A PATIENT IN HYPNOANALYSIS WAS ABLE TO BECOME AWARE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HER CHILDHOOD GERM PHOBIA AND HER EARLIER
Klemperer, Edith (1965). Past ego states emerging in hypnoanalysis. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 13 (3), 132-144.
Patients with anxiety, conversion, or phobic reactions differ from those with obessive-compulsive reactions in the type of visualization shown in hypnoanalytic regression or revivification. The former produce visualizations showing a well-rounded picture with logical progression of activity and few symbolic distortions. The latter, however, produce visualizations lacking a logical progression of activity and showing a somewhat disorganized and poorly-rounded picture. Symbolic distortions are frequent, often recurring intermittently. Case studies are presented. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2002 APA, all rights reserved)
1964
Arluck, Edward WIltcher (1964). Hypnoanalysis, a case study. New York: Random House.
Details transcripts (90 pages) and comments of a 28 session hypnoanalysis (Jungian) of a World War II soldier with traumatic war neurosis in a military setting shortly after the end of the war, for a conversion reaction with onset just prior to return to the States. Author cautions he found this amount of success in only about 15 of more than 70 individually treated cases. Emphasizes giving suggestions to dream about his condition/problem and utilizing dream interpretation. 53 references
Moss, C. Scott; Thompson, M. M.; Nolte, J. (1962). An additional study in hysteria: The case of Alice M.. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 10, 54-74. (Abstracted in Index Medicus, 62, 1425)
Detailed account of the psychotherapy of one female hysteric–a treatment failure–is the stimulant for discussion of the genetics and dynamics of this nosology. Hypnosis revealed the experimental basis for the symptoms and associated adjustment difficulties. The dynamics bear a remarkable resemblance to those advanced by Freud, though issue is taken with several psychoanalytic concepts. The discussion deals largely with the phenomenology of the female hysteric. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2002 APA, all rights reserved)
Furneaux, W. D. (1961). Neuroticism, extroversion, drive, and suggestibility. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 9, 195-214. (Abstracted in Psychological Abstracts, 62: 4 II 95F)
In the group studied, the body-sway scores of stable extraverts and neurotic introverts tended to be large, whereas they were smaller for stable introverts and neurotic extraverts. This result was explained in terms of a theoretical model in which the effective drive produced in a S by a test-situation is a function of both his neuroticism and his extraversion. The author believes that the theoretical model generates a number of predictions and suggestions which can serve to guide future experimental work in this field. From Psyc Abstracts 36:04:4II95F. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2002 APA, all rights reserved)
1960 Andreev, B. V. (1960). Sleep therapy in the neuroses. New York: Consultants Bureau. (Reviewed by Milton H. Erickson in American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 1962, 4, p. 203)
The book summarizes research on sleep therapy conducted at the Pavlov Clinic for Nervous Diseases, at the Pavlov Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. It provides a history of sleep therapy, which M. H. Erickson states “is as old as antiquity,” and details about the Russian research. Hypnosis and suggestion were two of many different procedures used to prolong sleep. 200-item bibliography
Lindner, Harold (1960). The shared neurosis: Hypnotist and subject. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 8, 61-70. (Abstracted in Psychological Abstracts, 62: 2 II 61L)
Psychoanalytic appraisal of the psychology of the hypnotist. Both hypnotist and subject share in a neurotic “hypnotic phantasy,” i.e., a magical satisfaction of emotional needs. The author posits that widespread subliminal recognition of the neurotic character of the hypnotic relationship has contributed to its lack of professional acceptance. From Psyc Abstracts 36:02:2II61L. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2002 APA, all rights reserved)
1955
Ament, Phillip (1955). A psychosomatic approach to the use of anesthesia for a hysterical dental patient: A case history. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 3, 120-123. (Abstracted in Psychological Abstracts 56: 1280)
Author describes a case highly resistant both to anesthesia and dentistry. Although very responsive to hypnosis, she continued moaning and moving from side to side (later determined to be her way of preventing dental work even though anesthetized). Ultimately a combination of hypnosis and multiple anesthetics was needed, including nembutal, sodium pentothal, nitrous oxide and novocain. In the author’s experience, most other patients require only hypnosis or hypnosis plus novocaine
Bowers, Margaretta; Brecher, Sylvia (1955). The emergence of multiple personalities in the course of hypnotic investigation. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 3 (4), 188-199.
“Summary. This paper is a preliminary report presenting only that portion of the material on one case depicting the actual process in which the multiple personality structure was uncovered. Due to space limitations only the more manifest dynamic material which was involved in the emergence of the personalities (and equally we feel, in their submergence) is reported. For the same reasons only a brief indication of the Rorschach and other psychological material is presented. The papr poses a number of problems which require further study and elaboration.
“Since the patient’s history gave no indication of fugue states or periods of amnesia, the possibility of the induction of multiple personalities by the hypnosis itself is considered and a careful noting of what occurred in the hypnotic sessions is made. In the authors’ opinion the multiple personality structure preceded the beginning of hypnotic work.
“The significance of an underlying multiple personality structure in a severely obsessive compulsive personality suggests that the obssessive-compulsive defense binds the underlying multiple personalities so that we have a conscious personality resulting that is conflicted, rigid, and cold as opposed to the hysterical dissociation in which the several personalities take turns in living out their roles.
living out their roles.
“The use of dissociation to repress unacceptable drives and behavior in a repeated effort to develop, through new identifications, a successful adaptation to a changing and conflicted environment, as well as to permit expression of forbidden impulses is indicated. The result of such repeated dissociation was the severe impoverishment of the self.
“The Rorschach finding that one of the personalities was schizophrenic suggests that further study of this material may be of value in the understanding of the development of schizophrenia.
“The question of the emotional and physiological state at the actual moment of change-over from one personality might well lead to further understanding of the process of dissociation which appears to have correlations with the hypnotic state.
“The correlation in this case of extensive age regression studies with the co-existing multiple personality structure should prove a rich field for the study of personality development” (pp. 198-199).
1954
Dittborn, Julio (1954). Dehypnotization and associated words. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 2 (2), 136-138.
Author tested Freud’s hypotheses about signs of emotional conflict gleaned from a word association test. A highly hypnotizable subject who had been accused of theft was tested with the word association test repeatedly. He had been given the suggestion, while in deep hypnosis, that any word provoking emotional conflict would automatically bring him out of hypnosis. That is, “dehypnotization was used as a new method to investigate the conflict-provoking quality of certain stimulus-words in an association word test” (p. 139). Freud’s predictions were only partially supported.
Erickson, Milton H. (1954). The development of an acute limited obsessional hysterical state in a normal hypnotic subject. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 2, 27-41.
The 25 year old female graduate student in psychology had often been used in hypnosis experiments and as a demonstration subject, and had witnessed induction of hypnotic deafness, blindness, and color-blindness though she had not been given those suggestions herself. Scientific curiosity appeared to be the motivation for volunteering to experience hypnotic blindness, but she was skeptical about her ability to experience it. The author gave a series of “exceedingly tedious” suggestions to develop somnambulism (passively responsive and receptive) followed by suggestions leading gradually to development of “blindness” with the intention of concealing it from the hypnotist, with attendant strong and mixed emotions.
The initial attempts failed because the subject ostensibly was deceiving herself into thinking she had developed hypnotic blindness, but the author also was of the opinion that she was seeking to meet unconscious personality needs. The author then covertly changed the goal of the experiment “to develop in the subject an acute hysterical obsessional compulsive mental state which would be accompanied by hypnotic blindness and which would parallel or resemble the obsessive compulsive hysterical mental disturbances encountered in psychiatric practice” (p. 32). The author developed a monologue of suggestions based in part on the utterances of hospitalized obsessive patients and in part on trauma relating to traumatic blindness in a kitten and a friend of the subject. In a slow but directed manner the author built up a double-bind situation which eventually led to the experience of hypnotic blindness as well as heightened emotional reactivity, crying etc.
obsessive patients and in part on trauma relating to traumatic blindness in a kitten and a friend of the subject. In a slow but directed manner the author built up a double-bind situation which eventually led to the experience of hypnotic blindness as well as heightened emotional reactivity, crying etc.
Schneck, Jerome M. (1954). An experimental study of hypnotically induced auditory hallucinations. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 2, 163-170.
“Summary. An experimental study of hypnotically induced auditory hallucinations was incorporated into therapeutic contact with a patient at a time when an exploratory phase of treatment process seemed appropriate. The study was divided roughly into ten parts, nine of which involved attempts to induce hallucinations on an auditory level following an initial control procedure involving ‘imagined’ conversation. Choice of perons to be hallucinated was made at times by the therapist and at times this was left for spontaneous development by the patient. Some of the episodes involved marked emotional participation by the patient. Others were less intense. ‘Imagined’ conversations were distinct from hallucinated comments. Her own voice when hallucinated emanated from within herself. Other hallucinated voices had external origins. Some were far away. Her aunt’s voice was in the same room. Spacial and temporal elements were divorced from their conventional relationships and distorted in keeping with psychodynamic needs. The patient was able to discuss her experiences and evaluate certain descriptive and dynamic qualities. Certain parts of the total experience served as controls in the evaluation of other parts. The beginning of hallucinatory behavior did not set a pattern for continuous similar activity. Responsive behavior varied from time to time. A hallucinatory episode might be followed by an ‘imagined’ conversation, although instructions remained the same. Deceased persons were hallucinated on an auditory level. This type of episode with her mother had considerable emotional impact. Her aunt died twenty years ago. Her husband was not hallucinated. Responses involving her daughter showed greater complexity.
“Further studies are in order in connection with the neuropsychological and neurophysiological elements in such hypnotic hallucinatory activity. Such elements as they play a role in visual imagery as described here and in visual hallucinations are also to be examined further. Aside from extensions of the type of investigation presented here, inroads may be made into an understanding of spontaneous hallucinatory activity among psychotic patients through the utilization of hypnotic exploratory methods. This would have to be preceded by more extensive studies of hypnosis in relation to psychotic patients than have been attempted thus far. The procedure discussed here and many potential ramifications makes possible a wide variety of investigations which can be planned for the future” (pp. 169-170).
Nonvolition/automatism
1995
Comey, Gail; Kirsch, Irving (1995, November). Intentional and spontaneous imagery in hypnosis. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Antonio, TX.
Students were given one of two versions of the Carleton University Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale (CURSS): a) the original version, which contains instructions to intentionally imagine goal-directed fantasies, and b) a modified version, in which instructions for suggestion-related imagery was deleted. Participants were asked to report their goal-directed fantasies and to indicate whether these occurred spontaneously or were generated intentionally. They were also asked whether they had tried intentionally to generate the suggested experience and to indicate whether they had believed that the suggested states of affairs were real (e.g., whether they thought a hallucinated cat really existed). The deletion of instructions for goal-related imagery significantly increased responsiveness to CURSS suggestions. Spontaneous goal-directed imagery was significantly correlated with behavioral response, but intentional imagery was not. Most successful responders tried to generate suggested experiences intentionally, indicated that they could have resisted challenge suggestions if they really wanted to, and reported believing in the reality of suggested ideomotor and challenge experiences, but not of cognitive suggestions. Voluntary attempts to generate suggested experiences were correlated with subjective responding.
Green, J. P.; Lynn, Steven J. (1995, August). Dissociation, hypnotic amnesia and automatic writing: Is there an association?. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, New York.
This study examined whether differences in self-reported dissociative experiences (DES, Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) and past performance on hypnotic amnesia (HGSHS: A, Shor & Orne, 1962) influence the frequency of passing an automatic writing suggestion. Participants (N = 112) were divided into high hypnotizable (‘real’) and simulating groups. Results from a log linear analysis indicated that automatic writing was independent of both dissociation status and past performance on an ostensibly dissociative hypnotic suggestion (i.e., amnesia). Simulators were more than six times as likely to pass the automatic writing suggestion than reals. Findings were discussed in light of other research regarding the relation between the DES and hypnotizability. (ABSTRACT from Bulletin of Division 30, Psychological Hypnosis, Fall, 1995, Vol. 4, No. 3.)
Malinoski, Peter; Martin, Daniel F.; Aronoff, Jodi; Lynn, Steven Jay; Gedeon, Scott (1995, November). Hypnotizability, individual differences, and interpersonal pressure to report early childhood memories. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Antonio, TX.
Infantile amnesia is attributed to developmental issues before 24 months. This study indicates non-hypnotic influences can shape early memories that cross the amnesia barrier.
227 Ss completed Harvard Scale and personality measures in Session 1. In Session 2 182 completed a suggestibility scale. In Session 3 they were selected, as if independent of earlier sessions – 143 [may have misheard number] Ss.
Interviewers told the selected Ss that they were experiencing something like psychotherapy, and they were asked to recall their earliest memory (independent of photos, what people had told them, etc.) Then Experimenters probed for earlier memories; that continued until Ss denied any more memories after 2 consecutive probes. Then Ss were asked to close their eyes and get in touch with more memories. Then they were told most Ss can remember more, including sometimes their second birthday party. After 1 minute, Ss were asked about memories of their second birthday. Then they were asked to focus on even earlier memories, implying it was expected and receiving complements for reporting earlier memories. Finally, Ss completed a post-study questionnaire.
Memory report was a verbal description of an event, person, or object. Initial memory mean age was 3.7; it correlated with Openness to Experience Scale and with Fantasy Proneness. Mean age of the last earliest memory report before the close eyes instruction was 3.2 years. After receiving visualization instructions, 59% reported a memory of their second birthday. Compliance correlated .33 with this. Subjective response, nonvoluntariness, and [missed words] also correlated.
Compliance scores correlated .28 with at least one memory at or before age 24 months. Yielding to leading questions correlated also with memory for an event at or before 24 months.
Clarity of memories decreased between conditions of initial memory, earliest query, birthday, and earliest memory. Mean confidence rating on 5 point scale for second birthday memory was 3.3; mean confidence rating for earliest memory was 3.6. Mean accuracy rating was 4.0, and 94% said their memory reports were accurate to at least a moderate degree.
The post study questionnaire, totally anonymous, indicated Ss did not feel much pressure to recall (2.9 on scale of 1-5). Only 9.8% indicated they felt a lot of pressure. Subjects also usually denied that they made up memories to satisfy the experimenter. On average, the reports of memory under visualization conditions occurred two years earlier than their first reported memories.
Woody, Erik Z. (1995, November). Trying, not trying, and trying not to try. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Antonio, TX.
In the “classic suggestion effect” the behavior of a hypnotized person following a suggestion is experienced as nonvoluntary. So alterations of experience are important to understand. We can think of it as a misattribution: which cues lead subjects to misattribute their behavior, etc.
A different view is to see it as how information is processed (neodissociation theory). There are two views of dissociation to consider: 1. Behavior is voluntary, but that voluntariness is blocked from awareness. (The S is trying but doesn’t know it consciously.) This is a barrier model of dissociation. The S lacks information about self agency. Bowers calls it a theory of dissociated experience. 2. Underlying control of behavior is altered (not so governed by executive control) and the subject is correct when they say they are not trying. Bowers called this a theory of dissociated control.
A persistent problem is that these two theories of dissociation are incomplete sketches. But cognitive neuroscientists and experimental psychopathologists have recently become interested also, rapidly developing and independently developing the same two theories.
Bowers and I stated that the theory presented by Normal (Norman?) and Shallice is similar to dissociative control theory. When a response is habitual, a lower system called contention scheduling can do it; if response is more complex, a higher control supervisory system involving unique information like goals is available, modulating the lower control system. Volition and how it is experienced depends on the nature of the supervisory system. When it is not [or when it is?] modulating or monitoring the contention scheduling process, one experiences will.
Thus, hypnosis is in the grey zone where the supervisory system monitors without modulation of contention scheduling–a wide realm. Also, for high hypnotizables hypnosis may weaken the higher level control system associated with the subjective experience of will; this dissociates lower levels of control from higher levels of control. The lower levels cannot be modulated as well at will. This indicates changes of frontal functions.
In psychopathology, Chris Frit argues that schizophrenia can be thought of as disorders of volition: 1. Spontaneous self initiated willed actions are generated by a different route to action from unwilled actions. In schizophrenia there is impoverishment of self initiated action. The patient also shows perseverated action. In contrast, when directly instructed the patient can perform complex tasks. This is close to the dissociated control model of hypnosis. Laboratory procedures for studying perseverative acts in schizophrenia can be applied to hypnosis. (However the theory doesn’t explain the positive symptoms of schizophrenia.) 2. There is an internal monitor that keeps track of the self initiated aspects of actions (e.g. inner speech), which schizophrenics lack. Likewise delusions of control, due to a failure to track the self initiated aspect of these actions, resemble the dissociated experience aspect of hypnosis.
The Classic Suggestion Effect is a mild delusion of control. This is very different from the social psychological view. Nisbett & Wilson say people do not introspect about the sources of their behavior. In their view, believing that alien forces are controlling you is due to failure of a mechanism. It is an interesting alternative to social psychological misattribution models to explain the nonvoluntary experience.
Functional brain imaging of normal subjects indicates that willed actions involve different areas of brain than nonvoluntary actions. Current thinking is that what differentiates schizophrenics from normals is in how their separate brain regions interact with each other. (This view is consistent with the research of Crawford and others on brain areas involved in hypnosis.) 3. There is a unifying mechanism of meta-representation or second order representations (“mentalizing”) which are distinct from normal representations of reality. Consider the example of the suggestion to hallucinate a fly on the Harvard Form A Group Scale. The hypnotist wants me to believe that a fly is buzzing around me. If the second order representation is not there, only the first order representation is there: “a fly is buzzing around me.” This is in Frit’s theory’s term a dementalized experience. The “dementalized experience” is a bit like Sarbin’s believed in imagining. Low hypnotizables are plagued with meta-representation (“trying not to try”).
Frit’s work even suggests some parts of neodissociation theory may be a better representation of schizophrenia than of hypnosis.
1994
Lynn, Steven Jay (1994, October). Toward an integrative theory of hypnosis. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Francisco.
This is a re-evaluation of neodissociation and cognitive models of hypnosis, and an attempt to be integrative. This paper focuses more on ideomotor behaviors but we will extend the model to other hypnotic behaviors in the future.
Automaticity of behavior in hypnosis can be accounted for without using a concept of divided consciousness or weakened consciousness. Parapraxes (doing one behavior while intending another) are not instances of decreased control of behavior, but relate to where attention is drawn. This requires a different use of the hierarchy concept from Hilgard’s model (which in turn comes from Hull’s concept of habit hierarchy).
Here hierarchy is a concept drawn from Miller, Galanter, & Pribram: acts are comprised of molecular units, that are comprised of even more molecular units. Behavior only needs to be processed at an executive level when unusual events occur. But one or more hierarchies may be set into motion at the same time. Dissociation is not an infrequent event. Behavior is controlled by subroutines rather than by an executive control structure; subroutines operate in parallel rather than in a hierarchy. Parapraxes are due to an overlap between two subfunctions.
Parapraxes are different from ideomotor responses, where we pay close attention and involuntariness is reported not just post facto but as part of the experience.
Malinoski, Peter; Aronoff, Jodi; Lynn, Steven J.; Moretsky, Michael (1994, August). Hypnosis and early memories. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Los Angeles.
We studied autobiographical memory in the college population, as manifested in the therapy situation, as a way of investigating an individual difference variable. Most people do not have recall before age 3 or 4 (and probably infantile amnesia begins before age 2).
Administered Autobiographical Memory Scale (AMS), and later in context of a hypnosis scale. 247 students were in phase 1, conducted as two separate experiments so that Ss wouldn’t link the AMS to measures used in the second study.
First study was presented as a study of personal memories. Asked Ss to distinguish first five birthdays, circumstances around loss of first tooth, first day of high school. Also, they were asked about their earliest memory events, rated according to 3 scales (detail, vividness, accuracy of recall). Authors summed Ss’ responses on these 3 ratings for the 8 item scale.
Part II. Administered various scales: Life Experiences, Fantasy Proneness, Wilson & Barber’s scale, Imagery Control Scale, Global Psychopathology, 25 item scale of physical and sexual abuse, Brier’s list of symptoms of abuse, and DES (Dissociative Experiences Scale). Imbedded were 12 items to test carelessness in responding (e.g. “I have never said Hello to anyone who wore eyeglasses.”)
RESULTS. Phase 1. Two people indicated they had memories dating to before their first birthday; an additional 5% of Ss gave memories between 12-24 months. This would probably be impossible. Another 14.4% described events between 24-36 months; 37.4% said their earliest memory was at age 3. Mean age for earliest memory was 3.4 years (which agrees with other surveys.) Only l subject stated his earliest memory was as late as the tenth year of life.
High intercorrelation was obtained, ranging .79 to .89, between ratings on any of the memory event ratings (as detailed, vivid, or accurate). There was a negative correlation of these ratings with age of recall. Ss who report more detail, vividness, and competence, were also likely to report earlier first memories.
Authors divided Ss into three groups based on age of first memory: 12 with first memory earlier than first year; those whose first memory was between 1-7 years; and those with a later first memory. The earlier memory group were more fantasy prone; and rated their memories as more reliable, vivid. This suggests there are persons who report memories that are covered by infantile amnesia, report them with greater detail, and are more fantasy prone than those who report memory events beginning later in life. This is consistent with Wilson & Barber’s finding that fantasy prone people have vivid recall of early childhood events.
than first year; those whose first memory was between 1-7 years; and those with a later first memory. The earlier memory group were more fantasy prone; and rated their memories as more reliable, vivid. This suggests there are persons who report memories that are covered by infantile amnesia, report them with greater detail, and are more fantasy prone than those who report memory events beginning later in life. This is consistent with Wilson & Barber’s finding that fantasy prone people have vivid recall of early childhood events.
None of the memory reports correlated with psychopathology or dissociation. Dissociation (DES) was correlated with abuse indicators, however. Compared top and lowest 10% and middle range on DES on their memory scores and found no relationship. There was no support for the idea that report of early life events in dissociative people is compromised. Failure to recall early memories shouldn’t suggest that people are dissociative (which some therapists tend to do).
All three memory measures were associated with Harvard Scale scores. The AMS was administered at the same time as the Harvard. Objective responding on the Harvard correlated with detail, vividness, and accuracy of recall. Also, involuntariness of response correlated with all 3 measures of the AMS. Finally, subjective involvement correlated with all three measures of AMS. At least when hypnosis is measured first, and explicit connection is suggested, there is a connection. Further research is needed to see if the relationship holds when measured in independent contexts. This may explain why High Hypnotizables are more prone to pseudo memories and leading questions. They may come to confuse them with historical reality.
The results suggest caution for early memory reports. They may be vulnerable to confusing fantasy and reality, as well as to biasing effects.
Tellegen, Auke (1994, October). Comments on Symposium “Hypnosis Reconsidered”. [Comment/Discussion] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Francisco, , as part of Symposium titled: Hypnosis reconsidered.
I agree that the topography of issues has become more complicated. I would want to look at the distinction between “special process” theories and other views. I still think there is some non-trivial element of difference between the two groups; but it’s not one well defined group vs another, with people now distributed across a continuum and to some degree moving around. At the poles of these theoretical positions are real differences (e.g. in favorite hypotheses, research methods). But there has been some closing of the gap between these two poles.
Historically, rapprochement in psychological theories has been the result of hard nosed behaviorism going soft and cognitive in the last 15 years. The behavioral paradigm is the ancestor of the social cognitive view within hypnosis research. You can see the evolution in Ted Barber, and eventually it was carried forward by Spanos. Today all major views of hypnosis have become systems models, requiring flow diagrams. We are comparing more parsimonious (social cognitive) with more surplus meaning positions. Parsimony is a good way to advance knowledge, making a theory more complex only when you have to. The major social psychological positions are widely shared; many are close to common sense. The question is, are they sufficient to the data? The behavioral approach recognizes individual differences but doesn’t weight them heavily; it may treat individual differences as a curve fitting issue, or may treat them as training outcome. Associated with the behavioral approach is a tendency not to explore fully individual differences from a naturalistic perspective. The difference in research approaches between the two poles is loosely aligned with Cronbach’s correlational vs experimental approaches to psychology.
The role of individual differences in hypnotizability however may be structural, in which case different flow diagrams may be needed, depending on trait levels, on the eliciting circumstances, etc. Thus we might need different flow diagrams for different levels of hypnotizability.
The role of imagination remains unexplicated across theoretical positions. Everyone since the Franklin committee thinks imagination is important in hypnosis; it is urgent to explore it. Even the most constructivist perspective on perception doesn’t equate perception with imagination.
-proaches to psychology.
The role of individual differences in hypnotizability however may be structural, in which case different flow diagrams may be needed, depending on trait levels, on the eliciting circumstances, etc. Thus we might need different flow diagrams for different levels of hypnotizability.
The role of imagination remains unexplicated across theoretical positions. Everyone since the Franklin committee thinks imagination is important in hypnosis; it is urgent to explore it. Even the most constructivist perspective on perception doesn’t equate perception with imagination.
We now must turn the flow diagrams into neurobehavioral models, like Helen Crawford is attempting to do.
COMMENTS FROM THE AUDIENCE:
Kenneth Bowers: The people flowing out from the neodissociation camp are going in different directions. I think that ideas are directly activated, Helen Crawford and John Kihlstrom would think it involves more effort on the part of the hypnotized Subject. Irving Kirsch agrees that at some level the words have to be processed, but doesn’t imply great effort. There is some kind of preattentive processing in hypnosis, the kind of processing which allows you to turn when you hear your name, in normal circumstances. Does it still make sense to talk about the field of hypnosis research or theory in terms of the two camps? I fear a return to the situation when the term “two camps” was justified.
Woody, Erik Z. (1994, October). Cognitive-processing models of hypnotic dissociation. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Francisco.
Spanos contended that social psychology is an appropriate ground for hypnosis, and his work highlights the value of not taking things at face value (e.g. feelings of nonvolition).
I did this research with Ken Bowers. It addresses the question, does non-volition occupy a small role in hypnosis, or are hypnotic responses performed intentionally despite the hypnotized person’s feeling of non-volition.
We did not rely on the research Subject’s verbal report. When one exerts intentional effort to suppress a thought, the thought gets stronger. For example, when people try to comply with instruction not to think about white bears, they think about them repeatedly (Waitner’s research).
Hypnosis suggestions are for amnesia (inability to remember), not intentional forgetting.
STUDY ONE. We used Waitner type instructions vs hypnosis in high and low hypnotizability Ss, to examine the role of intention in response. We used thinking about one’s favorite automobile instead of a white bear as the task stimulus. Subjects were not to think about it for 2 minutes, but to press a button whenever a thought about the automobile surfaced. There was another waking trial with suggestions; then hypnosis and re-testing.
Ss were undergraduates screened on Harvard Scale for hypnotizability and the Waterloo Stanford Group form. High hypnotizables scored 8 or more on both scales, lows scored 4 or less on both.
The variables recorded were total number of button presses, and average length of time per press. Analysis was by a 3 way mixed model ANOVA: high low, induction condition, and suggestion condition (blank mind vs. amnesia)
RESULTS.
Mean Number of Button Pushes Over Trials Group Waking Hypnosis
blank amnesia mind High 6.9 2.9 1.8 .6 Low 5.2 4.7 4.3 3.7
mind mind High 6.9 2.9 1.8 .6 Low 5.2 4.7 4.3 3.7
1993
Miller, Mary E.; Bowers, K. S. (1993). Hypnotic analgesia: Dissociated experience or dissociated control?. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102, 29-38.
High-hypnotizable subjects were found superior to low-hypnotizable subjects in degree of pain reduction produced by hypnotic analgesia and by a stress- inoculation (cognitive-therapy) procedure. But, stress inoculation and not hypnotic analgesia impaired performance on a cognitively demanding task that competed with pain reduction for cognitive resources. This outcome implies that hypnotic analgesia occurs with little or no cognitive effort to reduce pain, challenging the social psychological theory of hypnotic response, at least in high-hypnotizable individuals. The findings are also incompatible with the concept of dissociated experience wherein the pain and cognitive efforts to reduce it are separated from consciousness by an amnesia-like barrier. But the results do support the concept of dissociated control, which proposes that suggestions for hypnotic analgesia directly activate pain reduction and thereby avert the need for cognitive strategies to reduce pain.
Spanos, Nicholas P.; Burnley, M. C.; Cross, P. A. (1993). Response expectancies and interpretations as determinants of hypnotic responding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 1237-1242.
Subjects rated the extent to which they expected to respond to each of the suggestions on a hypnotizability scale both before and after the administration of the preliminary hypnotic-induction procedure. After the induction, subjects also rated the extent to which they planned to respond actively and passively to each suggestion. Contrary to strong versions of response-expectancy theory, the extent to which subjects planned to adopt an active interpretation predicted behavioral and subjective indexes of hypnotizability even after controlling for the effects of postinduction expectations. In addition, an active interpretation significantly predicted response to suggestion for which subjects held weak and uncertain expectations. The relationship between expectation and hypnotizability was found to be fan-shaped rather than linear. Implications are discussed.
Woody, Erik Z. (1993, October). Factors, facets, and fiddle-faddle. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington Heights, IL.
The classic suggestion effect implies involuntary behavior. A theory by Norman & Tim Shallice (published in a book on cognitive neuropsychology by Shallice) explains the classic suggestion effect in terms of underlying control processes.
There are 2 complementary systems: 1. contention scheduling (routine acts that don’t require conscious control, activating schemas through environmental events and other schemas) for well learned habitual tasks. 2. supervisory attentional system – nonroutine actions in centralized processes, accessing unique information, operating only indirectly by modulating lower level control system, biasing their selection of schemas by system #1.
These two systems permit the sense of behavior being automatic or willed. The theory can be used to explain hypnotic nonvolition. For highs, hypnosis may partly disable System #2, dissociating lower levels of control and resulting in genuine changes in behavior because System #1 would be more enabled, triggered directly by co-active schemas and environmental stimuli. This increased dependence on a lower level of control would not rule out a wide range of behavior. It’s mainly novel or very complex behaviors that would diminish, plus exercise of will.
The model also illuminates our understanding of behavioral rigidity and the tendency for thought/action to be triggered by [suggestions?]. Spontaneous voluntary behavior would be diminished. (See for example Orne’s studies of the effect of apparent power outage during an experiment, in which high hypnotizable Ss did not move or leave the room but sat passively, whereas low hypnotizable simulating Ss simply got up and left.)
Also a weaker “supervisor” would lead to disinhibition of inappropriate or peculiar associations or behavior. In labs one sees few such triggers, although Hilgard observed drug flashbacks. The phenomena of hypnosis sequelae appear like a disinhibition of experiences.
Hypnotic analgesia follows this model too, an automatic and controlled processing of perceptual input.
Amnesia that follows hypnosis can be explained by this theory. Shallice has a model of how memory is affected: memory is a higher control system, enabling the handling of non-routine situations. Confronted by a nonroutine memory problem, the supervisory system formulates a model of what [the information] should look like, pulls out memories, and compares the model. If hypnosis interferes with the supervisor function it should interfere with memory (the description and verification phases) leading to [hypnotic amnesia?]. [With hypnosis one would predict]: 1. Poor access to memories requiring description (not overlearned material). Recall should demonstrate good cued memory but poor free recall. [It has been observed that] hypnotic amnesia selectively impairs free recall rather than recognition recall. 2. Hypnotized Ss should show poorer verification (the ability to discriminate irrelevant from correct associations). Many studies have shown this, with impoverished verification (e.g. the “discovery” of elaborate previous lives).
A dissociated control theory of hypnosis is thus possible, emphasizing a loss of control of supervisory system processes. It would implicate changes in frontal lobe processing. The essence of hypnosis, according to this approach, is the bypassing of executive control, and the frontal lobe is viewed as a center of executive control.
There are several ways that hypnosis suggests inhibition of frontal lobe functioning: 1. impoverishment of self initiated behavior 2. other-directedness 3. frontal amnesia (unable to distinguish true memories from irrelevant memories; prone to confabulation, especially when probed with false information) 4. poorer in temporal or sequential organization in memory.
How do we proceed to make this theoretical approach useful? We should do more neuropsychological studies, as Helen Crawford does. They emphasize the inhibition of frontal lobe functions.
Testable hypotheses arise: 1. Hypnotizable Ss should show the same kind of problem solving problems as frontal lobe patients. 2. Memory of hypnotized Ss should be like patients with frontal amnesia.
1992 Dixon, Michael; Laurence, Jean-Roch (1992). Two hundred years of hypnosis research: Questions resolved? Questions unanswered!. In Fromm, Erika; Nash, Michael R. (Ed.), Contemporary hypnosis research (pp. 34-66). New York: Guilford Press.
These notes summarize only that part of the chapter concerning nonvoluntary behavior (pp 38-39; 58-61).
The concept of ‘nonvolition’ has been and continues to be an important issue in hypnosis research. The concept pertains to the “subjective report that the hypnotic suggestion is enacted without the subject’s conscious and willful participation” (p. 38). When hypnosis was attributed to a magnetic fluid, in the days of Mesmer, the issue did not arise (because of course a person would not have control over something that happened to them physically). However, when hypnosis came to be considered a psychological phenomenon, the issue of how a behavior could be the result of motivated action and yet not perceived as being under conscious influence became important. In 1819 Faria wrote that the nonvolition paradox is due to the hypnotized subject’s tendency to misattribute the source or reason for one’s behaviors; he noted that successful suggestions depended upon the subject falsely attributing to the hypnotist the power to influence them. From that point forward, circular reasoning was used to state that one is hypnotized if one experiences their behavior as nonvolitional, and nonvolitional behavior signifies that a person is hypnotized.
“The observation of the seemingly complete automaticity of response in the highly hypnotizable subject led Liebeault in his 1866 book (followed later on by Bernheim and Liegeois) to describe these subjects as ‘puppets’ in the hands of the hypnotist. This was a quite unfortunate statement, since it would lead to one of the fiercest legal debates surrounding the use of hypnosis in the last 20 years of the 19th century (Laurence & Perry, 1988). …
“The most prominent author (if not the only one) who attempted to tackle this difficult question was Pierre Janet, who would make the investigation of automatisms the basis of his theory of hypnosis, rather than suggestion or suggestibility. This theoretical orientation is best exemplified by his concept of desagregation psychologique seen in some psychopathologies, or the carrying out of a posthypnotic suggestion in the normal individual (Janet, 1889; see also Ellenberger, 1970; Perry & Laurence, 1984; Prevost, 1973). Nonetheless, until the end of the 19th century, and for a good part of the 20th century, these reports of nonvolition were thought to be the end result of some neurological changes happening during hypnosis–an idea that has not been substantiated by contemporary research.” (pp 38-39)
Reports of nonvolition are explained as due to dissociation by Hilgard, or as the results of misattributing the origins of behaviors and experiences by Spanos and by Lynn. Neodissociationists like Hilgard regard misattribution to be a cognitive alteration, mainly an internal triggering mechanism, while social psychologists like Spanos and Lynn regard the misattribution to be the results of situational demands and therefore an external triggering mechanism.
“Regardless of one’s preferred metaphor, the issue of nonvolitional reports remains at the core of an integrated view of hypnosis and hypnotizability. The question remains as follows: By which mechanisms does this occur, and how can we predict a priori who will report involuntariness and under what circumstances? Whereas dissociationists have emphasized general cognitive mechanisms and de-emphasized situational factors, social- psychological theorists have emphasized situational variables and de-emphasized individual differences. Given the limitations of both approaches, emphasis will have to be placed not on their continued separation but on their integration, as more and more investigations demonstrate that they clearly interact with each other (see, e.g., Nadon, Laurence, & Perry, 1991).” (p. 60)
“At the height of the confrontation between the two French schools, hypnosis found its way into the legal arena. Following a series of criminal cases in which hypnosis had been allegedly involved, the two schools once again found themselves on opposite sides of the fence. For La Salpetriere, only those who had a propensity toward criminality (and hystericals were prime candidates) could be the victims of hypnosis. For the Nancy school, in highly responsive individuals suggestions could lead to criminal behavior. Unfortunately for the Nancy school, it soon became evident that the concept of suggestion was not sufficient in explaining the questions raised by the courts, and Bernheim was forced to recognize that in cases where suggestions had played a role, other dispositional and situational factors were probably more important in the genesis of the reprehensible behaviors. His espousing a too extreme position meant that the baby was thrown out with the bathwater. History may indicate that the same fate is now awaiting contemporary theoretical positions that adopt an extreme stance vis-a-vis the phenomenon of hypnosis” (p. 61).
each other (see, e.g., Nadon, Laurence, & Perry, 1991).” (p. 60)
“At the height of the confrontation between the two French schools, hypnosis found its way into the legal arena. Following a series of criminal cases in which hypnosis had been allegedly involved, the two schools once again found themselves on opposite sides of the fence. For La Salpetriere, only those who had a propensity toward criminality (and hystericals were prime candidates) could be the victims of hypnosis. For the Nancy school, in highly responsive individuals suggestions could lead to criminal behavior. Unfortunately for the Nancy school, it soon became evident that the concept of suggestion was not sufficient in explaining the questions raised by the courts, and Bernheim was forced to recognize that in cases where suggestions had played a role, other dispositional and situational factors were probably more important in the genesis of the reprehensible behaviors. His espousing a too extreme position meant that the baby was thrown out with the bathwater. History may indicate that the same fate is now awaiting contemporary theoretical positions that adopt an extreme stance vis-a-vis the phenomenon of hypnosis” (p. 61).
1992
Hargadon, Robin M.; Bowers, Kenneth S. (1992, October). High hypnotizables and hypnotic analgesia: An examination of underlying mechanisms. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington, VA.
Bowers’ dissociated control adaptation of Hilgard’s neodissociation theory of hypnosis posits that higher control systems are not used if lower systems are activated.
Imagery may be less important for achieving hypnotic effects. It also may contribute differently than previously thought, an uncorrelated factor. If imaginal involvement and imagery is integral to the production of analgesia using hypnosis, one would get results different than if not integral.
Research: 65 Ss rated as high on two hypnotizability tests participated.
Session 1:
Procedure entailed finger pressure pain: baseline, followed by 2 hypnosis treatment trials. Ss were not informed of the second trial before they did the first.
Standard suggestions: imagery congruent with the suggestion (hand like block of wood, protected by a glove)
Imageless condition: your hand will remain comfortably nonresponsive to the pressure; you will not allow other things to come into your mind.
Outcome Measures
Analogue scale for pain 0-10
Nonvoluntary experience rated 0-4