Tinnin, L. (1990). Mental unity, altered states of consciousness, and dissociation. Dissociation, 3, 154-159.
This model for understanding altered states of consciousness and dissociation is based on the hypothesis that normal consciousness depends on an illusion of mental unity generated by dynamic brain processes. When these processes are altered and the illusion of unity lost, the individual experiences an altered state in which normal consciousness is latent or “dissociated.” Mental organizations formed during an altered state will also become dissociated when the altered state is terminated and mental unity returns. In some cases, recurrent altered states may lead to multiple dissociated mental systems or states. Therapeutic resolution of dissociation requires that the individual gain access to the memory, transcend the obligatory illusion of unity, and consciously avow the ego state formed during the traumatic altered state of consciousness.
1989
Kunzendorf, Robert G. (1989-90). Posthypnotic amnesia: Dissociation of self-concept or self-consciousness?. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 9, 321-334.
ABSTRACT: Two studies of posthypnotic amnesia tested predictions derived from the ‘source’ monitoring theory of self-consciousness. Experiment 1 tested the prediction that posthypnotic source amnesia is irreversible, because hypnosis attenuates self- consciousness of whether one’s sensations have an imaginal source or a perceptual source. In this initial study, recall amnesia was reversed by posthypnotic cueing with a prearranged signal, but source amnesia was not reversed by such cueing. Experiment 2 examined whether the cued reversal of recall amnesia is attributable, in part, to the hypnotic attenuation of self-conscious ‘source monitoring’ and, in part, to the reversal of recall criteria: from a criterion rejecting ‘seemingly imaginary’ or ‘sourceless’ memories, to a criterion accepting ‘sourceless but familiar’ memories. In this latter study, posthypnotic recall amnesia was breached when subjects were instructed to trust their seemingly imaginary memories, but not when they were instructed to try harder to remember [emphasis removed from quoted text].
Pekala, Ronald J.; Bieber, Stephen L. (1989-90). Operationalizing pattern approaches to consciousness: An analysis of phenomenological patterns of consciousness among individuals of differing susceptibility. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 9 (4), 303-320.
Pattern differences in subjective experience, as assessed by a self-report inventory, the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI), were compared across low, low-medium, high-medium, and high hypnotically susceptible individuals during hypnosis and eyes-closed. A hierarchical factor analytic approach was utilized that allowed for the determination of pattern differences among PCI dimensions as a function of hypnotic susceptibility. The factor analyses found that the four suspectibility (sic) groups were ‘pattern equivalent’ during eyes-closed, partially pattern dissimilar during hypnosis, and partially pattern dissimilar when comparing hypnosis against eyes-closed. The nature of these results support previous analyses (1) which compared pattern structure differences as a function of correlational matrices. The results suggest the complementarity of Bieber’s (2) and Pekala’s (3) approaches for assessing pattern differences in consciousness and are congruent with the theorizing of Tart (4), Izard (5), and the PDP researchers on the importance of pattern structure changes in understanding states of consciousness.
NOTES
This paper is based on the presentation at SCEH in Ashville, 1988.
Pekala, Ronald J.; Kumar, V. K. (1989). Phenomenological patterns of consciousness during hypnosis: Relevance to cognition and individual differences. Australian Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 17 (1), 1-20.
Relationships among phenomenological subsystems of consciousness associated with a baseline condition and an hypnotic induction condition were compared across individuals of differing hypnotic susceptibility. Phenomenological experience on 12 subsystems of consciousness was quantified by means of the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) and the relationships between dimensions were statistically assessed. The results replicated previous findings and suggested that hypnosis has differential effects upon the reported organization of phenomenological structures of consciousness across subjects of differing susceptibility. The data from the previous and present studies were pooled and the combined data were reanalyzed. The results provided further support for the differential pattern structure across low and high susceptibles during hypnosis. Furthermore, differences in pattern structure were augmented when comparing very low versus very high susceptible individuals.
NOTES
This paper is based on a paper presented to Division 30, Psychological Hypnosis, at annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Aug 1987.
1989
Van der Hart, O.; Friedman, B. (1989). A reader’s guide to Pierre Janet on dissociation: A neglected intellectual heritage. Dissociation, 2 (1), 3-16.
A century ago there was a peak of interest in dissociation and dissociative disorders. Janet (1859-1947) was the most important scientific and clinical investigator of this period, whose work is reviewed in this article. The evolution of dissociation theory and its major principles are traced throughout his writings. His introduction of the term ‘subconscious’ and his concept of the existence of consciousness outside of personal awareness are explained. The validity and reliability of dissociation as the underlying phenomenon in a wide range of disorders is presented. It is proposed that Janet’s theory and methodology of psychological analysis and dynamic psychotherapy are cogent and relevant for today.
1986
Kissin, Benjamin (1986). Conscious and unconscious programs in the brain. (1 ). New York: Plenum Press.
NOTES
Hypnosis is discussed in terms of inhibition/excitation mechanisms in the central nervous system, with both feedback and feedforward controls and lateralizing controls. The author employs a concept of engrams (neural representations of an idea, represented throughout the neocortex) to discuss sensation and perception as well as conscious and unconscious processes. Sensory information is processed serially with encoding of information mostly on the conscious level (but sometimes, less efficiently, on the unconscious level); and it also is processed in parallel. Parallel processing operates almost entirely at the unconscious level and is basic to perception.
Associative phenomena are explained in terms of overlapping engrams, so that two ‘related hypercomplex engrams’ could be assumed to have at least one simple engram in common. With Premack, he describes three types of engrams: veridical (primary sensory data perceived), abstract (formalized representations of concepts like line drawings of dog or house; Premack’s iconic representations), and symbolic (more complex entities that encompass an entire class of objects, actions, or ideas and may have artificial symbols such as words).
With Neiser he suggests that thinking (verbal and nonverbal) involves logical sequential processing of cognitive engrams of external (environmental), internal (visceral),and intracerebral (ideational) origin. Evoked response investigations shed light on the nature of such engrams, their distribution in brain tissue. John, Bartlett, Slumokochi, & Kleiman (1973) found that an error in choice discrimination learning (cats learning colors) is accompanied by the cortical evoked potential of the stimulus associated with that (erroneous) behavior, not the evoked potential of the true stimulus. In other words, ERPs represented the idea, not the actual visual stimulus provided to the cat.
Emotional/motivational influences are part of every cognition (R. S. Lazarus’s position). Interaction of motivational-emotional and cognitive engrams seems to occur primarily in the inferior temporal lobe and the entorhinal cortex. The interaction involves the upper rhinencephalon, the amygdaloid-hippocampal complex, the septal region, the cingulate gyrus, and the inferior and medial aspects of temporal lobe of the cortex. He also explains classical and operant conditioning (on pp. 75-76) in terms of the association of engrams.
The author’s position is that consciousness is the subjective equivalent of brain activity in the ‘alerting’ and ‘awareness’ systems. Awareness of the environment (‘general, vague’) appears to involve the limbic area (thalamus and basal ganglia), while more specific awareness of the self entails a system stretching from the basal ganglia through the parietal lobe (posterior aspect).
Normal alert consciousness involves the noradrenergic reticular activating system, as well as associated excitation of the general awareness system in the involved thalamic- basal gangliar nuclei and the self-awareness system in the posterior inferior parietal lobe system. Altered states of consciousness characterized by a relaxed hazy sense of the world involves thalamic activation of the self-awareness system. Dreaming involves activation from cholinergic cells in the pons. “Impaired general awareness occurs with lesions of the thalamic-basal gangliar centers while impaired self-awareness occurs with lesions in the posterior inferior parietal lobes. Finally, in certain physiological states such as sleep, hypnosis, and so on, the entire awareness system–the thalamic-basal gangliar and posterior inferior parietal nuclei–may be activated by different activation systems, such as the cholinergic in the pons or the dopaminergic in the thalamus, to produce different states of consciousness” (p. 82).
Consciousness is described as having seven dimensions: alertness, attention, arousal (heart rate, GSR), activation (EEG, evoked potential), affect, and the two awarenesses. The seven are related, so that changes in any one usually are correlated with changes in others (though dissociation among the seven also can be demonstrated). Motivational-emotional arousal produces electrophysiological activation of the brain, which is translated epiphenomenally into alertness and awareness; awareness is focused through attention onto the cognitively and motivationally significant events in the internal and external environments to determine the final sequence of drive-oriented behavioral responses.
The EEG is useful for diagnosing different states of consciousness: beta and gamma waves alertness, stemming from locus coeruleus and
reticular activating system delta (2-4/sec) waves coma alpha synchronized relaxing influences stemming from
thalamus; low level of awareness as in twilight sleep
or hypnagogic states theta, delta inactivity due to less stimulus from locus coeruleus
reticular activating system influences; associated
with increased inhibitory thalamic and septal-
hippocampal impulses radiating upward to the
cortex.
In some altered states of consciousness there is theta-wave activity, indicating influences from the inhibitory septal-hippocampal circuit.
The reticular activating system (RAS) and thalamus interact in complex ways. The RAS is essential to maintain consciousness, but if destroyed stepwise (in animal research) a low-grade type of consciousness can be maintained by thalamus and basal ganglia. The thalamus has two kinds of influence: it inhibits the cortex, as in sleep; and stimulates the cortex in the form of activating alpha waves. “The median thalamus is also related in a feedforward-feedback circuit with the inhibitory septal-hippocampal complex which generates theta-wave activity, thus accounting for the close association between alpha and theta wave activity in sleep and in other altered states of consciousness” (p. 86).
Thus there are two different activating systems originating in the lower brain stem: the norepinephrine locus coeruleus system that is associated with normal behavior, and the cholinergic FTG neurone system of REM sleep. The relationship of the latter to consciousness, awareness, self awareness, etc. is unknown, since the only time that it is readily observed is during REM sleep. The author reports that altered states of consciousness (e.g. hypnosis, fugue, alpha state) resemble Stage 1 sleep, rather than REM sleep, physiologically, with the central locus of activation in the medial thalamus rather than the RAS and locus coeruleus.
“It appears then that consciousness may be driven by one or another of three different activation centers: the norepinephrine RAS (emanating from the locus coeruleus), the cholinergic FTG cell system in the pons, and the dopaminergic alpha rhythm system radiating upward from the thalamus (Fig. 6-2). Brain activation by each of these centers is associated with a different state of awareness” (p. 91). The relative contribution from each center determines qualitative aspects of awareness.
The author refers to Mesulam and Geschwind (1978) who traced the self- awareness system from amygdala/hippocampus/midbrain to the inferior parietal lobe where they converge with the body’s proprioceptive neural tracts. What results is “a sense of self that was not necessarily present in the sense of general awareness stemming from the median thalamic-basal gangliar complex” (p. 97).
The thalamic-basal gangliar complex is both a center for emotional reception and a relay station for somatosensory events. Both somatic sensory reception and somatosensory elements of emotion are also represented in the parietal lobe. “Affective and somatosensory stimuli, which are constant and persistent even though we are unaware of them most of the time, produce the sense of one’s body which is the most basic element in the ‘sense of self.’… It is most probable that a major component of the sense of self is produced by the constant barrage of affective and somatosensory stimuli converging from all parts of the body; the majority of these stimuli may not reach consciousness most of the time but they must register a sense of feeling in the thalamus and parietal cortex even though the individual may be unconscious of it” (p. 100).
The author presumes that most of the incoming stimuli that define self are unconscious. “Whether sense-of-self stimuli are unconscious because of constant habituation … or whether they are unconscious because they are transmitted predominantly to the right hemisphere …, it appears that the major components of the self- concept are unconscious rather than conscious” (p. 102).
“Even the acutely self-aware component of the self-concept, by definition conscious, varies markedly in different altered states of consciousness. The conscious awareness of oneself in the alert condition is different from (1) that in the twilight state, (2) that in dreams, (3) that in hypnosis, (4) that under the influence of alcohol, (5) that under the influence of other sedatives, (6) that under the influence of stimulants, and (7) that under the influence of hallucinogens. In that sense the acute sense of self is a function of the momentary chemical and physiological state of the brain” (p. 102).
” … the decision-making apparatus of the brain is lodged largely in a consortium of neocortical centers including the prefrontal lobes (integration), the posterior inferior lobes (motivation and emotion), the anterior and posterior associational areas (cognition), the posterior inferior parietal lobes (self-awareness), the left-hemispheric language centers (language), and the precentral frontal lobe motor area (motor). Within the context of this integrated cortical complex, self-awareness functions are somewhat stronger on the right hemisphere while language and decisional activities are somewhat stronger on the left” (pp. 102-103).
The Chapter titled “Attention as directed consciousness” is relevant for investigations of hypnosis but is not included in these notes.
1985
Stumpfe, Von Klaus-Dietrich (1985). Psychosomatic reactions of near-death experiences. A state of affective dissociation. Zeitschrift fur Psychosomatische Medizin, 31, 215-225.
The feelings of persons who had encountered life-threatening danger were analyzed and compared with the feelings of persons, who are in hypnoses or trained in autogenic training. The symptoms are widely alike. The result of the comparison is, that there exists a state of affective dissociation, which can be caused by conscious or unconscious actions.
1984
Malott, James M. (1984). Active-alert hypnosis: Replication and extension of previous research. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 93 (2), 246-249.
NOTES
Compared levels of hypnotic responsiveness resulting from 4 induction procedures: (a) verbal active-alert induction alone, (b) bicycle pedaling alone, (c) verbal active-alert induction plus bicycle pedaling and (d) traditional relaxation induction. Ss were 48 undergraduates. Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale scores indicated that the verbal induction plus pedaling procedure was significantly more effective than either the verbal- or pedaling-alone procedures. There were no significant differences in scores produced by the verbal plus pedaling and traditional relaxation inductions. Findings are consistent with A. M. Ludwig”s (1966) proposal that there exists a range of stimulation necessary for the maintenance of normal waking consciousness and that levels of stimulation above or below that range are conducive to the production of altered states of consciousness.
This study adds experimental controls to the research design used by Banyai for active alert induction.
1983
Baars, B. J. (1983). Conscious contents provide the nervous system with coherent, global information. In Davidson, Richard J.; Schwartz, Gary E.; Shapiro, David (Ed.), Consciousness and self regulation (3, ). New York: Plenum Press.
NOTES
We are conscious of some content when there exists an internal representation that is global, stable, and informative.
Author views nervous system as a distributed information. processing system, in which highly complex & efficient processing is performed by specialized processors in a relatively independent way. These processors may be ‘data driven’–i.e. they may decide by their own criteria what is worth processing…” p. 41 [See also Gazzaniga’s (1985 Psychology Today article) idea that mind/brain consists of modules.]
p.44 gives references substantiating the above, e.g. Geschwind, Hilgard, La Berge, Shiffrin & Schneider.
p. 45 We are in habit of thinking hierarchically about nervous system rather than distributively.
p. 45 “Consciousness seems to be closely associated with a mechanism that permits interaction between specialized, dedicated processors” The ‘global’ data base’ is like a TV station sending out information that can be processed or not by the viewer. It is not an executive, and in fact can sometimes be controlled by the processors. ‘Consciousness …[is] a certain operating mode of this medium, & consciousness can likewise be used by processors acting as executives, without itself being an executive “(p.49).
The global data base is a lengua franca, so that one sense modality can communicate with others. p. 51. [Synesthesia reported by high hypnotizables implicates this system–either the communicating tracks are greased between color and smell, or the name of the destination, in computer language, is lost, or equivalent.]
p. 52 Repression and the dynamic unconscious. explained in terms of controlled access to the global data base, with certain specialized processors given high priority.
Context, taken by itself, is unconscious; & input, taken by itself & in the absence of the appropriate context, is also unconscious. Only when both of these conditions exist- -when there is input that can be organized within a current context–are we conscious of some percept.
Contextual factors become conscious only when they are challenged.
Erickson, Milton H. (1980). Hypnotic investigation of psychodynamic processes. (3 ). New York: Irvington Publishers, Inc..
NOTES 1:
NOTES: This third volume of four has 2 sections (7 subsections) with chapters as follows. I. General and Historical Surveys of Hypnotism
1. A brief survey of hypnotism
2. Hypnosis: A general review
3. Hypnotism
4. The basis of hypnosis: Panel discussion on hypnosis II. Psychodynamic Processes: Hypnotic Approaches to the Unconscious Section 1: Amnesia
5. The investigation of a specific amnesia
6. Development of apparent unconsciousness during hypnotic reliving of a traumatic experience
7. Clinical and experimental observations on hypnotic amnesia: Introduciton to an unpublished paper
8. The problem of amnesia in waking and hypnotic states
9. Varieties of hypnotic amnesia Section 2: Literalness
10. Literalness: An experimental study
11. Literalness and the use of trance in neurosis Section 3: Age Regression
12. Age regression: Two unpublished fragments of a student’s study
13. Past weekday determination in hypnotic and waking states
14. On the possible occurrence of a dream in an eight-month-old infant
15. The successful treatment of a case of acute hysterical depression by a return under hypnosis to a critical phase of childhood Section 4: Automatic Writing and Drawing
16. The experimental demonstration of unconscious mentation by automatic writing
17. The use of automatic drawing in the interpretation and relief of a state of acute obsessional depression
18. The translation of the cryptic automatic writing of one hypnotic subject by another in a trancelike dissociated state Section 5: Mental Mechanisms
19. Experimental demonstrations of the psychopathology of everyday life
20. Demonstration of mental mechanisms by hypnosis
21. Unconscious mental activity in hypnosis–psychoanalytic implications
22. Negation or reversal of legal testimony Section 6: Dual Personality
23. The permanent relief of an obsessional phobia by means of communication with an unsuspected dual personality
24. The clinical discovery of a dual personality
25. Findings on the nature of the personality structures in two different dual personalities by means of projective and psychometric tests Section 7: Experimental Neuroses
26. A clinical note on a word-association test
27. A study of hypnotically induced complexes by means of the luria technique
28. A study of an experimental neurosis hypnotically induced in a case of ejaculatio praecox
29. The method employed to formulate a complex story for the induction of an experimental neurosis in hypnotic subject
Schuman, Marjorie (1980). The psychophysiological model of meditation and altered states of consciousness: A critical review. In Davidson, J. M.; Davidson, R. J. (Ed.), The psychobiology of consciousness (pp. 333-378). New York: Plenum Press.
Psychophysiological changes have been found to occur as correlates of meditation. Major emphasis has been placed on changes in alpha brainwave activity and on changes in alpha blocking response to sensory stimuli. Taken together, these changes in baseline EEG and electrocortical responsiveness to sensory stimulation have been interpreted to be evidence of a unique meditative state of consciousness. The literature on the psychophysiology of meditation, including EEG and autonomic changes, is reviewed with careful attention to different types of meditation practice and various physiological measures of arousal and attentional set. The phenomenology of meditative states and their relationship to trance states is also considered. It is concluded that EEG and autonomic data cannot be used to define states of consciousness; the state of consciousness must be known before the significance of physiological changes can be inferred.
1979
Barmark, Susanne M.; Gaunitz, Samuel C. B. (1979). Transcendental meditation and heterohypnosis as altered states of consciousness. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 27 (3), 227-239.
The effects of transcendental meditation and relaxation-heterohypnosis on subjective phenomena and physiological arousal were examined. One group of Ss, who were experienced meditators, participated in meditation, and a second group of Ss, who were highly susceptible to hypnosis but with little hypnotic experience, were exposed to hypnosis. A period of quiet sitting served as control for Ss in each group. Neither heterohypnosis nor transcendental meditation were identified as low-arousal states. They were assumed to be similar phenomenologically altered states of consciousness, mainly characterized by changes in the distribution of attention and in body image.
1979
Barrett, Deirdre (1979). The hypnotic dream: Its relation to nocturnal dreams and waking fantasies. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 88 (5), 584-591.
A review of the literature in the area of hypnotic dreams suggests that physiological correlates of hypnotic dreams are better established than content characteristics. A study is also reported that examined the content of hypnotic dreams in relation to that of nocturnal dreams and daydreams from the same subjects. Subjects were 16 undergraduates divided into deep-trance and medium-trance groups. Deep trance subjects hypnotic dreams were similar to their nocturnal dreams and different from daydreams on a wide variety of characteristics including length, emotional themes, characters, setting, and amount of distortion. Medium trance subjects’ hypnotic dreams were found to fall between their nocturnal dreams and daydreams on most of these measures.
Bennett, Henry L.; Giannini, Jeffrey A.; Kline, Mark D. (1979, September). Consequences of hearing during general anesthesia. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, New York.
A double blind 2X2 study exposed 23 herniorraphy and cholecystectomy patients to either a 45 minute suggestion tape or to the actual sounds of the operation. Structured interviews conducted postoperatively assessed hypnotic susceptibility and regressed patients under hypnosis to operative events. Ten patients accurately recalled significant events from surgery but only under hypnosis. Recall was greater and more accurate in patients scoring high on the Stanford Clinical Hypnosis Scale. Fewest number of pain medications were given postoperatively to patients receiving the suggestion tape. Hernia patients showed better recall than gallbladder patients.
1977
Brown, Daniel P.; Fromm, Erika (1977). Selected bibliography of readings in altered states of consciousness (ASC) in normal individuals. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 25, 388-391.
The bibliography is divided into the following sections:
I. General Works
II. Reference material on personality in relation to altered states
III. Social and cultural determinants of altered states
IV. Cognition, information-processing, and ego-functioning
V. Methodology in the study of altered states
VI. Differentiation of hyperaroused states
VII. Shamanistic states
VIII.Possession-trance
IX. Psychedelic states
X. The meditative states
XI. Personality differences and meditation
XII. Affective and cognitive change in meditation
XIII.Ordinary Buddhist meditation, concentration, and insight meditation
XIV. The variety of Buddhist meditation traditions
Davidson, R. J.; Goleman, D. J. (1977). The role of attention in meditation and hypnosis: A psychobiological perspective on transformations of consciousness. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 25, 291-308.
ABSTRACT: A temporally based scheme for investigation of changes in consciousness, applicable to areas such as meditation and hypnosis, is proposed and is divided into 3 basic epochs: before — predispositional variables that affect response to consciousness altering techniques; during — the state effects of the particular technique; and after — the trait effects of the practice. Research is surveyed which indicates the role of attentional processes during each of these 3 basic epochs in both meditation and hypnosis. Attentional flexibility is a predispositional variable affecting response to both meditation and hypnosis. The state effects of concentrative meditation involve alterations in stimulus set while the state effects of hypnosis may reflect primarily response set. The trait effects elicited by meditation depend critically on the psychobiological systems which are called into play. Evidence is discussed which suggests that concentrative meditation shares with relaxation an autonomic quiescence, but in addition enhances some attentional skills. A mindfulness technique involving the adoption of a particular attentional stance toward all objects of awareness appears to enhance cortical specificity, but a concentration technique does not. Some implications of attentional self-regulation are discussed.
Fromm, Erika (1977). Altered states of consciousness and hypnosis: A discussion. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 25, 325-334.
The author explains why it is important at this juncture in time to acquaint researchers and clinicians in the field of hypnosis with the current serious research in altered states of consciousness, and vice versa. In a 1975 SCEH symposium, the author brought together both well-established and young researchers coming from orientations as widely differing as neurophysiology, cognitive theory, and psychoanalytic ego psychology. This discussion summarizes, critically evaluates, and attempts to integrate with each other the findings of meditative researchers, Davidson and Goleman, and Daniel Brown; the altered states of consciousness model-maker Roland Fischer; the hypnotherapist, Sacerdote; and the generalist in altered states of consciousness and hypnosis, Krippner. A short summary of the author’s own new ego-psychological theory of hypnosis and 12 other altered states of consciousness is also presented.
Fromm, Erika (1977). An ego-psychological theory of altered states of consciousness. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 25, 372-387.
In this paper a new ego-psychological theory is proposed for the understanding of altered states of consciousness. The dichotomies of primary and secondary process, ego activity and ego receptivity, and automatization and de-automatization of ego functions in daydreaming, in the inspirational phase of creativity, in hypnosis, in psychedelic states, and in meditation are discussed; so are the roles of fantasy, imagery, and varous forms of attention.
NOTES
The author provides a table titled “Typology of Waking State and Several Altered States of Consciuosness by Attention Mode.” The states listed in the table are: Waking, normally alert, and concentrated; Waking, fascinated, entranced; Free association; Daydreaming; Dreaming; Psychedelic drugs; Hypnosis; Self-hypnosis; Biofeedback; Transcendental meditation; Concentrative meditation; Satipatthana [mindfulness of body, feelings, mind, and mental events]; Classical vipasyana [Clear intuitive insight into physical and mental phenomena as they arise and disappear, seeing them for what they actually are]. She summarizes, “In general, the present author strongly feels that the advantage of hypnotherapy over therapy in the waking state is that hypnosis allows the therapist to help patients work with more primary process thinking, more fantasy, more imagery, more ego receptivity than they would employ in the waking state” (p. 385). “What helps the therapy is not the depth itself; it is that in the hypnotic state there is greater mobility, a greater ability to dip into the unconscious and to bring the unconscious material back into the waking state of consciousness” (p. 385).
1975
Spear, J. E. (1975). The utilization of non-drug induced altered states of consciousness in borderline recidivists. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 18, 111-126.
Utilizing non-drug induced altered states of consciousness, various modes of interior reflection, behavior modification and reprogramming of conscious attitudes and values were utilized with 49 borderline recidivists. Such offenders were so determined by the Department of Corrections, Probation and Parole Office, District II. No coercion was used to induce such individuals to enter the program and there was no reprisal for stopping therapy at any time. Over a two and one-half year period the recidivist rate among this group was less than 5%. It is suggested that non-drug induced altered states of consciousness combined with indirect as well as symbolic techniques may prove to be the most effective means of criminal rehabilitation.
NOTES
Berderline recidivists were “individuals, who, in the opinion of the P.O. [probation officer] were, in all probability, to be returned to prison within a few months, or less, if there wasn’t a major change in attitude and actions” (p. 111). Therapy employed closed circuit TV with bi-directional audio and induction of altered state of consciousness using an ophthalmology-type rotary prism. Therapy involved (s) recall of relaxed state when under stress, (2) exploration of early conditioning events, (3) self evaluation during the ASC, (4) use of symbolic mental exercises and mental practice for similar circumstances in normal waking state, (5) suggestions for setting goals and ideals, (7) a type of logotherapy, (7) ‘nudging’ the person to examine their relationship with their concept of God. The author noted in the parolees: (1) low levels of self esteem, (2) depression, (3) going into deep levels of altered states once trust was established with the therapist.
1974
Galin, David (1974). Implications for psychiatry of left and right cerebral specialization: A neurophysiological context for unconscious processes. Archives of General Psychiatry, 31 (4), 572-583
A brief review is presented of hemispheric specialization for different cognitive modes, and of the symptoms that follow disconnection of the two hemispheres by commissurotomy. Our present knowledge of the hemispheres’ cognitive specialization and potential for independent functioning provides a framework for thinking about the interaction of cognitive structures, defensive maneuvers, and variations in awareness. Parallels are noted between some aspects of the mental processes of the disconnected right hemisphere and some aspects of primary process thinking and repression. The hypothesis is proposed that in normal intact people mental events in the right hemisphere can become disconnected functionally from the left hemisphere (by inhibition of neuronal transmission across the cerebral commissures), and can continue a life of their own. This hypothesis suggests a neurophysiological mechanisms for at least some instances of repression and an anatomical locus for the unconscious mental contents.
1971
Kihlstrom, J. F.; Edmonston, W. E., Jr. (1971). Alterations in consciousness in neutral hypnosis: Distortions in semantic space. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 13, 243-248.
30 highly hypnotizable Ss were equally divided into three groups, equated for age, sex and hypnotic susceptibility. A semantic differential scale was administered to each S in waking, individual sessions. An oral form of the same scale was administered during: (a) hypnosis (E), (b) waking — post hypnosis (C1), and (c) waking — no hypnosis (C2). All groups showed significant change between administrations of the scale; E showed more change than C1, and the latter more than C2. Ratings of “My Self” changed toward the negative pole in the evaluative factor. Results wre interpreted as indicating a distortion in semantic space and an alteration in ego-state occurring spontaneously with hypnosis.
Fromm, Erika; Oberlander, Mark I.; Gruenewald, Doris (1970). Perceptual and cognitive processes in different states of consciousness: The waking state and hypnosis. Journal of Projective Techniques and Personality Assessment, 34, 375-387.
Hypnosis was assumed to influence perceptual and cognitive functioning in the direction of increased primary process ideation and adaptive regression. The Rorschach test was administered to 32 Ss in the waking state and under hypnosis in counterbalanced order. Hypnosis was induced by a standardized procedure. Ss received identical instructions for the Rorschach in both conditions. Protocols were scored according to Holt’s system for manifestations and control of primary process. Hypnotic Rorschachs showed an increase in primary process manifestations, but no changes in defensive and coping functioning, and no overall changes in the Adaptive Regression Score. However, the nature of the data was found to be influenced by Ss’ sex and level of adjustment.
NOTES
The authors used High hypnotizables (SHSS>9) in this investigation.
1963
King, C. D. (1963). The states of human consciousness. New York, NY: University Books. (Reviewed in American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 7, 1964, 96.)
NOTES