Now we can predict who will win a race. Elite runners do not dissociate; they use association strategy. They pay close attention to race strategy, they monitor themselves constantly (they slow down when they feel bad), and attempt informally to stay loose, not get tight, and relax. Dissociation has, however, been used for the last 300 meters of a marathon (New Zealander Dixon).

Dixon, Michael; Laurence, Jean-Roch (1992). Two hundred years of hypnosis research: Questions resolved? Questions unanswered!. In Fromm, Erika; Nash, Michael R. (Ed.), Contemporary hypnosis research (pp. 34-66). New York: Guilford Press.

These notes summarize only that part of the chapter concerning nonvoluntary behavior (pp 38-39; 58-61).
The concept of ‘nonvolition’ has been and continues to be an important issue in hypnosis research. The concept pertains to the “subjective report that the hypnotic suggestion is enacted without the subject’s conscious and willful participation” (p. 38). When hypnosis was attributed to a magnetic fluid, in the days of Mesmer, the issue did not arise (because of course a person would not have control over something that happened to them physically). However, when hypnosis came to be considered a psychological phenomenon, the issue of how a behavior could be the result of motivated action and yet not perceived as being under conscious influence became important. In 1819 Faria wrote that the nonvolition paradox is due to the hypnotized subject’s tendency to misattribute the source or reason for one’s behaviors; he noted that successful suggestions depended upon the subject falsely attributing to the hypnotist the power to influence them. From that point forward, circular reasoning was used to state that one is hypnotized if one experiences their behavior as nonvolitional, and nonvolitional behavior signifies that a person is hypnotized.
“The observation of the seemingly complete automaticity of response in the highly hypnotizable subject led Liebeault in his 1866 book (followed later on by Bernheim and Liegeois) to describe these subjects as ‘puppets’ in the hands of the hypnotist. This was a quite unfortunate statement, since it would lead to one of the fiercest legal debates surrounding the use of hypnosis in the last 20 years of the 19th century (Laurence & Perry, 1988). …
“The most prominent author (if not the only one) who attempted to tackle this difficult question was Pierre Janet, who would make the investigation of automatisms the basis of his theory of hypnosis, rather than suggestion or suggestibility. This theoretical orientation is best exemplified by his concept of desagregation psychologique seen in some psychopathologies, or the carrying out of a posthypnotic suggestion in the normal individual (Janet, 1889; see also Ellenberger, 1970; Perry & Laurence, 1984; Prevost, 1973). Nonetheless, until the end of the 19th century, and for a good part of the 20th century, these reports of nonvolition were thought to be the end result of some neurological changes happening during hypnosis–an idea that has not been substantiated by contemporary research.” (pp 38-39)
Reports of nonvolition are explained as due to dissociation by Hilgard, or as the results of misattributing the origins of behaviors and experiences by Spanos and by Lynn. Neodissociationists like Hilgard regard misattribution to be a cognitive alteration, mainly an internal triggering mechanism, while social psychologists like Spanos and Lynn regard the misattribution to be the results of situational demands and therefore an external triggering mechanism.
“Regardless of one’s preferred metaphor, the issue of nonvolitional reports remains at the core of an integrated view of hypnosis and hypnotizability. The question remains as follows: By which mechanisms does this occur, and how can we predict a priori who will report involuntariness and under what circumstances? Whereas dissociationists have emphasized general cognitive mechanisms and de-emphasized situational factors, social- psychological theorists have emphasized situational variables and de-emphasized individual differences. Given the limitations of both approaches, emphasis will have to be placed not on their continued separation but on their integration, as more and more investigations demonstrate that they clearly interact with each other (see, e.g., Nadon, Laurence, & Perry, 1991).” (p. 60)
“At the height of the confrontation between the two French schools, hypnosis found its way into the legal arena. Following a series of criminal cases in which hypnosis had been allegedly involved, the two schools once again found themselves on opposite sides of the fence. For La Salpetriere, only those who had a propensity toward criminality (and hystericals were prime candidates) could be the victims of hypnosis. For the Nancy school, in highly responsive individuals suggestions could lead to criminal behavior. Unfortunately for the Nancy school, it soon became evident that the concept of suggestion was not sufficient in explaining the questions raised by the courts, and Bernheim was forced to recognize that in cases where suggestions had played a role, other dispositional and situational factors were probably more important in the genesis of the reprehensible behaviors. His espousing a too extreme position meant that the baby was thrown out with the bathwater. History may indicate that the same fate is now awaiting contemporary theoretical positions that adopt an extreme stance vis-a-vis the phenomenon of hypnosis” (p. 61).

Giolas, M. H.; Saners, B. (1992). Pain and suffering as a function of dissociation level and instructional set. Dissociation, 5, 205-209.

48 female student Ss who scored above 20 on the Dissociative Experiences Scale and 48 subjects scoring below 20 on the DES were compared for response to ischemic pain. Experimental conditions included (1) a group imagining their arm becoming numb and insensitive, (2) a distraction group focusing on their breathing, and (3) a control group with no instructions. Subjects rated pain at one-minute intervals for the sensory experience of pain and for suffering (the emotional experience). The procedure was ended at subject’s request or after 20 minutes. Across all conditions, the high dissociative group tolerated pain significantly longer than low dissociatives. Analysis revealed lower suffering ratings for high dissociators in the condition where, like in hypnosis, they imagined their arm numb. This is consistent with beliefs that during abuse in childhood the child learns to use imagination to reduce suffering.

Kvaal, Steven; Lynn, Steven Jay; Myers, Brian (1992, October). The Gulf war: Effects on hypnotizability. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington, VA.

We did a study that follows the line that volunteers may differ from nonvolunteers for hypnosis experiments (Authors cite 3 studies, including one with Hilgard as later author; Brodsky; Zamansky). Also, Ss who volunteer early in the quarter at the university are motivated for hypnosis; later volunteers want course credit. The former want to experience hypnosis.
Previously we did a study on authoritative vs permissive suggestions with Ss who volunteered early or late in the quarter; Ss were tested twice. For Ss who volunteered in first 2 weeks of the quarter, scores decreased across testing; for Ss volunteering late, scores remained stable across testing. This implies that if an experiment were conducted late in a quarter we would conclude that repeated testing has no effect; if done earlier, we would have concluded repeated testing decreases scores.
This result has been replicated. It is therefore important to run Ss across an entire quarter or year.
The present study differs from the foregoing study. It addresses the question: Do life events affect scores on the Harvard Scale? Do tension, uncertainty, etc. affect scores? Would they depress scores? Are scores reactive to environmental events?
On January 14 the U.S. issued an ultimative to Iraq; that very day we administered a tape recorded version of the Harvard Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, preceded by the Tellegen Absorption Scale. The hypnotizability tests were self-scored for involvement and involuntariness. Tension throughout the day escalated, culminating with bombing 2 hours before the hypnosis screening. The graduate student announced war had started and told Ss they could leave if they wanted. All 52 Ss stayed!
Control group was 58 Ss tested at same time of the quarter, one year before (10 days into the quarter).
Analysis was by a 3 x 2 ANOVA. There was no main effect for time of testing, sex, or interaction for any measures on hypnotizability, or subjective involvement.
The Tellegen Absorption scale showed a significant timing x sex interaction: males on outbreak of war scored lower than all other groups (15 vs 21 or more for all other groups). Tensions had no effect on subjective or objective scores of hypnotizability. Thus the males were affected on the Absorption Scale by outbreak of war.
The fact the Tellegen Scale was more reactive suggests hypnotizability may be more stable than Absorption. Absorption might have been depressed because males were more upset by images of military services.
Little research has been conducted to examine the possible positive effects on hypnotizability of positive events in real life.

Lynn, Steven Jay; Sivec, Harry (1992). The hypnotizable subject as creative problem-solving agent. In Fromm, Erika; Nash, Michael R. (Ed.), Contemporary hypnosis research (pp. 292-333). Guilford Press.

These notes are taken only from the section of this chapter that deals with Hypnotic Responding, Imaginative Activity, and Expectancies, and they treat of the concept of nonvoluntary responding (pp 315-316). Other topics covered in the chapter include: Imagination, Fantasy, and Hypnosis Theories; The Hypnotizable Subject as Creative Problem-Solving Agent; Hypnosis and Subjects’ Capability for Imaginative Activity; Goal-Directed Fantasy: Patterns of Imaginative Activity during Hypnosis; Hypnosis and Creativity; and a Conclusion.
Several studies manipulated expectancies re the relationship between imagination and involuntariness. When Ss were told that “good” hypnotic subjects could (or could not) resist suggestions, “this information affected their ability to resist the hypnotist and tended to affect subjects’ report of suggestion-related involuntariness … [Lynn, Nash, Rhue, Frauman, & Sweeney, 1984]. Furthermore, subjects who successfully resisted suggestions and subjects who failed to do so reported comparable levels of hypnotic depth and imaginative involvement in suggestions.
“Spanos, Cobb, and Gorassini (1985) conducted a similar experiment in which they found that hypnotizable subjects who were instructed that they could become deeply involved in suggestions and yet resist them successfully resisted 95% of the suggestions and rated themselves as maintaining voluntary control over their behavior. Thus, subjects are able to resist nearly all of the suggestions when resistance is facilitated by situational demands. It is worth noting that subjects in this research who resisted hypnotic suggestions rated themselves as just as deeply involved in the suggestions as Ss who failed to resist suggestions after being informed that deeply hypnotized subjects were incapable of resisting suggestions” (pp. 315-316).
Lynn, Snodgrass, et al. (1987). showed that hypnotizable Ss who were just “imagining” along with suggestions but instructed to resist responding to motoric suggestions acted the way hypnotized Ss did in their earlier countersuggestion research: imagining subjects tended to move in response to suggestion (that “good” Ss responded in certain ways), despite being instructed to resist. In this study, with instructions designed to increase the use of goal directed fantasies (GDFs), low and high hypnotizable subjects reported equivalent GDF absorption and frequency of GDFs. However, highs responded more and reported greater involuntariness than lows, even when their GDFs were equivalent.
“A number of other studies have examined the effects of expectancies on imaginings and hypnotic behavior. Spanos, Weekes, and de Groh (1984) informed subjects that deeply hypnotized individuals could imagine an arm movement in one direction while their unconscious caused the arm to move in the opposite direction. Even though subjects so informed moved in the opposite direction, they imagined suggested effects and described their countersuggestion behavior as involuntary” (p. 317).

Lyons, Larry C. (1992, October). Absorption and hypnotizability: Meta-analysis of studies to determine if contextual effects are important. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington, VA.

Correlations between hypnotizability and Absorption range from .20 to .40; Council et al. suggest the correlation between these variables is a context effect (expectancy). In our review there was no statistically significant difference between correlations that were found in and out of context (.26 and .23, weighted means) in more than 40 studies with more than one correlation per study.
When Absorption was measured before hypnosis experience the r = .25; after the hypnosis experience, r = .32 (significantly different), which also was different from what context hypothesis would predict. Any context difference may be a function of length of time between the Absorption and hypnosis sessions.
Data does not support the context hypothesis. Measuring Absorption after hypnosis resulted in higher mean correlations with susceptibility. However, the magnitude of this relationship was small. Variation due to test reliability and small sample size are likely explanations of the differences in the magnitude of the correlations across studies. We also must consider scale reliability and sample error (samples less than 1000 have departures from the population correlation that are fairly large).

We should construct confidence intervals around observed correlations and look at the overlap; don’t look only at the significance of the difference between correlations.
Author is in the process of conducting a mail survey to obtain unpublished results on context effect.

Morse, Donald R.; Martin, John; Moshonov, Joshua (1992). Stress induced sudden cardiac death: Can it be prevented?. Stress Medicine, 8, 35-46.

Previously, psychosomatically induced death relative to stress, hypnosis, mind control, and voodoo was discussed. In this article, emphasis is on one aspect of that – stress induced sudden cardiac death (SCD). A brief review is presented of the sympathetic aspects of the acute stress response and stress induced SCD. Findings from previous studies are presented to highlight sympathetic aspects of the acute stress response. This is followed by a presentation of various strategies to prevent of decrease the possibilities for stress induced SCD. These include long-term measures (e.g. diet control, smoking control, hypertension control, stress management strategies) and immediate measures (e.g. calm, controlled approach, elicitation of the relaxation response, selected use of drugs, and heart rate variability monitoring). Relative to prevention strategies, findings are presented both from previous studies and new investigations.

Murrey, Gregory J.; Cross, Herb J.; Whipple, Jim (1992). Hypnotically created pseudomemories: Further investigation into the ‘memory distortion or response bias’ question. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 101 (1), 75-77.

In order to study whether pseudomemories represent actual memory distortions or are a result of response bias, 60 highly hypnotizable subjects and subjects from the general population were divided into 4 experimental groups and were tested for pseudomemory manifestation after receiving a false suggestion. Of the 4 groups of subjects, 3 were offered a monetary reward as a motivation to distinguish false suggestion from the actual occurrence. Pseudomemory manifestation was found to be significantly higher among subjects not offered a reward than among subjects who were offered such a reward. The implications of these findings are discussed.

The article contains a review of the literature through 1989. The study tested the hypothesis that when it is important to distinguish fantasy from reality in a hypnosis experiment, subjects can do so–a position presented by Spanos and McLean (1986). They used a verifiable event to test for pseudomemory production, as in research published by McCann and Sheehan (1988). Subjects were 30 high hypnotizable and 30 unselected students.
Subjects were shown a videotape of a mock robbery scene. The next week, Groups A, B, and C heard audiotapes “to enhance memory,” but in addition to motivating statements about “trying to remember” certain details, the tapes included misleading information (e.g. “Remember the color of the hat the robber was wearing” when in fact there was no hat on the robber). Subjects in these groups were ‘influenced.’
“Both highly hypnotizable subject groups (Groups A and B) listened to the audiotape after being administered a 10-min hypnotic induction procedure (modified from that of Barber, 1969). Subject Group C listened to the audiotape without hypnosis. The control group, Group D, did not listen to the audiotape and was, therefore, classified as ‘uninfluenced.'”
A week later subjects responded to multiple-choice and yes-no or true-false questions about the robbery scene. The yes-no question about whether the robber was wearing a hat served as the dependent variable, a measure of pseudomemory. “To motivate subjects to report the truth rather than to follow any perceived expectations of the experimental of social context, we offered subjects in Groups B, C, and D a monetary reward if they achieved the most correct answers on the quiz (according to the videotape). The reward was offered just before administration of the quiz to ensure that no collusion between the subjects could occur. Group A was not offered any such reward” (p. 76).
“The number of subjects in Group A (hypnotized, influenced, no reward) who reported the false information at posttest (12) was significantly greater then that of Group B (hypnotized, influenced, offered reward…. However, the difference in incidence of pseudomemory between Group B and the control group, Group D (not hypnotized, uninfluenced, offered reward), was nonsignificant” (p. 76).
Table 1 Incidence of Pseudomemory Per Group ——————————————————————————————- False suggestion Group A Group B Group C Group D
result (n=15) (n=15) (n=15) (n=15) ——————————————————————————————-
Accepted 12 6 7 3
Rejected 3 9 8 12 —————————————————————————————— Note. Group A = hypnotized, influenced, not offered reward.
Group B = hypnotized, influenced, offered reward.
Group C = not hypnotized, influenced, offered reward.
Group D = not hypnotized, not influenced, offered reward.
In the Discussion, the authors wrote, “Because the only variable among these groups was the reward, a reasonable conclusion from the findings is that pseudomemories manifested by the subjects were (for the most part) not actual memory distortions. Presumably, the reward provided the subjects in Group B an incentive to ‘report the truth’ and a disincentive to give biased reports on the basis of the perceived expectations of the social or experimental context. Thus these data suggest that pseudomemory effects or the occurrence of the pseudomemory phenomenon among highly hypnotizable subjects can be minimized by providing a motivation to subjects to give unbiased reports.
“A major implication of these findings is that researchers should control for response bias resulting from perceived social demands or from leading test designs when they conduct pseudomemory research. Of further concern is the fact that a number of researchers contend that hypnotic interrogation of eye-witnesses can greatly facilitate the creation of pseudomemories (Levitt, 1990; Loftus, 1979; Orne, 1979; Putnam, 1979), and therefore hypnosis either should not be allowed in the courtroom or should be strictly controlled. Yet in light of our findings, response bias may be a confound in pseudomemory research, and thus researchers need to be cautious when making inferences to specific situations from data obtained in an experimental setting.
“Despite the existence of a confound of (unmeasured) differences in hypnotizability between the two groups, there was no significant difference between Group B and the control group (Group D). This suggests that if response bias is controlled for, there may not be significant differences in manifestation of pseudomemories between highly hypnotizable subjects and subjects representative of the general population. However, further research is needed in order to address this question” (pp. 76-77).

Oakman, Jonathan M.; Woody, Erik Z. (1992, October). Automaticity, the Stroop effect, and hypnotic ability. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington, VA.

Builds on the first Dixon study of Stroop effect and hypnotizability, which presented stimuli too fast and also the probabilities of congruent/noncongruent stimuli were varied. Highs had more interference in all conditions, seeming to process with language more. It cast doubt on the use of strategies by highs. Measurement of hypnotizability outside the situation cast doubt on expectancy (social psychology influence) theories.
Automaticity refers to responses that seem effortless, fast, and require little attention. They propose that this characterizes hypnosis. Highly automatic behavior cannot be suppressed. Reading is automatic; color naming is not. The greater the automaticity factor, the more the Stroop effect. Automaticity relates to automatic movement in hypnosis.
Previous research on Stroop used visual tasks, while hypnosis is largely auditory. So we used identification of volume of a word presented over a speaker, plus the regular (visual) Stroop task.
The words “loud” or “soft” were presented as loud or soft in volume. Lows = 4 or lower; highs = 8 or more on Canadian test of hypnotizability, the Waterloo Group Form C.
[In the Visual Stroop?] Reaction Time was greater for incongruent than congruent stimuli for highs (almost statistically significant) but not lows. It is an 8 ms difference for highs.
The Auditory Stroop is very different for both groups; however highs did not show more difference in reaction time than lows.
Auditory and Visual Stroop tasks did not correlate. Waterloo hypnotizability correlated: .28 with Visual Stroop, .11 with Auditory Stroop.
Logan’s theory about automaticity seems appropriate: automatization is a shift from using a strategy to relying on memory; inhibition of the automatic response is based on using a strategy instead of relying on memory. Lows may be very able to inhibit automatic processing when necessary; they are the interesting exceptions to the rule, because the Stroop has been a reliable finding in psychological research for years.

Page, Roger A.; Handley, George W. (1992). Effects of ‘deepening’ techniques on hypnotic depth and responding. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 40, 157-168.

The present study attempted to assess the effectiveness of commonly used deepening techniques and of surreptitiously provided stimulation on hypnotizability scores, in-hypnosis depth reports, retrospective realness ratings, and the Field Inventory of Hypnotic Depth (Field, 1965). High, medium, and low hypnotizables were assigned in equal numbers to 1 of 3 groups, each containing 54 Subjects. Controls were compared to Subjects receiving 2 deepening techniques or 2 suggestions for positive and negative hallucinations that were surreptitiously enhanced. Of the 4 dependent measures employed, the only significant different between groups related to a change in depth reports for the manipulation items themselves, leading to the conclusion that the effect of the techniques was at best minimal and transient. Some methodological and conceptual issues are also discussed.

Perry, Campbell (1992). Theorizing about hypnosis in either/or terms. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 40, 238-252.

The present paper addresses 3 issues raised by Coe (1992). First, it maintains that the “altered state” issue of the 1960s remains buried in current dichotomous classifications of hypnosis theories as involving either “special processes” or the social- psychological position. Given the current diversity of the field, it appears imprudent to classify theorizing in either/or terms; additionally, despite a history of using the term “altered state” in a circular way, it is not an inherently circular formulation. It can be used descriptively simply to point to the observation that some individuals in hypnosis report subjective alterations. A second issue broached concerns the metaphorical status of the term “hypnosis”; it is accepted as a misleading metaphor inherited from 19th century investigators such as Braid, Faria, Puysegur, and Liebeault. Provided that it is recognized that this metaphor refers to a “domain” (E. G. Hilgard, 1973) of characteristically elicited behaviors, no problem ensues in retaining this metaphor derived from nocturnal sleep. A subsequent discussion of current conceptualizations of hypnosis indicates considerable agreement among investigators; there is much consensus that hypnosis is an individual differences phenomenon, in which imagination may, in some individuals, become so intense and so vivid, as to take on “reality value,” to the extent that a hypnotized person may have difficulty in distinguishing fantasy from reality. The S abilities of imagery/imagination, absorption, dissociation, and automaticity (which may be proved to be an index of dissociation) are proposed as being the main ingredients of the hypnotic experience. Finally, a synergistic approach is proposed as a means of progressing beyond the current impasse of either/or theorizing.

30 low hypnotizability Ss were administered the Carleton Skills Training (CST) program, while 8 were assigned to a practice group. Prior to treatment, an attempt was made to facilitate training by altering the ecological conditions of the laboratory. All Ss were tested immediately after treatment, and trained Ss were retested after 5-7 months. Immediate training gains were large and were comparable in magnitude to those routinely found at Carleton University. In addition, (a) trained Ss responded comparably whether screened once or twice, (b) practice alone did not enhance hypnotic performance, and (c) natural high hypnotizability Ss obtained significant larger Field Inventory of Hypnotic Depth (Field, 1965) scores than created high hypnotizables. Follow-up scores fell between scores posted at screening and immediately after training. Current findings are interpreted in the context of existing evidence concerning the CST program.

(based on the Discussion) “Results from these two investigations (include Bates et al., 1988) challenge the claim that lasting changes have occurred in the ability of most trained Ss to experience hypnosis. With regard to the present findings, it is reasonable to wonder whether scores would have been even lower had follow-up data been gathered a few months later. In the only other published study to address the problem of maintenance, Spanos, W. P. Cross, Menary, and Smith (1988) found that after at least 9 months, trained Ss outscored low hypnotizability Ss who had never received training. Unfortunately, these investigators do not report comparisons between trained Ss’ follow-up scores and either original screening or immediate posttest scores. The authors do report, however, that 20% of trained Ss obtained high scores at follow-up. Given that at least 50%, and as high as 80%, of Ss routinely score in the high range immediately after receiving the CST program at Carleton University, a follow-up figure of 20% implies that with time, the hypnotic performance of most trained Ss began to return to baseline levels.
“With regard to the subjective experience of trained Ss…. These results confirm previous findings by Bates & Brigham (1990) which indicated that the hypnotic experiences of CST graduates – even those who are the most responsive to the modification program – may not be comparable in all respects to those of untrained, high hypnotizable individuals” (pp. 237-238).
“The present study altered the context in which training occurred by increasing the salience of the laboratory; adding, repainting, carpeting, and redecorating experimental rooms; requiring Es to dress professionally; and temporarily attributing the CST program to Washington State University. When demand characteristics were arranged in this manner, training gains were of the same magnitude as those found at Carleton University and were much larger than those found in all prior replication studies. The apparent importance of contextual factors is underscored by findings reported by Bates et al. (1988), who manipulated demand characteristics in a systematic fashion and observed that Ss’ responses to the CST program are moderated by the context in which training occurs. Given the important role that ecological variables have generally played in hypnosis research, it should come as no surprise that factors like these would affect attempts to modify hypnotic performance” (p. 238).

Daglish, Mark R. C.; Wright, Peter (1991). Opinions about hypnosis among medical and psychology students. Contemporary Hypnosis, 8, 51-55.

A survey was undertaken of opinions about hypnosis among first year medical and psychology students at the University of Edinburgh. Data are presented on the effects of self-estimated hypnotizability and sex, on opinions about hypnosis. The results are compared with those from similar studies conducted in Australia and the USA. Overall, the surveyed population showed a similar level of knowledge about hypnosis to that found among the general public.

Grabowski, Karen L.; Roese, Neal J.; Thomas, Michael R. (1991). The role of expectancy in hypnotic hypermnesia: A brief communication. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 39, 193-197.

Previous research has yielded equivocal evidence of hypnotic memory enhancement. This study assessed effects of expectancy and hypnotizability on recall for videotaped material under waking and hypnotic conditions. Ss (n – 138) were informed of hypnotic induction either before (expectancy condition) or after (no expectancy condition) watching a videotaped enactment of a crime and completing an initial waking recall test (R1). Both groups then underwent hypnotic induction, and completed the test again (R2). Ss’ raw recall scores were significantly greater under hypnotic than waking conditions, but this hypermnesia was not evident when scores were corrected for mere increase in rate of responding. Ss expecting later hypnosis scored significantly higher than Ss with no such expectations, but again, this different was not evident in corrected scores. Hypnotizability of Ss was, however, related to corrected recall, with high hypnotizability Ss displaying the greatest increase in rate of responding from R1 to R2. No evidence for the hypothesized “suppression effect” underlying hypnotic hypermnesia was found.

Thus Ss tended to answer more questions on R2 but most of this increase was error. Moreover, high hypnotizability Ss displayed this pattern to a far greater extent than other Ss, indicating that they were more likely than others to increase the no. of responses made between tests.
The finding of an interaction effect between hypnotizability and corrected recall suggests that hypnosis does play some role in the hypnotic hypermnesia described in the literature, possibly refuting the findings of several recent studies (e.g., Nogrady, McConkey, & Perry, 1986; Register & Kihlstrom, 1987). High hypnotizability Ss increased the number of responses made from R1 to R2 to a greater extent than other Ss. The lack of an interaction between hypnotizability and expectancy, however, fails to support the suggestion by Salzberg and DePiano (1980) that people of differing hypnotizabilities differ also in their susceptibility to demand biases.
As both Klazky and Erdelyi (1985) and Whitehouse et al. (1988) have noted, however, the use of hypnosis with witnesses of crimes may be useful if it can stimulate individuals to share uncertain recollections, perhaps providing otherwise unconsidered clues. The present data suggest that such guessing may also be increased by mere expectation of hypnosis. The value of forensic hypnosis may, therefore, be in part one similar to placebo: the simple notion of hypnosis placed in witnesses’ minds may be sufficient to inspire useful leads.

Lynn, Steven Jay; Weekes, J. R.; Neufeld, U.; Ziuney, O.; Brentar, J.; Weiss, F. (1991). Interpersonal climate and hypnotizability level: Effects of hypnotic performance, rapport, and archaic involvement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 737-743.

Designed to extend research by McConkey and Sheehan, they tested 24 hypnotizable and 21 unhypnotizable Ss in high interpersonal/high rapport (including education about misconceptions about hypnosis, eye contact, and friendly self-disclosure) and low interpersonal/low rapport testing contexts. Overall, hypnotizable Ss were more responsive to hypnosis, rated the hypnotist more positively, and experienced greater involuntariness and archaic involvement than unhypnotizable subjects. However, results provide support for the hypothesis that low hypnotizable Ss are particularly sensitive to variations of the hypnotist’s interpersonal behavior. Only low hypnotizable Ss’ objective and subjective hypnotic performance on the SHSS, Form C, was enhanced by hypnotist behavior designed to optimize rapport. Hypnotizable Ss’ behavior was stable across testing contexts.

Oettingen, Gabriele; Wadden, Thomas A. (1991). Expectation, fantasy, and weight loss: Is the impact of positive thinking always positive?. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 15 (2), 167-175.

Investigated the impact of expectation and fantasy on the weight losses of 25 obese women participating in a behavioral weight reduction program. Both expectations of reaching one’s goal weight and spontaneous weight-related fantasies were measured at pretreatment before Ss began 1 year of weekly group treatment. Consistent with the hypothesis that expectation and fantasy are different in quality, these variables predicted weight change in opposite directions. Optimistic expectations but negative fantasies favored weight loss. Ss who displayed pessimistic expectations combined with positive fantasies had the poorest treatment outcome. Expectation but not fantasy predicted program attendance. The effects of fantasy are discussed with regard to their potential impact on weight reduction therapy.

Persinger, M. A.; Makarec, Katherine (1991-92). Interactions between temporal lobe signs, imaginings, beliefs and gender: Their effect upon logical inference. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 11, 149-166.

Rotton’s Paralogic Test, Wilson-Barber’s Inventory of Childhood memories and Imaginings (ICMI) and the PPI (Personal Philosophy Inventory) were administered to 100 male and 100 female university students. Both sexes displayed moderately strong (0.50) correlations between content-selected and factor analyzed clusters of possible temporal lobe signs, exotic beliefs and the numbers of childhood imaginings. Although there were no sex differences between the accuracy of logical statements that contained paranormal or neutral content, males who displayed more temporal lobe signs were more accurate for logical items that contained paranormal content. Females who displayed more imaginings were more accurate for valid than for invalid items. Accuracy for items with paranormal content increased with exotic beliefs but not with conservative religious beliefs for both sexes. The relationship between exotic beliefs and accuracy for items with paranormal content was especially strong for females. These results suggest: 1) gender differences in the neurocognitive processes that contribute to logical problem solving and 2) accuracy may depend upon the degree to which the subject matter is commensurate with the person’s history of enhanced temporal lobe signs, capacity for fantasy and imaginings and beliefs in exotic concepts.

Review of related literature indicates that Personal Philosophy Inventory (PPI) temporal lobe signs are correlated with temporal lobe EEG alpha but not occipital lobe alpha (Makarec & Persinger, 1990), with increased suggestibility (Persinger & DeSano, 1986; Ross & Persinger, 1987), with creativity and proneness towards fantasy (Persinger & DeSano, 1986; Ross & Persinger, 1987; Makarec & Persinger, 1987), and with reports of psi experiences and beliefs in such things as reincarnation and aliens in UFOs (‘exotic themes’) (Persinger & Makarec, 1987; Persinger & Makarec, 1990).
This experiment was designed to answer four questions: ” 1) Do imagery and temporal lobe signs emerge from the same source of variance?; 2) Do males and females differ significantly in their incidence of imaginings and temporal lobe signs?; 3) Do males and females differ in their ability to solve logical problems?; and 4) Is the accuracy of problem solving affected by the subject matter of the problem and the problem solver’s temporal lobe signs and capacity for imagery?” (p. 151).
The PPI consists of 140 true-false items that were selected with a goal of discerning temporal lobe signs within a normal population. One 30-item subscale has items that are similar to experiences reported by patients with verified electrical foci in the temporal lobes, albeit milder (the TLS or temporal lobe sign scale). Of these 30 items, 16 refer to ictal-like experiences (the CPES, or complex partial epileptic signs), and 14 refer to interictal-like behaviors (ILB). CPES items are items like “Sometimes an event will occur that has special significance for me only,’ and ‘While sitting quietly, I have had uplifting sensations as if I were driving over a rolling road.” ILB items are items like “People tell me I blank out sometimes when people are talking,’ and ‘When I lose an argument I spend a lot of time thinking about what I should have said.”
Wilson and Barber’s Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings (ICMI) has 52 true-false items that include reports of paranormal experiences (5 items), moderate imaginings (18 items) such as ‘When I was a child I enjoyed fairytales,’ and extreme imaginings (15 items) such as ‘When I was a child or teenager, at times I was afraid my imagining would become so real to me that I would be unable to stop it.’
Rotton’s Paralogic Test [unpublished, at Florida International University, Miami] has 16 syllogisms, each with major premise, minor premise, and conclusion. “The person must decide if the argument is valid (n = 8) or invalid (n = 8). Half of each of the valid and invalid arguments refer to mundane material while the other half of the arguments refer to paranormal-related material. An example of the former is ‘If a president is a crook, he would be impeached; Congress did not impeach Nixon. Therefore Nixon is not a crook’ and ‘If flying saucers really existed, somebody would have photographed one. Nobody has ever photographed a flying saucer. Therefore, flying saucers do not exist'” (p. 153).
Correlations were computed separately for males and females. Both groups increased in accuracy for paranormal items as their belief in things like reincarnation and UFOs (‘exotic concepts’) increased. Males with a higher number of temporal lobe signs demonstrated more accuracy for logic test items with paranormal (psi) content than logic test items with mundane content.
“The single most important correlation was between exotic beliefs and the interaction term for the Rotton scale; the coefficient was unusually strong (0.54) and highly statistically significant (p<0.001) for females only. Because of the manner in which the interaction term was calculated, this correlation meant that females who reported more exotic beliefs were also more accurate for valid items that contained paranormal content only" (p. 159). In their Discussion, the authors write, "The significant positive correlations between exotic beliefs and the clusters of CPES items and extreme Wilson-Barber imagining items are expected associations according to Bear's concept of sensory-limbic hyperconnectionism [Temporal Lobe Epilepsy: A Syndrome of Sensory-Limbic Hyperconnectionism, Cortex, 15, pp. 357-384. It would predict that concepts (or word trains) that are unusual, strange or infrequent would be charged with emotional significance and personal value. Ideas that generate substantial imagery, such as time- travel, reincarnation and alien intelligence, would be particularly prone to this affective infusion from limbic sources. Induction of such unique or intensified affective states, especially during childhood, would facilitate the development of more frequent or more extreme periods of dissociation in the adult. We have collected (unpublished) clinical evidence to suggest that the emergence of this pattern is found in the propensity for creative thinkers, including writers, poets, musicians, artists and scientists, to have had developmental histories that could have promoted temporal lobe lability without overt seizure activity; clusters of such "promoters" include mild physical abuse, febrile episodes, minor head injuries and likely hypoxic periods during extreme physical exertion (competitive athletics)" (pp. 161-162). Another conclusion of the study is that males and females do not differ in their accuracy in solving syllogisms, but "the neurocognitive processes, as inferred from inventories of temporal lobe signs or childhood imaginings, by which the two sexes arrive at solutions may be quite different" (p. 162). Peterson, Patricia; Coe, William C. (1991, April). Negative sequelae to hypnosis: A function of expectations?. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Western Psychological Association. NOTES Researchers have theorized that the ways in which hypnotic subjects respond may result from their expectancies of the experience. If so, it seems likely that warning subjects of possible negative aftereffects before they are hypnotized could elicit subsequent reports of such effects. Three groups of subjects were given varied expectancies prior to a hypnotic induction and scale: (A) a specific warning of a 50% chance of negative aftereffects, (B) a vague warning of negative aftereffects, and (C) no mention of aftereffects. Subjects later reported positive, negative, sleep related, and bodily change sequelae. The findings were in the expected direction in that Group A reported more negative sequelae than Groups B or C. However, Group C (the controls) also reported more negative sequelae and bodily changes than Group B. The inadvertent addition of a positive expectancy administered in the Group B scenario may have acted as a confound and caused that group's lower level of negative sequelae. Reiss, Steven (1991). Expectancy model of fear, anxiety, and panic. Clinical Psychology Review, 11, 141-153. The purposes of this article are to summarize the author's expectancy model of fear, review the recent studies evaluating this model, and suggest directions for future research. Reiss' expectancy model holds that there are three fundamental fears (called sensitivities): the fear of injury, the fear of anxiety, and the fear of negative evaluation. Thus far, research on this model has focused on the fear of anxiety (anxiety sensitivity). The major research findings are as follows: simple phobias sometimes are motivated by expectations of panic attacks; the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI) is a valid and unique measure of individual differences in the fear of anxiety sensations; the ASI is superior to measures of trait anxiety in the assessment of panic disorder; anxiety sensitivity is associated with agoraphobia, simple phobia, panic disorder, and substance abuse; and anxiety sensitivity is strongly associated with fearfulness. There is some preliminary support for the hypothesis that anxiety sensitivity is a risk factor for panic disorder. It is suggested that future researchers evaluate the hypotheses that anxiety and fear are distinct phenomena; that panic attacks are intense states of fear (not intense states of anxiety); and that anxiety sensitivity is a risk factor for both fearfulness and panic disorder. Kihlstrom, John F.; McConkey, K. M. (1990). William James and hypnosis: A centennial reflection. Psychological Science, 1, 174-178. For William James, hypnosis was both an experimental technique for creating divisions of consciousness, and a laboratory model of naturally occurring disorders of awareness. James' treatment of consciousness in hypnosis presages contemporary interests in dissociation and implicit cognition, and underscores the role of the self in conscious mental life. At the same time, James recognized the complexity of hypnosis as an interpersonal process. In the end, James' views suggest how a rapprochement between the cognitive and social approaches to hypnosis might be achieved. Kirsch, Irving (1990). Changing expectations: A key to effective psychotherapy. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. (Reviewed in American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 34, 138) NOTES This is a clinical hypnosis textbook written from the perspective of a cognitive therapist, and based on response-expectancy theory. The author discusses how expectancy theory can account for results obtained with hypnosis, cognitive behavioral, and psychodynamic psychotherapy, as well as with psychopharmacology. The book draws heavily upon psychological research in psychotherapy as well as hypnosis, and discusses how therapists can mobilize patient positive expectations for change. Hypnotic responses are viewed as 'genuine' responses that subjectively are not perceived to be under voluntary control (similar to other classes of response behavior). Lynn, Steven Jay (1990). Is hypnotic influence coercive? Invited discussion of Levitt, Baker, and Fish: Some conditions of compliance and resistance among hypnotic subjects. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 32 (4), 239-241. NOTES Unlike Levitt, Baker, & Fish (1990), Lynn, Rhue, & Weekes (Psychological Review, 1990 in press) concluded that nonvoluntary behaviors in hypnosis are similar to other spontaneous social behaviors (like conversational response to social stimuli). "Hypnotized subjects, like nonhypnotized subjects, act in terms of their aims, according to their point of view, and in relation to their interpretation of appropriate behavior and feelings" (p. 239). "Research shows that hypnotizable subjects resist and even oppose suggestions as a function of their expectancies and perceptions about appropriate hypnotic behavior (Lynn, Nash, Rhue, Frauman, & Sweeney, 1984; Lynn, Snodgrass, Rhue, & Hardaway, 1987; Lynn, Weekes, Snodgrass, Abrams, Weiss, & Rhue, 1986; Spanos, Cobb, & Gorassini, 1985). In one study (Spanos et al., 1985), when subjects were informed that deeply hypnotized subjects were capable of becoming involved in suggestions and simultaneously resisting them, subjects resisted 95% of the suggestions. When subjects were told that deeply hypnotized subjects were incapable of resisting suggestions, they passed the majority of suggestions. Thus, knowledge about what constitutes appropriate hypnotic role behavior is a reliable determinant of resistance, apparently more reliable than the monetary lures used by Levitt et al." (P. 240). These studies by Levitt et al. only used behavioral measures of resistance and hypnotizability, and Ss' perceptions of the resistance instructor and hypnotist. "The ratings of global perceptions are, however, no substitute for measures of subjects' perception of the _relationship_. ... The failure to measure important variables relevant to the central dimensions of concern--coercion, compliance, involuntariness, and relational factors--precludes meaningful interpretation of the nonresisters' motivation and behavior" (p. 240). As Orne (1959) has suggested, we should not attribute behavior in the hypnosis context to something unique to hypnosis (such as coercive influence), because other kinds of social context also constrain behavior, e.g. psychotherapy and psychology experiments, with coercive features. Therefore, it seems important in the future to compare the responses of hypnotized subjects with those of subjects in waking-imagination and hypnosis-simulating conditions. In addition to looking at their behavior, it is important to examine their own perceptions of their actions, given the complexity of the social situation entailed in hypnosis. "Finally, there are statistical grounds to be wary of the authors' conclusions. They assert that 'relational factors in the hypnotic dyad influence hypnotic responsiveness,' yet in three of the studies (I, II, and IV), subjects' ratings of the hypnotist failed to discriminate whether they resisted or responded to the suggestion" (p. 241). Even where Study III was compared with Study II, the difference in the percentage of Ss who resisted failed to reach statistical significance. "In fact, across all studies, differences in overall resistance rates were not documented by statistical tests--despite procedural variations and differing monetary incentives. So contrary to authors' assertion, relational factors _in the hypnotic dyad_ generally had little bearing on resistance behavior. If anything, ratings of the resistance instructor had greater weight" (p. 241). McCue, Peter A. (1990). Unsuggested effects in the hypnosis setting: Evidence of a special state?. British Journal of Experimental and Clinical Hypnosis, 7, 69-79. Controversy still surrounds the traditional view that a special state ('hypnotic trance', 'hypnotic state' or simply 'hypnosis') arises in responsive subjects when they are exposed to hypnotic induction procedures. The existence of reliable unsuggested (spontaneous) effects would lend support to a special state interpretation of hypnosis, provided that such effects only tended to occur in hypnosis or self-hypnosis settings and provided that the possibility that they arose from inadvertent suggestion, cues in the situation or from subjects' knowledge of, or expectations about, hypnosis could be excluded. Several supposedly unsuggested effects are considered (e.g. increased 'primary process thinking', 'trance logic', and literalness), but it is concluded that the evidence bearing on them does not provide strong support for a special state interpretation of hypnosis. NOTES Increased suggestibility following a hypnotic induction procedure could arise from subjects' expectations: if subjects believe that they will respond better to suggestions if they are 'hypnotized', they may be less likely to respond if no induction procedure is administered. Further, hypnotic induction procedures themselves contain suggestions, and successful response to them may facilitate responsiveness to subsequent suggestions - not through the development of a special state of consciousness ('trance'), but through simple changes in subjects' beliefs and expectations. For example, take the case of a subject exposed to a hand levitation induction procedure: the hypnotist asks the subject to focus his or her attention on a spot on the back of one of the subjects hands. The hypnotist then suggests that the hand will feel light and will lift by itself towards the subject's face, whereupon the subject will enter a hypnotic trance. The subject might not realize that hand levitation can be experienced fairly easily by many people, and when his or her hand starts to lift, without any feeling that it is being deliberately lifted, he or she may infer that it is due to entering a trance. Believing that he or she is entering an altered state, the subject may interpret certain sensations, which actually result from sitting still and relaxing, as additional evidence that he or she has been 'hypnotized'. When given further suggestions, the subject may be less inclined to harbour negative, doubting thoughts and may be more likely to respond positively" (pp. 69-70). "Hypnotic state theorists might argue that some people can readily 'slip into hypnosis' without the necessity of an induction procedure, but such reasoning threatens the 'special' quality of the presumed 'hypnotic state', i.e. if people can drift into and out of a 'state of hypnosis' in the course of everyday life, it has to be asked whether the presumed hypnotic trance state is anything other than an ordinary state of consciousness. If it is not, then the term 'hypnotic trance' or 'hypnotic state' is essentially redundant" (p. 70). "It is conceivable that simply labeling a condition as 'hypnotic' may, in itself, facilitate 'primary process' material, i.e. if subjects believe that hypnosis entails dream-like experiences, their being exposed to a hypnotic induction procedure may constitute a tacit suggestion for such experiences" (p. 72). McNally, Richard J. (1990). Psychological approaches to panic disorder: A review. Psychological Bulletin, 108 (3), 403-419. Panic disorder has been the subject of considerable research and controversy. Though biological conceptualizations have been predominant, psychological theorists have recently advanced conditioning, personality, and cognitive hypotheses to explain the etiology of panic disorder. The purpose of this article is to provide an empirical and conceptual analysis of these psychological hypotheses. This review covers variants of the "fear-of-fear" construal of panic disorder (i.e., Pavlovian interoceptive conditioning, catastrophic misinterpretation of bodily sensations, anxiety sensitivity), research on predictability (i.e., expectancies) and controllability, and research on information-processing biases believed to underlie the phenomenology of panic. Suggestions for future research are made. Nilsson, Kayla Mae (1990). The effect of subject expectations of 'hypnosis' upon vividness of visual imagery. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 38, 17-24. This study explored how the expectation of hypnosis and the expectation of relaxation affected the vividness of visual imagery. 63 Ss who volunteered for a visual imagination study were randomly assigned to 4 groups. Ss were administered the vividness subscale (VS) of the Vividness and Control of Imagery Scale twice. In the 3 experimental groups, expectations were varied during the 2 VS administrations. All 3 groups were presented with a relaxation exercise between VS administrations. In 2 groups, it was labeled "hypnosis," and in the third group it was correctly labeled "relaxation." A control group listened to a neutral tape between their VSs. All groups were administered the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (Shor & E. C. Orne, 1962) after the 2 imagery tests. The results indicated that the vividness of visual imagery was significantly enhanced (equally) in the experimental groups but not in the control group. Perry, Campbell (1990). Coercion by hypnosis? Invited discussion of Levitt, Baker, and Fish: Some conditions of compliance and resistance among hypnotic subjects. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 32 (4), 242-243. NOTES 1: NOTES: "A postexperimental inquiry (following Orne, 1959) might have informed the reader of the degree to which operationalization of the coercion in terms of disobedience was successful. Without this additional step, it is difficult to determine whether what was found in the laboratory by these investigators applies to what has been reported in clinical and field settings for almost 200 years" (p. 242). "In particular, elsewhere, the authors equate coercion with involuntariness and appear to view involition as a euphemism for coercion. While I agree that perceiving involition of one's own behavior may contribute to the commission of unconsenting acts in hypnosis, the two are easily distinguished at the conceptual level. Laboratory subjects ordinarily report much behavior in hypnosis that is experienced involuntarily, without the issue of it being coerced ever being broached" (p. 242). Author describes cases in which patients claimed they participated in sex with hypnotist against their wills because they were hypnotized. "What may be happening in both of these reports is that the hypnotized subjects found themselves responding involuntarily; from this, they appear to have adduced that they could not resist the hypnotist's suggestion. That is, they were coerced not by hypnosis but by their belief, which was a direct function of the experience of involuntariness, that they could not resist" (p. 243). "In short, if a hypnotized person equates involuntary behavior with powerlessness, "coercion" may occur in this limited sense. Conceptually, this appears to be a far cry from equating involition with coercion" (p. 243). 1990 Rokke, Paul D.; Carter, Alice S.; Rehm, Lynn P. (1990). Comparative credibility of current treatments for depression. Psychotherapy, 27, 235-242. Current treatments of depression were evaluated for credibility. Interpersonal, communication, self-control, cognitive, social skills, and relaxation placebo therapies were rated significantly more credible and efficacious than psychodynamic and activity-change therapies, which were rated significantly more credible than biological (drug) therapy. Implications were addressed. NOTES The authors presented the basic theoretical rationale and procedures associated with the nine therapies. They used the Beck Depression Inventory and the Eysenck Personality Inventory to investigate individual differences.