When given 3 choices, the number of misleading items endorsed dropped from .7 to 0.4 which is the most robust finding in the study and affects the rest of the study. Many Ss who endorsed the items reported minutes later that they had no memory for the event (on the check list). While many Ss given only two choices wrote in the margin that the event had never occurred.
Offering an ‘I don’t know’ third option decreased endorsement of the Harvard items also, from 6.4 to 5.2 which is significant. The relationship between hypnotizability and endorsement of misleading items became much weaker when accounting for this.
Scoring high on DES is significantly related to accepting misinformation. Tellegen Absorption Scale also related to accepting misleading information. Harvard Hypnotizability Scale was not related to accepting misinformation.
Total memory on the Harvard (before cue plus after cue) did not correlate with resistance to misleading information. History of abuse was related to hypnotizability. Have to evaluate whether it was traumatizing, multiple abuse, etc.

Eisen, Mitchell L.; Goodman, Gail S.; Qin, Jianjian (1995, November). Child witnesses: Dissociation and memory and suggestibility in abused children. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Antonio, TX.

Our study looked at suggestibility and resistance to suggestion. During 5-day hospitalization for investigation of child abuse. The first day patient gets physical exam; 2nd day a genital exam, heart arousal, stress arousal; a later day had mental status, emotional functioning, cognitive functioning–and gross screen of IQ for age 5 and up and the digit span for 6 and up, plus rating of global functioning and provisional diagnosis. On Day 5 each child was given structured interview that included questions about the anal- genital exam, with some misleading questions included.
35 minutes after the psychological examination they were given questions about the exam, for brief memory. Next exam was forensic examination of memory for abuse. Gave memory for sentences, perceptual alterations scale (PAS), adolescent version of Dissociative Experiences Scale (A-DES); gave questionnaire to parents.
Hypotheses: suggestibility would be negatively related to age (more errors when younger). Sexually and physically abused children would show more dissociation or psychopathology. Dissociation or psychopathology should be inversely related to memory ability. IQ should be related to memory and resistance to misinformation. Wanted to reconcile two models of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD): one says they have poorer memory, and the other says they are hypervigilant.
Over 100 children in the 200 received the questionnaire on Day 5. 39% were 3-5 years old, 41% 6-10 years old. 76% were African American. 22% had no documented abuse or neglect; 13% had experienced physical abuse; 30% sex abuse; 12% both types of abuse; 15% neglect; 8% parental addiction.
Measuring dissociation in kids is problematic. The concept is used to describe a huge range of phenomena. Scores on the DES are more highly correlated with the F Scale on the MMPI than with any other measure (Michael Nash’s research). So the DES measures psychopathology. Also, children have healthy kinds of dissociation– daydreaming, etc. Josephine Hilgard noted that young kids are naturally involved in imagination. Early traumas may lead to this dissociative style. How do we sort out the healthy imaginal involvements of children from the psychopathology? There is not sufficient data at this time.
Available measures are not validated well. The CDC indicates behavior problems in children. The C-PAS conceptualizes dissociation as relating to eating disorders; the A- DES is a self report measure that related to psychopathology.
CDC scores increase, in 3-5 year olds, as the amount of abuse increases. This looks like general psychopathology, and it is a parental rating. The A-DES and C-PAS were not related to abuse or neglect. In the older groups the CDC related to poor performance on memory tests; but only for the 6-10 year olds. (Poorer memories in younger children could have masked the effect in them.)
The main finding for the study was clinician’s estimate of Global Adaptive Functioning was significantly related to Resistance to Misleading Information. The effect did not show for the 3-5 yr old group, perhaps because their memory functioning is poor anyway. Also age was related to memory and suggestibility.

Frischholz, Edward J. (1995, November). A critical evaluation of the 1985 AMA Report on hypnosis and memory. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Antonio, TX.

JAMA 1985 concluded that hypnotically refreshed memories are less reliable than nonhypnotic recall. There are two problems with their conclusion: 1. No consensually validated definition of ‘hypnosis’ is identified. They talk about administration of induction, and differences in hypnotic susceptibility. 2. Empirical criteria for discriminating the unique and/or moderating effects attributable to hypnosis are not specified.
For example Loftus showed that memory errors can be created without hypnosis. You should not just add hypnosis to that model.
The criticisms have not led to remedial practices. No research has been done to show how to minimize errors or how to facilitate accuracy.
‘What is Hypnosis?’ Something that is done vs. something that happens? A procedure or responsivity? Questions like this are relevant to research on whether hypnotically refreshed memories are less reliable than ordinary recall.
Hypnosis is not a ‘valid therapeutic modality’ (i.e., ‘hypnotherapy’ is a misnomer). Hypnosis can be used adjunctively with many different types of therapeutic modalities: –psychodynamic therapies –behavior modification treatments –cognitive restructuring strategies –systematic desensitization –flooding –direct suggestion
There is a specious communality: hypnosis is used in a different kind of way with each approach.
If hypnosis is defined in terms of whether an hypnotic induction procedure was administered to the subject, then hypnosis is a universal phenomenon (i.e., everyone can be administered an hypnotic induction procedure). This, in the AMA report, permitted the courts to define it this way, which leads to a number of ridiculous results.
We need to highlight ‘What are the variables that are the source of the errors?’ The sources are not hypnosis. We can minimize the sources by the way we ask questions, instruct the subjects, etc.
If hypnosis is defined in terms of the nature of the subjects’ response to the procedures, then hypnosis is not a universal phenomenon (i.e., there are wide individual differences in hypnotic responsivity). I have shown that it is possible to alter memories, using the Loftus model, in people who are both low and high hypnotizable.
We need to take into account induction procedure, hypnotizability, type of memory, and the retrieval/influence procedure. The demand characteristics re forced responding, expectancies about memory (e.g. video recorder model), expectancies about hypnosis (e.g., everyone remembers) must be accounted for.
Dependent variables in this type of research include memory accuracy, memory errors, and subjective confidence.

Malinoski, Peter; Martin, Daniel F.; Aronoff, Jodi; Lynn, Steven Jay; Gedeon, Scott (1995, November). Hypnotizability, individual differences, and interpersonal pressure to report early childhood memories. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Antonio, TX.

Infantile amnesia is attributed to developmental issues before 24 months. This study indicates non-hypnotic influences can shape early memories that cross the amnesia barrier.
227 Ss completed Harvard Scale and personality measures in Session 1. In Session 2 182 completed a suggestibility scale. In Session 3 they were selected, as if independent of earlier sessions – 143 [may have misheard number] Ss.
Interviewers told the selected Ss that they were experiencing something like psychotherapy, and they were asked to recall their earliest memory (independent of photos, what people had told them, etc.) Then Experimenters probed for earlier memories; that continued until Ss denied any more memories after 2 consecutive probes. Then Ss were asked to close their eyes and get in touch with more memories. Then they were told most Ss can remember more, including sometimes their second birthday party. After 1 minute, Ss were asked about memories of their second birthday. Then they were asked to focus on even earlier memories, implying it was expected and receiving complements for reporting earlier memories. Finally, Ss completed a post-study questionnaire.
Memory report was a verbal description of an event, person, or object. Initial memory mean age was 3.7; it correlated with Openness to Experience Scale and with Fantasy Proneness. Mean age of the last earliest memory report before the close eyes instruction was 3.2 years. After receiving visualization instructions, 59% reported a memory of their second birthday. Compliance correlated .33 with this. Subjective response, nonvoluntariness, and [missed words] also correlated.
Compliance scores correlated .28 with at least one memory at or before age 24 months. Yielding to leading questions correlated also with memory for an event at or before 24 months.
Clarity of memories decreased between conditions of initial memory, earliest query, birthday, and earliest memory. Mean confidence rating on 5 point scale for second birthday memory was 3.3; mean confidence rating for earliest memory was 3.6. Mean accuracy rating was 4.0, and 94% said their memory reports were accurate to at least a moderate degree.
The post study questionnaire, totally anonymous, indicated Ss did not feel much pressure to recall (2.9 on scale of 1-5). Only 9.8% indicated they felt a lot of pressure. Subjects also usually denied that they made up memories to satisfy the experimenter. On average, the reports of memory under visualization conditions occurred two years earlier than their first reported memories.

Spiegel, Herbert (1995, November). Hypnosis and memory: Point/counterpoint. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Antonio, TX.

Humans need an interactive flow, a ribbon of concentration, that holds people together with self and environment; a healthy continuity of flow. If there are interruptions, that suggests pathology.
Bernheim said there must be some degree of involuntariness to have hypnosis. Many tests of hypnotizability (e.g. the Stanford scales) involve tests of behavioral compliance. The Hypnotic Induction Profile [HIP] incorporates a bio-psycho-social concept, not simply behavioral compliance, and actually measures the degree of involuntariness with arm levitation.
The eye roll item on the HIP relates to a capacity for dissociation.
Hypnosis involves Dissociation, Absorption, and Suggestibility; the degrees of which correspond with the three personality styles.* [A presentation of the Spiegel and Spiegel theory of Dionysian, Odyssean, and Apollonian personality types followed here.]*
Trance capacity is a constant. Depression can interfere with it, but when depression is relieved the person is responsive again. This is not so for schizophrenics, who do not improve in hypnosis when their symptoms are clinically contained. Cognitive fragility is always present.
The issue of memory is made interesting because of the phenomenon of intrinsic memory. (He gave an example of single case study of remembering how to do developmental drawing tests.)
Max Weber talked about balancing ethics of responsibility with ethics of conviction. In therapy the former is important; in forensics, the relevance of data for issues central to legal issue is important and external corroboration is essential.
Since we are getting around to believing that we don’t need formal induction ceremonies to elicit hypnotic phenomena, we should apply that knowledge in the forensic setting. So isn’t it relevant, in investigating a crime, to try to understand veridicality of a memory by understanding the hypnotizability of the subjects involved? Because if they are high hypnotizables and have a goal, there may be a twist in their memory; while lows may not have the same problem, and other things might affect the accuracy of recall for them).

Weitzenhoffer, Andre M. (1995, November). The incorporation of current events among true memories during age-regressions: Another way of creating pseudo-memories. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Antonio, TX.

In 1947 while someone else was demonstrating hypnosis, the subject remembered a cat being squeezed and dying; a week later, in hypnosis, she said “That man with a cat is here again.” So a pseudomemory became part of an earlier memory, which spontaneously appeared later during age regression.
This event reminds one of Milton Erickson’s “February Man” [a case in which pseudomemories were created for purposes of treatment]. So I tried to repeat the 1949 experiment, in a demonstration with a classical somnambulist.
In the demonstration, the other experimenter offered to give the hypnotized Subject a cat; the subject asked him to intercede with her mother. This was during age regression to age 4. Later, regressed to age 5, she spontaneously said that she had a cat and had received it from the other experimenter the year before. The memory had been elaborated into another memory. When not age regressed, she told of a cat having been given to her by “a friend of the family.”
We don’t know whether, if we regressed these subjects to the same age again, they would still have this memory? I do not view these two experiments as actual replications of the February Man situation. What is in common with that case published by Erickson is the transformation of a current event into a memory in age regression. It is hard to dismiss the possibility of role playing. But these were very highly hypnotizable people.

Ceci, Stephen J.; Loftus, Elizabeth F.; Leichtman, Michelle D.; Bruck, Maggie (1994). The possible role of source misattributions in creation of false beliefs among preschoolers. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 42 (4), 304-320.

In this article the authors examine one possible factor in the creation of false beliefs among preschool-aged children, namely, source misattributions. The authors present the results from an ongoing program of research which suggest that source misattributions could be a mechanism underlying children’s false beliefs about having experienced fictitious events. Findings from this program of research indicate that, although all children are susceptible to making source misattributions, very young children may be disproportionately vulnerable to these kinds of errors. This vulnerability leads younger preschoolers, on occasion, to claim that they remember actually experiencing events that they only thought about or were suggested by others. These results are discussed in the context of the ongoing debate over the veracity and durability of delayed reports of early memories, repressed memories, dissociative states, and the validity risks posed by therapeutic techniques that entail repeated visually guided imagery inductions.

Frankel, Fred H. (1994, October). On patients remembering abuse when it in fact may not have occurred. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Francisco.

The concept of hidden memories has supported the profession of psychotherapy for a century. This process can only occur if there is a mechanism to support it. Bowers says, if memory is not reliably accurate, it is not reliably inaccurate either.
“Ideas passing as descriptions lead us to equate the tentative with [the factual.]” – Gould.
Three studies purporting to establish repression: 1. Briere & Comte sampled 450 adults who reported abuse. They asked, “Was there ever a time when you couldn’t remember the forced experience?” How does respondent understand the question? Clients were all in therapy. 2. Herman and Schatzow (1989) “verification of abuse” study. 53 Ss in a survivor’s group. Reports percentages who had no or little recall. Authors don’t acknowledge that the group discussion and the attitude of therapist may have shaped the response. It is also not clear how many Ss who claimed to have “verified” their accounts were among those who had severe amnesia for the event. They could be Ss who had never lost the memory in the first place. 3. Williams interviewed women who earlier were in Emergency Rooms because of abuse being suspected. 38% did not report childhood abuse when questioned, and author concluded it was due to repression. Significant numbers of adults cannot remember things even past the age of 5.
Problem with wording of questions. Some of the women interviewed might have preferred not to report the event. This was not investigated in the study.

Freyd, Jennifer J. (1994). Betrayal-trauma: Traumatic amnesia as an adaptive response to childhood abuse. Ethics and Behavior, 4.

Betrayal-trauma theory suggests that psychogenic amnesia is an adaptive response to childhood abuse. When a parent or other powerful figure violates a fundamental ethic of human relationships, victims may need to remain unaware of the trauma not to reduce suffering but rather to promote survival. Amnesia enables the child to maintain an attachment with a figure vital to survival, development, and thriving. Analysis of evolutionary pressures, mental modules, social cognitions, and developmental needs suggests that the degree to which the most fundamental human ethics are violated can influence the nature, form, processes, and responses to trauma.

A logical extension of this research direction, based on a strategy that has been very effective in cognitive neuroscience, would be to look for neuroanatomical underpinnings of the cognitive mechanisms implicated in dissociation. … For instance, the ability to dissociate current experience may depend partly on representational structures that support spontaneous perceptual transformations of incoming events. One possible perceptual transformation that is amenable to scientific investigation, would be the creation of spatial representations in which the mental ‘observer’ is spatially distinct from the real body of that observer. Such a representation would fit patient descriptions of ‘leaving their body’ during a traumatic episode and viewing the scene as if from afar. Additionally one could investigate the role of mental recoding and restructuring during memory ‘recovery’ and psychotherapy” (pp. 19-20).

Kinnunen, Taru; Zamansky, Harold S.; Block, Martin L. (1994). Is the hypnotized subject lying?. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103, 184-191.

Do the verbal reports of deeply hypnotized Subjects truthfully reflect their subjective experiences of hypnotic suggestions? Exp 1 established that the electrodermal skin conductance response (SCR) provides an effective method for detecting deception in the laboratory equally well in hypnotized and nonhypnotized Subjects. In Exp 2, deeply hypnotized and simulating Subjects were administered a number of hypnotic suggestions in a typical hypnotic session, without mention of deception, and were questioned about their experiences while SCR measures were recorded concurrently. Results indicate that 89% of the hypnotized Subjects’ reports met the criterion for truthfulness, whereas only 35% of the simulators’ reports met this criterion. Implications for the theory of hypnosis are discussed.

Lynn, Steven Jay; Nash, Michael R. (1994). Truth in memory: Ramifications for psychotherapy and hypnotherapy. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 36, 194-208.

In this article we address a number of issues relevant to the practice of psychotherapy and hypnotherapy: How reliable is memory? How are therapists’ and clients’ beliefs and expectancies related to pseudomemory formation? Are certain clients particularly vulnerable to pseudomemory creation? Does hypnosis pose special hazards for pseudomemory reports? What are the variables or factors that mediate hypnotic pseudomemories? In addition to reviewing the literature on these topics, we intend to sensitize the clinician to the potential pitfalls of critical reliance on the patient’s memories, as well as uncritically accepted clinical beliefs and practices.

Malinoski, Peter; Aronoff, Jodi; Lynn, Steven J.; Moretsky, Michael (1994, August). Hypnosis and early memories. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Los Angeles.

We studied autobiographical memory in the college population, as manifested in the therapy situation, as a way of investigating an individual difference variable. Most people do not have recall before age 3 or 4 (and probably infantile amnesia begins before age 2).
Administered Autobiographical Memory Scale (AMS), and later in context of a hypnosis scale. 247 students were in phase 1, conducted as two separate experiments so that Ss wouldn’t link the AMS to measures used in the second study.
First study was presented as a study of personal memories. Asked Ss to distinguish first five birthdays, circumstances around loss of first tooth, first day of high school. Also, they were asked about their earliest memory events, rated according to 3 scales (detail, vividness, accuracy of recall). Authors summed Ss’ responses on these 3 ratings for the 8 item scale.
Part II. Administered various scales: Life Experiences, Fantasy Proneness, Wilson & Barber’s scale, Imagery Control Scale, Global Psychopathology, 25 item scale of physical and sexual abuse, Brier’s list of symptoms of abuse, and DES (Dissociative Experiences Scale). Imbedded were 12 items to test carelessness in responding (e.g. “I have never said Hello to anyone who wore eyeglasses.”)
RESULTS. Phase 1. Two people indicated they had memories dating to before their first birthday; an additional 5% of Ss gave memories between 12-24 months. This would probably be impossible. Another 14.4% described events between 24-36 months; 37.4% said their earliest memory was at age 3. Mean age for earliest memory was 3.4 years (which agrees with other surveys.) Only l subject stated his earliest memory was as late as the tenth year of life.
High intercorrelation was obtained, ranging .79 to .89, between ratings on any of the memory event ratings (as detailed, vivid, or accurate). There was a negative correlation of these ratings with age of recall. Ss who report more detail, vividness, and competence, were also likely to report earlier first memories.
Authors divided Ss into three groups based on age of first memory: 12 with first memory earlier than first year; those whose first memory was between 1-7 years; and those with a later first memory. The earlier memory group were more fantasy prone; and rated their memories as more reliable, vivid. This suggests there are persons who report memories that are covered by infantile amnesia, report them with greater detail, and are more fantasy prone than those who report memory events beginning later in life. This is consistent with Wilson & Barber’s finding that fantasy prone people have vivid recall of early childhood events.
None of the memory reports correlated with psychopathology or dissociation. Dissociation (DES) was correlated with abuse indicators, however. Compared top and lowest 10% and middle range on DES on their memory scores and found no relationship. There was no support for the idea that report of early life events in dissociative people is compromised. Failure to recall early memories shouldn’t suggest that people are dissociative (which some therapists tend to do).
All three memory measures were associated with Harvard Scale scores. The AMS was administered at the same time as the Harvard. Objective responding on the Harvard correlated with detail, vividness, and accuracy of recall. Also, involuntariness of response correlated with all 3 measures of the AMS. Finally, subjective involvement correlated with all three measures of AMS. At least when hypnosis is measured first, and explicit connection is suggested, there is a connection. Further research is needed to see if the relationship holds when measured in independent contexts. This may explain why High Hypnotizables are more prone to pseudo memories and leading questions. They may come to confuse them with historical reality.
The results suggest caution for early memory reports. They may be vulnerable to confusing fantasy and reality, as well as to biasing effects.

Martin, D.; Tomak, J.; Lynn, S. J. (1994, October). Detecting simulation with the hypnosis simulation index. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Francisco.
Orne described demand characteristics of the hypnotic situation, such that some Ss want to either deceive the hypnotist or to please the hypnotist or to help the experiment work. To separate essence of hypnosis he devised an experimental technique, which informs S to role-play, and tells them intelligent Ss will be able to do this. Sheehan & McConkey note that though the model specifies subjective experience, it lacks a way of determining if people are truthful.
We developed a scale assuming hypnotized Ss would be truthful and wouldn’t say they had experiences they didn’t, but that simulators would exaggerate. The scale included events plausibly reported by highs but not widely reported.
The scale has 31 items, and is titled the Hypnotic Experience Scale. It has 24 items for experiences during hypnosis, 5 for experiences after hypnosis, and 2 for how deeply hypnotized they felt and what kind of hypnotic subject they thought they were.
Ss participated in 2 sessions. They had the Harvard group scale in the first, and simulation instructions in second session. Simulation instructions were read to Low and Medium subjects. To encourage Ss to keep eyes closed, they were told it was essential to keep their eyes closed. We had scores on:
Hypnosis Simulation Index
SCL 90
Tellegen Absorption Scale
Highs did not receive any simulation suggestions. Then the Stanford Scale was administered. Highs and Simulators had to pass at least 9 Harvard items.
Of the predictors, only the Hypnosis Simulation Index discriminated. It correctly classified 94% of the Ss. To eliminate non-useful items, a stepwise discriminate analysis was performed. 15 items remained. These 15 items were used in a series of analyses. They discriminated between the 2 groups from 100% to 70% of the time.
This study is the first to successfully discriminate hypnotized from dissimulating subjects. Simulators’ performance indicate they tend to respond in stereotypic ways that exaggerate how hypnotized Ss respond. Hypnotized Ss who passed more than 10 items only rated themselves as average on hypnotizability.
This has potential applications in forensic situations.

Ofshe, Richard; Singer, Margaret T. (1994). Recovered memory and robust repression: Influence and pseudomemory. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 42, 391-410.

A subset of the psychotherapists practicing trauma-focused therapy predicate their treatment on the existence of a newly claimed, powerful form of repression that differs from repression as used in the psychoanalytic tradition and from amnesia in any of its recognized forms. Recovered-memory specialists assist patients to supposedly retrieve vast quantities of information (e.g., utterly new dramatic life histories) that were allegedly unavailable to consciousness for years of decades. We refer to the hypothesized mental mechanism as ‘robust repression’ and call attention to the absence of evidence documenting its validity and to the differences between it and other mental mechanisms and memory features. No recovered-memory practitioner has ever published a full specification of the attributes of this mechanism. That is, the properties it would have to have for the narratives developed during therapy to be historically accurate to any significant degree. This article reports a specification of the properties of the robust repression mechanism based on interviews with current and former patients, practitioners’ writings, and reports to researchers and clinicians. The spread of reliance on the robust repression mechanism over the past 20 years through portions of the clinical community is traced. While involved in therapy, patients of recovered-memory practitioners come to believe that they have either instantly repressed large numbers of discrete events or simultaneously repressed all information about abuse they may have endured for as long as a decade. Patients’ therapy-derived accounts are thought by some social influence, memory, and clinical specialists to be inadvertently created iatrogenic effects: inaccurate pseudomemories and confabulations produced due to patient-therapist interaction, the use of leading, (sic) suggestions, hypnosis, and the mismanagement of the dependent relation of the patient on the therapist. Three cases are reported which illustrate how new life accounts predicated by robust repression can develop during therapy with a recovered- memory practitioner.

Scheflin, Alan W. (1994). Forensic hypnosis: Unanswered questions. Australian Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 22, 25-37.

Many courts have mistakenly identified hypnosis as more suggestive than eyewitness testimony or leading questions, and therefore these courts have applied unnecessarily restrictive rulings on hypnosis. The dangers of suggestion in eyewitness and interrogation cases pose reliability problems that are equally as great. In all situations, pre- trial evidentiary hearings on admissibility of ‘suggestive’ testimony is essential. Expert testimony should be available to assist the judge. The forensic rules to date have failed to clarify some hard cases. In resolving these cases, courts are encouraged to adopt a case- by-case analysis rather than a total prohibition on hypnotically refreshed recollection. Courts have assumed conclusions about hypnosis that the laboratory experiments suggest are incorrect – juries are not overly persuaded by hypnosis testimony, there is no inevitable concreting effect and witnesses do not become impervious to cross-examination. Thus, the restrictive per se disqualification rules for hypnotically refreshed recollection are too severe.

Spiegel, David (1994, October). On patients not remembering abuse when it in fact may have occurred. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Francisco.

False memories and false non-memories may be two sides of the same coin. What is the evidence for repression?
If people are abducted by extraterrestrials, why don’t they just keep them? [Joke!] It seems counter-intuitive that people would forget important, arousing things that happen.
The three main components of hypnosis (suggestibility, absorption, and dissociation) are also aspects of memory: 1. Absorption relates to encoding (narrowing attention); also happens during traumatic events (Loftus’ “gun memory” which is so clear, while they don’t encode what gunman’s face looks like). 2. Dissociation relates to memory storage (compartmentalization of information). Traumatized people have symptoms of dissociation, depersonalization. If you are in an unusual mental state, you may watch the event; the memory is stored without the usual network of associations. 3. Suggestibility relates to retrieval. The way questions are asked influences one’s response. But hypnosis is not an infinite influencer; the main damage to memory contributed by hypnosis is “confident errors” (McConkey).
We did research one week after the Loma Prieta earthquake, and found significant cognitive alterations, memory alterations, etc. In our sample, 1/4 of the people felt detached from their body or from the ground right after the earthquake.
Memory alterations were compared with data from other studies after other traumas. Difficulties with memory occurred in 29% of our sample.
The disorganization of memory can follow even just witnessing trauma (e.g. the recent slaying of 8 people in the law office in San Francisco) And people who witnessed the execution of Harris. They were in no danger themselves, yet the level of dissociative symptoms were as high in the former.
The Briere & Cone and Herman & Shatzow studies are based on self report of earlier trauma, and that is a problem in research. But Williams’ study does have the age of people when they were abused as children; see her article in Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology.

Dabney Ewin: Sex abuse trauma differs from earthquakes because the abuser says, “If you tell anybody I’ll kill you.” This is like a post hypnotic suggestion, which is carried out compulsively when given to the victim during fear.
Dale: How to we account for the vigor in the attempts of each side to convince the other. The people who have been real victims of sexual abuse need to be able to talk with the people who are victims of False Memory Syndrome. The impact on a family is just as traumatic as the sexual abuse itself.
Response by D. Spiegel: I wouldn’t recommend that combination, but the point you make about damage to the falsely accused is relevant. Their lives are shattered but remember the damage done throughout life by sexual abuse.

Yapko, Michael D. (1994). Suggestions of abuse: True and false memories of childhood sexual trauma. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

From the section titled “A Note to Therapists:”
“I would encourage you _not_ to (1) preclude open communication at all times among family members; (2) act as your client’s ‘hired gun’; (3) act as if corroboration of allegations of abuse were unnecessary; (4) jump quickly to the conclusion abuse occurred simply because it is plausible; (5) suggest a history of abuse to someone who is not your client; (6) refer a client out for hypnotic confirmation or disconfirmation on the false premise that hypnosis is some kind of lie detector; (7) ask leading or suggestive questions; (8) assume repression is in force when someone does not have much memory from childhood; (9) rely on your memory of the interaction. Tape your investigative sessions and review them later for any evidence of possible unintentional contamination of your client’s recollections” (p. 217).

Hawkins, Russell (1993). An analysis of hypnotherapist-client sexual intimacy. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 41, 272-286.

While sexual interaction between psychologists, physicians, and other health therapists of all kinds and their clients is typically condemned by professional bodies as unethical, the controversy regarding the potential for hypnosis to produce compliant behavior in unwilling or nonconsenting subjects suggests that hypnotherapist-client sex may warrant special attention. Because the experiments required to clarify the potential for hypnosis to potentiate nontrivial compliance are themselves unethical and/or inconclusive, experimental methods cannot be adequately used to clarify this issue. Instead, the matter can be addressed by reference to other forms of evidence, such as the responses of therapists and clients to anonymous surveys and the analysis of cases, that have reached the courts. Consideration of this qualitatively deficient evidence suggests that even if the use of hypnotic suggestion can lead to compliance to sexual demands, overt coercion is seldom used in practice. Social psychological and situational factors are particularly salient in understanding therapist-client sex. The question of whether there are special properties of the dynamics of the hypnotic experience, other than specific coercive suggestion and beyond those typically found in other forms of therapy, is considered. Comparisons are drawn with other examples of socially condemned sex, such as teacher-student sex, sexual harassment in the workplace, incest, and extramarital sex.
Stolar, Donald Sigmund (1993). History of hypnosis in court. [Lecture] UCLA Hypnosis Seminar.

Disclaimer–The following information is not intended to substitute for professional legal advice and should not be used as such.
The following events led up to our current situation in California, regarding the use of hypnotically elicited information in court:
1968 – Harding vs. the State of Maryland. First case in which the state prosecution requested use of hypnosis. (Prior to this hypnotically refreshed memory was not used in court testimony because the memory was regarded as unreliable.) Police hypnotized a state’s witness, and a man was convicted of rape. Hypnosis in this case was considered no different from other memory jogging techniques (Like showing a witness pictures.)
1978 – Reiser published “Hypnosis and it’s use in law enforcement.” In it he stated that 60% of witnesses hypnotized by police gave important information that helped the case. Reiser is a psychologist working in the Los Angeles Police Department.
1976 – Chowchilla kidnaping case, the driver of the bus was hypnotized, and remembered enough of a license plate to catch the kidnappers.
1980 – Reiser, _Handbook of Investigative Hypnosis_ N=384 cases were investigated using hypnosis. In 67% of these cases, hypnosis was thought to have led to valuable information. Where external corroboration was possible, 90% of the new pieces of information were accurate. The Society for Investigative and Forensic Hypnosis was established by Reiser.
During this same period, courts were pulling back from permitting hypnotically refreshed memories to be given in court testimony.
1979 Martin Orne (in the International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis) proposed safeguards for the use of hypnosis for forensic purposes. 1. Licensed psychologist or psychiatrist does the hypnosis. 2. Hypnotist is independent of prosecution, defense, and investigator. 3. Any information regarding a crime given to the hypnotist before hypnosis must be written down. 4. The hypnotist writes everything the witness says. 5. All interviews, including the pre-hypnosis interview, are recorded. 6. Only the hypnotist and witness are in the room, and 7. independent verification is very important.
Inasmuch as Reiser had been training detectives to do investigative hypnosis, he countered the Orne requirements by noting that: 1. Therapists are not trained investigators; detectives typically work with trauma victims. 2. Reports of adverse side effects following investigative hypnosis are exaggerated 3. Confabulation and fantasy are no more prevalent in hypnosis than in waking state.
Herbert Spiegel, in addressing the reliability of hypnotically refreshed memories, said hypnosis can make an “honest liar” out of a person. That is, they can be personally convinced that they have remembered something that in fact did not happen.
1980 – Bernard Diamond, M.D. (psychiatrist and law professor) wrote an article in the California Law Review, noting that: 1. Hypnotically refreshed testimony is full of fantasy and confabulation. 2. A hypnotist cannot tell if the subject is simulating. 3. A hypnotized subject cannot discriminate between fact and fantasy. 4. A hypnotized subject could become hardened against cross examination because with hypnosis he becomes more confident.
Courts began using the Frye Rule: in order for expert testimony to be admissible, it must be what is generally accepted to be true, in the scientific research literature.
1982 – The Shirley Decision (California Supreme Court) A woman who was raped was hypnotized before the trial. The accused, a man named Shirley, admitted having sex but said it was not forced. The Supreme Court used the Frye Rule to exclude any testimony from either side from anyone who had been hypnotized. (This rule applied to any hypnosis, including hypnotherapy.) Later the Court revised it to say that the defendant could be hypnotized (but not the plaintiff) because nothing should impede their defense.
1982 – Proposition 8 passed (Victim’s Rights bill) and allowed hypnotically refreshed testimony to be used.
1986 – Three Justices, including Justice Rose Bird, were removed from the California Supreme Court (by election) and the legislature wrote Section 795 (which represented a middle ground). Hypnotically refreshed memory is allowed if the court testimony is limited to pre-hypnotic recall.

Christianson, S-A (1992). Emotional stress and eyewitness memory: A critical review. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 284-309.

Although not addressing hypnosis specifically, this is a comprehensive review of literature on memory for negative emotional events relevant to issues of hypnosis and memory. The final conclusion is that emotional events are indeed remembered differently than neutral or ordinary events and are well retained with respect to the event itself and concerning central, critical detail (not peripheral detail). Such memories seem less susceptible to forgetting. There is evidence for dissociation between memory for emotional information and memory for specific event information. There is also evidence of amnesia or memory impairment effects after high-arousal events, with memory increasing as more time passes after the event. The functional amnesia effects are probably due to an interaction between altered encoding operations and the specific retrieval circumstances aiding consciously and unconsciously controlled reconstructive processes. There is little evidence to support Loftus’ contentions that emotional stress is bad for memory.

Faller, Kathleen Couborn (1992, Summer). Can therapy induce false allegations of sexual abuse?. The Advisor (Published by American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children), 5 (3), 3-6.

Concern about the impact of therapy on children’s accounts of sexual abuse should be understood in the context of two phenomena: (1) the adult need to deny that children are sexually abused, and (2) adult identification with the alleged abuser. These phenomena operate at both individual and societal levels” (p. 3).
“Research related to impact of stressful situations on children’s ability to recall provides mixed results, some studies finding children are less accurate if the event is traumatic (Peters, 1991) and others finding they are not (Goodman, Reed, & Hepps, 1985).
“Research reveals that it is rare for children to falsely allege that they have been touched in their private parts. In one study, a substantial proportion of children who experienced genital and anal touch during a physical examination by a doctor did not volunteer this information when asked general questions about the examination. The majority of children in the study revealed genital and anal touch only when they were asked specific questions like, “Did the doctor touch you there?” (Saywitz, Goodman, Nicholas, & Moan, 1991)” (pp. 3-4).
“Clarke-Stewart and her colleagues (1989) have demonstrated that children’s interpretation of ambiguous events can be manipulated and altered by an authority figure who insists upon a particular interpretation (see also Lindberg, 1991)” (p.4).
“In sum, the research suggests that older children are likely to provide more complete unassisted disclosure than younger children. Younger children may need more memory cues in the form of specific questions than older children. Therapists are much more likely to find false negatives than false positives. Finally, therapists should be aware of the possibility the child may identify the wrong person. … Generally, however, the research indicates that concern about the contaminating effects of therapy on children’s recollections of sexual abuse is exaggerated” (pp. 4-5).
“Research indicates that the proportion of fabricated reports may be higher in the divorce scenario than in other contexts (Faller, 1990; Jones & Seig, 1988). Studies suggest most false reports are made by adults, not children (Jones & McGraw, 1987; Jones & Seig, 1988)” (p. 5).
“Clinical research (Sorenson & Snow, 1991) and experience (Faller, 1988) indicate that for most children, revealing sexual abuse is a process which occurs over time. A typical pattern is one in which children begin with the least overwhelming experience and gradually disclose more and more as their accounts are accepted and believed” (p. 5).
“[In conclusion]… therapists should be aware of the findings from research on children’s memory and suggestibility. This research indicates that there are vulnerabilities which should be taken into account during therapy” (p. 6).

Gravitz, Melvin A. (1992, October). Historical and legal issues. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington, VA.
The 1976 Chowchilla kidnaping case in California stimulated interest in using hypnosis for forensic investigation; in the same year, it was used in a case of airline hijacking in the Mediterranean to Uganda. Hypnosis is used for obtaining “leads” and doesn’t claim to develop “the truth.”
Other uses include: lifting amnesia of witnesses and victims of trauma–including but not limited to crime; obtaining additional information in nonamnesic Ss; evaluation of a subject’s mental condition (e.g. multiple personality disorder vs malingering, as in the Bianchi case). In each use, hypnosis is not infallible, is not complete. But no procedure is. Motivation, resistance, transference are all critical.
Historic questions: 1. whether coercion is entailed 2. impact of hypnosis on memory 3. possible harm to subject, physically and mentally
The coercion issue dates to Mesmer, whose procedures led to accusations of immoral suggestions. In the 1880s Charcot said no one could be forced to do anything while the Nancy school (Liebeault) said they could. Since then we have seen laboratory studies using student volunteers, fake “poison,” rubber daggers, etc., as well as recent “real life” studies where Ss were induced to violate their morals (see Watkins). Review articles include those by Jacob Conn of Baltimore and the 1985 JAMA article written by a panel headed by Martin Orne.
For impact of hypnosis on memory, see the Orne report which did not fully support using hypnosis for memory enhancement.