal-External Locus of Control Scale, Rotter's (1967) Interpersonal Trust Scale, and Tellegen's Absorption Scale (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). Mediating variables included a measure of induction credibility based on Borkovec and Nau (1972), and a 20-item inventory measuring expectancies for hypnotic performance. Dependent variables included 20 standard hypnotic suggestions taken from the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C; the Creative Imagination Scale; ratings of the 'realness' or experienced intensity of each suggestion; and the Field Inventory of Hypnotic Depth (Field, 1965). The authors conclusion reads as follows: "The results of this study may be summarized as follows: (a) Traditional trance hypnotic inductions and cognitive- behavioral skill inductions were shown to be equally effective in eliciting experiential and behavioral responses to hypnotic suggestions, although trance subjects reported a somewhat greater alteration in conscious experience. (b) Experimenter modeling was not found to be an effective component of the skill induction package. (c) Subjects' expectancies for hypnotic responses, reported prior to hypnotic induction, bore a very strong relationship to hypnotic responsivity. (d) A highly credible placebo induction resulted in levels of expectancy and hypnotic responsivity generally comparable to those produced by trance and skill hypnotic inductions. (e) Absorption was significantly correlated with expectancy, but was not found to be significantly related to responsiveness once variance due to expectancy was taken into account. Thus the relationship between absorption and hypnotic responsiveness appears to be mediated by expectancies. "In sum, these results suggest that various hypnotic inductions elicit expectancies for responding to hypnotic suggestions and that these expectancies are sufficient to elicit hypnotic responses. Further studies are needed to determine the nature of the relationship between absorption and hypnotic response expectancies" (p. 439). Dillon, F. Richard; Spanos, Nicholas P. (1983). Proactive interference and the functional ablation hypothesis: More disconfirmatory data. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 31, 47-56. According to the functional ablation hypothesis, memories for which amnesia has been hypnotically suggested do not interact with other information in memory. This hypothesis was tested in 2 interrelated experiments. In Experiment 1, Ss high and low in hypnotic susceptibility were administered a hypnotic induction procedure and tested on a Brown-Peterson (e.g., Wickens & Gittis, 1974) memory task designed to induce proactive interference (PI). Ss were exposed to 10 blocks of successive 3-word lists. Within each block, all words were strongly related, and, therefore, lists presented early in a block interfered with the retention of lists presented later (PI "buildup"). Following the "buildup" of PI, Ss were administered either a cue to be amnesic for the previous words of a block or a cue to relax. Contrary to the functional ablation hypothesis, the amnesia suggestion did not produce a "release" from PI in high susceptible hypnotic Ss. In other words, the amnesia suggestion did not prevent previously learned material from interfering with newly presented material. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the amnesia cues employed in the Brown-Peterson task produced a reversible recall deficit even though they failed to produce PI "release." These findings are consistent with the results of studies of the functional ablation hypothesis using the retroactive interference paradigms. 1982 Crawford, Helen J. (1982). Cognitive processing during hypnosis; much unfinished business. Research Communications in Psychology, Psychiatry and Behavior, 7, 169-179. Studies of cognitive processing during hypnosis per se are reviewed suggesting that hypnotically responsive individuals not only experience subjective changes during hypnosis that are seen as often being discontinuous from their normal consciousness but also may exhibit measurable cognitive changes. Evidence (ego functioning changes, enhanced creativity, enhanced imagery processing, etc.) is presented to support the hypothesis that hypnosis may involve a shift in cognitive functioning away from a verbal, detail-oriented strategy towards a more imaginal, non-analytic, holistic- oriented strategy. Limitations of present research and potentially valuable research areas are discussed. NOTES The author reviews evidence for cognitive changes during hypnosis--evident especially in high hypnotizables but also to some degree in moderate hypnotizables. She concludes that there may be changes in ego functioning, imagery functioning, creativity, and strategy preferences and that high hypnotizables are more flexible in cognitive processing . "The question remains whether or not there are accompanying objectively measurable cognitive changes during hypnosis" (p. 170). "In normal waking consciousness, the hypnotically responsive individual is typically found to be more involved in nonhypnotic imaginative activities and experiences (Hilgard, 1979; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), more able to image things (for review, see Sheehan, 1979) and daydream vividly and positively (Crawford, 1982), more able to perceive gestalt closure figures (Crawford, 1981), more able to divert attentional process (e.g., Karlin, 1979), and more creative on certain tasks (e.g., P. Bowers, 1979). Experiential reports indicate that it is these very cognitive processes, amongst others, which are perceived to be enhanced or changed during the hypnotic state" (p. 170). "Levin and Harrison (1976) found that hypnosis ego changes occurred most in those individuals who also demonstrated good capacity for adaptive regression in the waking state" (p. 171). "Dave (1979) compared hypnotically induced dreams with rational-cognitive treatment as to their effects on creative problem solving of the problems or projects. 'Conditional support' was given to the significantly stronger effect form the hypnotically induced dreams" (p. 172). There are many investigations of the effect of hypnosis on imagery, with a number of methodological problems. "Self-reports can be criticized on the grounds that they are easily subject to demand characteristics, subject expectations, and social desirability influences. Coe et al. (1980) found order of condition influenced their findings, while Crawford (1979) found that imagery rating scales suffered from a low ceiling effect among high imagers" (pp. 172-173). "Surprisingly, while the field of cognitive psychology has devoted extensive attention to the study of the enhancing effects of imagery upon memory, few of their paradigms have been applied to the study of hypnotic processing of information. Germaine to the field of hypnosis are three operational approaches to the investigation of imagery: (a) the manipulation of the availability of imagery as a coding device, such as varying the degree to which stimuli may evoke imagery, (b) the manipulation of the processing strategy in cognitive performance, such as asking subjects to use imagery in the mediation of stimuli information, and (c) the comparing of information processing strategies and performance in subjects who are low and high in imagery ability (Paivio, 1971)" (p. 173). "Several studies (Nomura, Crawford, & Slater, 1981; Walker, Garrett, & Wallace, 1976; Wallace, 1978) found that a very few high hypnotizables can successfully produce eidetic imagery, using nonfakable stereograms, during hypnosis even though they cannot during waking. Spanos, Ansari, & Stam (1979) were unable to replicate these findings. It was only self-reported childhood eidetikers who exhibited eidetic imagery during hypnosis, and then only a few. This research suggestions that hypnosis permits certain individuals to access the "lost" ability to image eidetically, possibly through a shift in cognitive strategies" (p. 174). "An underlying emphasis of this paper is the need for hypnotic investigators to integrate findings form cognitive psychology into their research, as well as apply the many new approaches to understanding brain functioning which are now being developed, inn their search for a better understanding of what occurs during hypnosis" (p. 176). 1980 Ericsson, K. Anders; Simon, Herbert A. (1980). Verbal reports as data. Psychological Review, 87 (3), 215-251. NOTES Proposes that verbal reports are data and that accounting for them, as well as for other kinds of data, requires explication of the mechanisms by which the reports are generated, and the ways in which they are sensitive to experimental factors (instructions, tasks, etc.). Within the theoretical framework of human information processing, different types of processes underlying verbalization are discussed, and a model is presented of how ss, in response to an instruction to think aloud, verbalize information that they are attending to in short-term memory (STM). Verbalizing information is shown to affect cognitive processes only if the instructions require verbalization of information that would not otherwise be attended to. From an analysis of what would be in STM at the time of report, the model predicts what could be reliably reported. The inaccurate reports found by other research are shown to result from requesting information that was never directly heeded, thus forcing Ss to infer rather than remember their mental processes. (112 ref) 1979 Karlin, Robert A. (1979). Hypnotizability and attention. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 88 (1), 92-95. An attentional explanation of cognitive hypnotic phenomena (e.g., hallucinations and amnesia) based on the ability to shift the pertinence of stored information was developed. It was hypothesized that individuals who were successful at a difficult attentional task would also succeed on cognitive hypnotic items. The Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A was used to assess hypnotizability. To measure pertinence-shift ability, two tape recordings made by the same person were played through a single sound source. One tape was designated the target tape. Amount remembered and perceived task ease were summed to form an additive score of task success. Subjects above the median on the task were assigned to the good pertinence shift group (GP); those below the median were assigned to the poor pertinence shift group (PP). As predicted, GP subjects passed significantly more cognitive hypnotic items than did PP subjects (p<.05). When task difficulty and compliance were controlled for, the results remained significant (p<.05). These results were replicated in a second study. NOTES A brief version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Asheville, North Carolina, October, 1978 1978 Kihlstrom, John F. (1978). Context and cognition in posthypnotic amnesia. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 26, 246-267 Coe's (1978) contextualist analysis of posthypnotic amnesia appears to be predicated no the mistaken assumption that the amnesic S actually remembers the critical material. This position leads Coe to place inappropriate emphasis on the social context in which amnesia taes place and to focus on the social-psychological processes that might lead Ss to say that they do not remember something, be believed by others, and even believe themselves. An alternative view is outlined which affirms the surface similarities between posthypnotic amnesia and other failures of memory. From this vantage point, the investigator seeks to understand the cognitive processes that produce subjectively compelling disruptions of memory retrieval, whether found in association with hypnosis or in other circumstances. 1976 Coe, William C.; Basden, B.; Basden, D.; Graham, C. (1976). Posthypnotic amnesia: Suggestions of an active process in dissociative phenomena. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 85, 455-458. A retroactive inhibition design was used to examine the process of posthypnotic amnesia. The results supported the notion that "forgotten" material is as available to amnesic subjects at some level as it is to nonamnesic subjects. Further, so- called forgetting appears to be the result of an active process, that is, something the subject does. Implications for understanding dissociative phenomena in general are discussed. Krippner, Stanley; Bindler, P. R. (1974). Hypnosis and attention: A review. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 16 (3), 166-177. Two seemingly contradictory formulations in hypnosis literature are reviewed: that hypnotic induction can produce a condition of diffuse attention, and that hypnotic induction can produce a condition of selective attention. It is concluded that either condition can be produced, depending on the set, level of arousal, individual differences, type of task to be performed, type of instructions, etc. It is also suggested that diffuse attention and selective attention be kept conceptually distinct since the terms may reflect a series of related processes rather than a dichotomy. (Authors' abstract.) Kihlstrom, J. F.; Edmonston, W. E., Jr. (1971). Alterations in consciousness in neutral hypnosis: Distortions in semantic space. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 13, 243-248. 30 highly hypnotizable Ss were equally divided into three groups, equated for age, sex and hypnotic susceptibility. A semantic differential scale was administered to each S in waking, individual sessions. An oral form of the same scale was administered during: (a) hypnosis (E), (b) waking -- post hypnosis (C1), and (c) waking -- no hypnosis (C2). All groups showed significant change between administrations of the scale; E showed more change than C1, and the latter more than C2. Ratings of "My Self" changed toward the negative pole in the evaluative factor. Results wre interpreted as indicating a distortion in semantic space and an alteration in ego-state occurring spontaneously with hypnosis.