Session 2:
Administered Tellegen Scale, Woody & Oakman Scale, Marks Vividness of Imagery, Bowers’ Effortless Experiencing, and Duality of Experience during age regression.
RESULTS.
No difference was found between the standard and imageless conditions in amount of pain reduced. So in high hypnotizables, use of imagery or not doesn’t matter for controlling pain. Some Ss had a clear preference however, for one or the other method (even counter to their own expectations).
Feelings of nonvolition did not differ as a function of imagery use.
Multiple regression showed effects of hypnotizability and effortless experiencing. Ss who have an effortless experiencing of imagery benefit from using it to reduce pain; those who find it more effortful do better without imagery when attempting to reduce pain.
Contrary to last year’s results reported by Bowers, high imagery was related to duality of experiencing in age regression.
Dissociated control theory is consistent with the results but not necessarily demonstrated. It is important to discriminate between imagery as a mediator rather than as a co-occurrence. This research suggests, as did Zamansky’s work on counter suggestions, that imagery is not as critical for hypnotic response as we previously thought.
more effortful do better without imagery when attempting to reduce pain.
Contrary to last year’s results reported by Bowers, high imagery was related to duality of experiencing in age regression.
Dissociated control theory is consistent with the results but not necessarily demonstrated. It is important to discriminate between imagery as a mediator rather than as a co-occurrence. This research suggests, as did Zamansky’s work on counter suggestions, that imagery is not as critical for hypnotic response as we previously thought.
Jacoby, Larry L.; Lindsay, D. Stephen; Toth, Jeffrey P. (1992). Unconscious influences revealed: Attention, awareness, and control. American Psychologist, 47, 802-809
Recent findings of dissociations between direct and indirect tests of memory and perception have renewed enthusiasm for the study of unconscious processing. The authors argue that such findings are heir to the same problems of interpretation as are earlier evidence of unconscious influences–namely, one cannot eliminate the possibility that conscious processes contaminated the measure of unconscious processes. To solve this problem, the authors define unconscious influences in terms of lack of conscious control and then describe a process dissociation procedure that yields separate quantitative estimates of the concurrent contributions of unconscious and consciously controlled processing to task performance. This technique allows one to go beyond demonstrating the existence of unconscious processes to examine factors that determine their magnitude
Kunzendorf, Robert; Carrabino, Carlene; Capone, Daniel (1992-93). ‘Safe’ fantasy: The self-conscious boundary between wishing and willing. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 12, 177-188.
This experiment tested the hypothesis that a fantasy will impel people to ‘act out’ only if they fail to distinguish the fantasy from the anticipated reality. In the experiment, one task obtained a baseline measure of how long subjects could resist eating popcorn, then measured how long subjects could resist popcorn while fantasizing its taste. Another task instructed subjects to merge three circular images with three circular percepts of equal vividness, then presented subjects unexpectedly with only two of the three circular percepts. Some subjects thought that there were three circular percepts during the merger, and for these subjects, the length of resistance to popcorn was significantly shorter during the popcorn fantasy. But for subjects who self-consciously differentiated the two real circles from the three merging images, the normal ‘boundary’ between wishful fantasy and willful eating was intact.
This research investigated whether people can fantasize without acting out. The authors place the study in the context of theories proposed by Freud and William James. Kunzendorf’s source monitoring theory of self-consciousness suggests that “self- consciousness _that one is imaging_ is the phenomenal consequence of neurally monitoring the central source of one’s imaged sensations, and self-consciousness _that one is perceiving_ is the subjective quality of neurally monitoring the peripheral source of one’s perceived sensations” (p. 178).
The ability to carry out source monitoring varies. Those who have difficulty monitoring whether they are imaging or perceiving may also have trouble distinguishing wishful fantasy from anticipatory imagery, and therefore they might act on it.
This research “identified subjects with poor source monitoring–nondiscerners of reality–and investigated the effect of fantasy on their impulse control” (p. 179).
METHODS.
Subjects sat in front of a computer monitor for all tests; they completed Eysenck’s seventh impulsivity questionnaire for measures of impulsivity, venturesomeness, and empathy, Marks’ Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ).
The study used a test in which subjects maintained in mental imagery a red, green, and yellow filled circle that had been on screen, with eyes closed; were instructed to open eyes and merge their 3 imaginary circles with the 3 on the screen (but when they opened eyes only 2 were there), and they were then asked questions about how many circles they saw when they opened their eyes.
Then they were given a taste of popcorn, told to resist eating any more (but could press a key to receive a little if they couldn’t resist), and then were told to resist by imagining that they were eating popcorn.
RESULTS.
Those who discerned the two real circles while imaging a third circle of equal vividness (the Discerners), could resist eating popcorn for 137 sec in the baseline condition and 132 sec in the fantasy condition. Those who could not discern two real circles while imagining a third (Nondiscerners) could resist eating popcorn for 127 sec in the baseline treatment but only 95 sec in the fantasy treatment.
Discerners could identify the missing circle as the red one, whereas nondiscerners could not do so with any certainty; there was no effect of “image vividness”.
“Vivid imagers” whose imagery matched real yellow circles of greater illuminance, exhibited more vivid imagery on the VVIQ as well.
In their Discussion, the authors suggest that “fantasy impels people to ‘act out’ only if they fail to distinguish fantasized sensations from perceived sensations. … [the theory] is applicable to sexual fantasy and aggressive fantasy as well. This theory– Kunzendorf’s ‘source monitoring’ theory of self-consciousness–implies that fantasies of the sensory consequences of a behavior should not lead to the behavior, so long as the fantasies are self-consciously known to be imaginal and are not expected to be perceptual… But for people who cannot self-consciously distinguish between wishful images of pure fantasy and anticipatory images of perceptual reality, between wishing and willing, fantasies of gastronomical, sexual, or aggressive sensations are implicitly unsafe.
“Indeed, as Baars notes, ‘the issue of voluntary control is at the very core of human psychopathology’ [31, p. 254]. But recently, Baars’ and others’ theories of volition have emphasized the computer-metaphoric distinction between conscious ‘willful’ behavior and unconscious ‘automatic’ action [31, 39-40], and have neglected James’ distinction between conscious willing and conscious wishing. Decades ago, when pre- computational theorists like Janet used the term ‘automatism’ to describe psychopathological behavior, they meant that an abnormally behaving patient was _consciously ‘possessed’ by a fantasy_–a wishful image, a hypnotic suggestion, or a fantasized personality [41]. In reemphasizing the phenomena of wishing, willing, and possession by fantasies, the present article redefines the latter phenomenon as possession by ‘unmonitored’ fantasies, which are distinguishable from anticipatory images impelling action” (pp. 184-185).
Lynn, Steven Jay; Sivec, Harry (1992). The hypnotizable subject as creative problem-solving agent. In Fromm, Erika; Nash, Michael R. (Ed.), Contemporary hypnosis research (pp. 292-333). Guilford Press.
These notes are taken only from the section of this chapter that deals with Hypnotic Responding, Imaginative Activity, and Expectancies, and they treat of the concept of nonvoluntary responding (pp 315-316). Other topics covered in the chapter include: Imagination, Fantasy, and Hypnosis Theories; The Hypnotizable Subject as Creative Problem-Solving Agent; Hypnosis and Subjects’ Capability for Imaginative Activity; Goal-Directed Fantasy: Patterns of Imaginative Activity during Hypnosis; Hypnosis and Creativity; and a Conclusion.
Several studies manipulated expectancies re the relationship between imagination and involuntariness. When Ss were told that “good” hypnotic subjects could (or could not) resist suggestions, “this information affected their ability to resist the hypnotist and tended to affect subjects’ report of suggestion-related involuntariness … [Lynn, Nash, Rhue, Frauman, & Sweeney, 1984]. Furthermore, subjects who successfully resisted suggestions and subjects who failed to do so reported comparable levels of hypnotic depth and imaginative involvement in suggestions.
“Spanos, Cobb, and Gorassini (1985) conducted a similar experiment in which they found that hypnotizable subjects who were instructed that they could become deeply involved in suggestions and yet resist them successfully resisted 95% of the suggestions and rated themselves as maintaining voluntary control over their behavior. Thus, subjects are able to resist nearly all of the suggestions when resistance is facilitated by situational demands. It is worth noting that subjects in this research who resisted hypnotic suggestions rated themselves as just as deeply involved in the suggestions as Ss who failed to resist suggestions after being informed that deeply hypnotized subjects were incapable of resisting suggestions” (pp. 315-316).
Lynn, Snodgrass, et al. (1987). showed that hypnotizable Ss who were just “imagining” along with suggestions but instructed to resist responding to motoric suggestions acted the way hypnotized Ss did in their earlier countersuggestion research: imagining subjects tended to move in response to suggestion (that “good” Ss responded in certain ways), despite being instructed to resist. In this study, with instructions designed to increase the use of goal directed fantasies (GDFs), low and high hypnotizable subjects reported equivalent GDF absorption and frequency of GDFs. However, highs responded more and reported greater involuntariness than lows, even when their GDFs were equivalent.
“A number of other studies have examined the effects of expectancies on imaginings and hypnotic behavior. Spanos, Weekes, and de Groh (1984) informed subjects that deeply hypnotized individuals could imagine an arm movement in one direction while their unconscious caused the arm to move in the opposite direction. Even though subjects so informed moved in the opposite direction, they imagined suggested effects and described their countersuggestion behavior as involuntary” (p. 317).
Oakman, Jonathan M.; Woody, Erik Z. (1992, October). Automaticity, the Stroop effect, and hypnotic ability. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington, VA.
Builds on the first Dixon study of Stroop effect and hypnotizability, which presented stimuli too fast and also the probabilities of congruent/noncongruent stimuli were varied. Highs had more interference in all conditions, seeming to process with language more. It cast doubt on the use of strategies by highs. Measurement of hypnotizability outside the situation cast doubt on expectancy (social psychology influence) theories.
Automaticity refers to responses that seem effortless, fast, and require little attention. They propose that this characterizes hypnosis. Highly automatic behavior cannot be suppressed. Reading is automatic; color naming is not. The greater the automaticity factor, the more the Stroop effect. Automaticity relates to automatic movement in hypnosis.
Previous research on Stroop used visual tasks, while hypnosis is largely auditory. So we used identification of volume of a word presented over a speaker, plus the regular (visual) Stroop task.
The words “loud” or “soft” were presented as loud or soft in volume. Lows = 4 or lower; highs = 8 or more on Canadian test of hypnotizability, the Waterloo Group Form C.
[In the Visual Stroop?] Reaction Time was greater for incongruent than congruent stimuli for highs (almost statistically significant) but not lows. It is an 8 ms difference for highs.
The Auditory Stroop is very different for both groups; however highs did not show more difference in reaction time than lows.
Auditory and Visual Stroop tasks did not correlate. Waterloo hypnotizability correlated: .28 with Visual Stroop, .11 with Auditory Stroop.
Logan’s theory about automaticity seems appropriate: automatization is a shift from using a strategy to relying on memory; inhibition of the automatic response is based on using a strategy instead of relying on memory. Lows may be very able to inhibit automatic processing when necessary; they are the interesting exceptions to the rule, because the Stroop has been a reliable finding in psychological research for years.
Perry, Campbell (1992). Theorizing about hypnosis in either/or terms. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 40, 238-252.
The present paper addresses 3 issues raised by Coe (1992). First, it maintains that the “altered state” issue of the 1960s remains buried in current dichotomous classifications of hypnosis theories as involving either “special processes” or the social- psychological position. Given the current diversity of the field, it appears imprudent to classify theorizing in either/or terms; additionally, despite a history of using the term “altered state” in a circular way, it is not an inherently circular formulation. It can be used descriptively simply to point to the observation that some individuals in hypnosis report subjective alterations. A second issue broached concerns the metaphorical status of the term “hypnosis”; it is accepted as a misleading metaphor inherited from 19th century investigators such as Braid, Faria, Puysegur, and Liebeault. Provided that it is recognized that this metaphor refers to a “domain” (E. G. Hilgard, 1973) of characteristically elicited behaviors, no problem ensues in retaining this metaphor derived from nocturnal sleep. A subsequent discussion of current conceptualizations of hypnosis indicates considerable agreement among investigators; there is much consensus that hypnosis is an individual differences phenomenon, in which imagination may, in some individuals, become so intense and so vivid, as to take on “reality value,” to the extent that a hypnotized person may have difficulty in distinguishing fantasy from reality. The S abilities of imagery/imagination, absorption, dissociation, and automaticity (which may be proved to be an index of dissociation) are proposed as being the main ingredients of the hypnotic experience. Finally, a synergistic approach is proposed as a means of progressing beyond the current impasse of either/or theorizing.
the main ingredients of the hypnotic experience. Finally, a synergistic approach is proposed as a means of progressing beyond the current impasse of either/or theorizing.
Price, Simani M.; Crawford, Helen J.; Plantier, Mary E.; Jones, Elizabeth P. (1992, October). Sustained attention, selective attention, and automaticity: Relationships to hypnotic responsiveness. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington, VA.
There are four dimensions of attention: 1. focused & sustained attention 2. selective attention 3. divided or dual attention 4. ambient attention (the ability to attend to one thing but have floating attention also)
Ss had Harvard and Group Stanford scales of hypnotizability, to divide them into low, medium, and high groups. They were recruited for a study of attentional correlates with no mention of hypnosis, in order to reduce expectancy effects.
In this study, 57 Ss had two 45 second trials on the Stroop test; the higher scores mean less Stroop-type interference.
We studied the effects of distraction on ability to do mental arithmetic. (There were to ignore a word in the sum column.) Then Ss were tested for implicit memory of the words.
Necker Cube task was administered (to replicate Crawford & Wallace): four trials, 60 sec. each
Absorption Scale
Crawford & Gumbles scale
RESULTS.
There were no differences on most of the tests for high, medium, and low groups. Hypnotizability correlated with extremely focused attentional ability as measured by the DAPI Extremely Focused Attention factor, and the Tellegen Absorption Scale. Moderately Focused Attention loaded on DAPI Moderate Focus. Necker Cube and Implicit Memory (for words) loaded on the Dual Ambient Attention factor.
Somerville, Wayne R.; Jupp, James J. (1992). Experimental evaluation of a brief ‘ideodynamic’ hypnotherapy applied to phobias. Contemporary Hypnosis, 9, 85-96.
This study used a test-retest design to investigate the effectiveness of a brief ‘ideodynamic’ hypnotherapy which notionally located and reformulated memories in the treatment of simple phobia disorder. Subjects were 19 phobics randomly assigned to treatment (n = 10) and waiting control groups (n = 9). Rapid, significant, and sustained relief from phobic fear and avoidance was reported by 50% of treatment subjects. A number of symptoms and therapy process variables were correlated with treatment outcome. These included a negative association with hypnotizability and a positive association with hypnotic depth estimates. The ramifications of these and other associations are discussed and it is concluded that the ‘ideodynamic approach’ investigated may have contributed a therapeutic effect beyond the operation of treatment non-specific factors.
Treatment consisted of: 1. Hypnotic induction. 2. Establishment of ideomotor signals described to clients as a means of communicating with the ‘inner unconscious mind’. 3. Beyond the first therapy session, a review of work done in previous sessions. 4. Gaining signaled permission from clients to work on their problem and for the ‘inner mind’ to review relevant memories. 5. Location of the ‘earliest critical event’ by the ‘inner mind’. 6. Review of the located memory by the ‘inner mind’. 7. Establishing age at the occurrence of the ‘critical’ event. 8. Ideomotor signaling indicating suitability of a visual imagoic processing of the event.
If visual processing was chosen, the dissociated viewing procedure (step 9A) was used next, otherwise the ego-state procedure (step 9B) was employed.
The authors describe each treatment step in detail. Each subject received at least two sessions of therapy, or a maximum of three sessions if signaling indicated the presence of further unresolved memories after two sessions.
They present a case illustrating that the approach is possible with minimally hypnotizable subjects, in the apparent absence of imagoic experience, ‘desensitization’, catharsis, unpleasant affect, talking through or ‘insight’.
“There was a positive correlation between changes in phobic fear and capacity for mental imagery which suggests that this may be one relevant variable in predicting response to memory reformulating therapy.
“There was a negative correlation between changes in fear and hypnotic responsiveness. So, successful therapeutic outcome was obviously not limited to highly hypnotizable subjects. Hypnotizability was assessed in a careful and standardized manner but testing was conducted 10 weeks following therapy. This meant that subjects had a substantial experience in hypnotherapy at assessment. Furthermore, at the time of assessment subjects were aware of the outcome of therapy and of the kinds of memories located during therapy. it has been suggested that an association between level of hypnotizedness achieved during treatment and outcome rather than an association between degree of hypnotizability possible during therapy and outcome, taps an hypnotic effect (Spiegel & Spiegel, 1978).
“All therapy sessions were of equal duration and, as the inductions were standardized, all subjects had an approximately equal opportunity to engage in memory reformulation. However, there were individual differences in the number of memories located and a strong significant association was found between reduced fear and the number of these critical memories that were dealt with. This result suggests that the therapeutic effect may have derived either from factors specific to the therapy cycle or from differing levels of motivation among subjects to undertake the necessary ‘work’.
“Maximum discomfort experienced during session two of treatment was negatively correlated with relief from phobic fears. This relationship may again reflect the influence of unresolved problematic memories on subjects who had not achieved relief by that time. It is clearly consistent with relief not being associated with painful abreaction.
“The therapy permitted a pervading privacy through the options of non- imaginative processing of recalled material (which was used by a substantial minority of subjects) and conscious withholding of the content of memories from the therapist (which was employed to a large extent by all subjects). Their reports indicated that this ‘privacy’ was seen as attractive by both successfully and unsuccessfully treated subjects. Taken with other results mentioned above these process findings suggest that the treatment studied stood up quite well against other brief but highly stressful exposure treatments for phobia currently in use (e.g. Ost, 1989).
“Further research needs to address the complex question as to what are the necessary and sufficient features of this procedure in producing therapeutic change. Unsolicited comments by subjects about their experience during treatment suggested that some of them were surprised by the ‘involuntary’ nature of their ideomotor signaling while others said that signaling was under their voluntary control. Some expressed surprise at the nature of the memories that came to them ‘suddenly’ during therapy. Some memories were of traumatic childhood experiences that were unexpected and considered to have ‘nothing to do with my phobia'” (pp 93-94).
Bowers, Kenneth S. (1991). Dissociation in hypnosis and multiple personality disorder. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 39, 155-176.
The first part of this paper examines the concept of dissociation in the context of hypnosis. In particular, the neodissociative and social psychological models of hypnosis are compared. It is argued that the social psychological model, in describing hypnotic enactments as purposeful, does not adequately distinguish between behavior that is enacted “on purpose” and behavior that serves or achieves a purpose. 2 recent dissertations (Hughes, 1988; Miller, 1986) from the University of Waterloo are summarized, each of which supports the neodissociative view that hypnotic behavior can be purposeful (in the sense that the suggested state of affairs is achieved) and nonvolitional (in the sense that the suggested state of affairs is not achieved by high level executive initiative and ongoing effort). The second part of the paper employs a neodissociative view of hypnosis to help understand the current epidemic of multiple personality disorder (MPD). In particular, it is argued that many symptoms of MPD are implicitly suggested effects–particularly prone to occur in persons who have a lifelong tendency to use dissociative type defenses. The present author believes that this account is easier to sustain conceptually and empirically than the current view, which states that a secondary (tertiary, etc.) personality accounts for the striking phenomenological discontinuities experienced by MPD patients.
As an example of the fact that behavior that serves a purpose is not always performed on purpose, the author cites not falling out of bed while sleeping, and waking up in response to signals from the bladder to go to the bathroom. Lower levels of control can be dissociated from executive initiative and/or monitoring. “Since the experience of volition is closely tied to executive initiative and effort, suggested behaviors that bypass such initiative and effort are typically experienced as nonvolitional” (p. 157). Dissociated control occurs under waking conditions also, as when one dials a very familiar phone number rather than the one that they intended to dial. In this case, the behavior that is enacted is not what one consciously intended.
Miller’s dissertation, also published as Miller & Bowers, 1986, is described on p. 158 ff. Without hypnosis, cold pressor pain (cold water immersion) reduced accuracy of performance on a multiple choice vocabulary test 35%. Both hypnotic analgesia and cognitive pain management strategies were equally effective in reducing pain of cold pressor test (and both interventions were more effective for high than for low hypnotizable Ss). However, the cognitive strategy group showed an additional drop of 30% in vocabulary performance from pre- to posttreatment cold water immersion (despite successfully reducing their pain). In the hypnosis condition, lows showed only a slight additional decrease (8%) while highs showed a slight (10%) _increase_ in their vocabulary performance from pre- to posttreatment immersion.
Thus, the effect of hypnosis in pain control “does not depend on S’s utilization of high-level cognitive strategies. Rather, hypnotic analgesia seems to involve the dissociated control of pain–that is, control which is relatively free of the need for high- level, executive initiative and effort. … Because hypnotic analgesia minimizes the degree of executive initiative and ongoing effort required to reduce pain, however, it seems inappropriate to view such reductions as something achieved on purpose” (p. 161).
Hughes’ dissertation is described on p. 162 and ff. Instead of performance decrement on a cognitive task like vocabulary testing, she used increased heart rate as an index of cognitive effort. If heart rate increases when Ss successfully use hypnotic imagery, that would confirm the social psychological view that “suggested effects are achieved by this kind of ongoing allocation of high-level cognitive force or work” (p. 162).
of high-level cognitive force or work” (p. 162).
Highs and lows were hypnotized and administered three trials of neutral and three trials of fearful imagery in counterbalanced order. Each imagery trial lasted 1 minute, after which Ss rated vividness of imagery, effort required, and amount of fear experienced.
Average imagery vividness was higher in highs than lows, for both neutral and fear imagery. For lows the correlation between heart rate increases and ratings of cognitive effort were .54 (neutral imagery) and .49 (fear imagery). For highs, the correlations were -.05 (neutral) and -.52 (fear). Thus, “for low but not high hypnotizable Ss, we find the predicted positive relationship between a cardiac indicator of cognitive effort and the ratings of cognitive effort involved in producing neutral imagery” (p. 163).
“First, for low hypnotizables engaged in fear imagery, ratings of effort are correlated .66 with ratings of fear. In other words, the more low hypnotizable Ss work to produce a fearful image, the more frightening the image is. Second, for high hypnotizables engaged in fear imagery, the correlation between ratings of fear and effort is minus 68– indicating that the less effort highs report in producing fear imagery, the more frightened they become. Finally, for high hypnotizables, the correlation between ratings of fear and heart rate increase is .59, indicating that the more fear high hypnotizable Ss experience when engaged in fear imagery, the more their heart rate increases (the comparable figure for low hypnotizables is .16)” (p. 164).
The authors discuss why the pattern of correlations is different for people high and low in measured hypnotizability, and summarize the implications of both Miller’s and Hughes’ research. Both investigations indicate that, at least for high hypnotizable people, less initiative and effort are required to effect a response to hypnotic suggestion than one would expect. The show how behavior can be both purposeful and nonvolitional (in the sense of not exhibiting conscious intention and strategic efforts). By noting that the sense of nonvolition that accompanies a response to suggestion is an actual alteration in executive control, they provide a model for dissociative psychopathology such as MPD. For although executive control is dissociated, these experiments do not suggest that there is a second executive system or ‘personality’ that is responsible for the behavior.
Patients diagnosed with MPD have very high measured hypnotizability (Bliss, 1984). In fact, they seem to engage in self hypnosis, withdrawing into a trance or a dissociated state (Bliss, 1984). The authors quote Wilson & Barber (1983) as indicating that highly hypnotized, fantasy-prone normal individuals may become so absorbed in a character being imagined that they lose awareness of their own identity.
The authors offer a neodissociative account of MPD: “People prone to MPD are very high in hypnotic ability and are, therefore, vulnerable to the suggestive impact of ideas, imaginings, and fantasies; what is more, they are high in hypnotic ability because they have learned to use dissociative defenses as a way of dealing with inescapable threat– such as physical and sexual abuse (Kluft, 1987). … Fantasied alternatives to reality (including a fantasied alter ego … ) can become increasingly complex and differentiated. Gradually, these fantasied alternatives begin to activate subsystems of control more or less directly–that is, with minimal involvement of executive level initiative and control. Such ‘dissociated control’ of behavior does not necessarily eliminate consciousness of it, though one’s actions are apt to be experienced as increasingly ego-alien. If and when the activating fantasies and resulting behaviors become sufficiently threatening, however, they can also be repressed into an unconscious (i.e., amnesic) status, thus further separating high-level executive and monitoring functions from the dissociated, ego-alien aspects of oneself. The fully realized result of this process is an individual who is subject to profound discontinuities in his or her sense of self. … The experience of behaving in an outwardly uncharacteristic manner requires only that subsystems of control are more or less directly activated by ideas and fantasies in a manner that effectively bypasses executive initiative and control” (pp. 168-169).
923, Bowers, 1992 NOTES: Tart allegedly taught ESP skills based on reinforcement, using a machine that projected display and gave feedback immediately, so the subjects could learn to anticipate the picture better. But the picture presented next was time-linked to the S’s response (so S could learn it).
1987 Behavioral and Brain Sciences review, with 2 target articles, makes one doubt strength of findings. ESP research doesn’t distinguish between description of an observation and it’s proposed cause.
MPD shares with ESP a tendency to predispose toward a certain explanation. Feeling like one has a separate personality leads to finding evidence for one. But an MPD account is wrong-headed because the diagnosis misconstrues a notion of personality, which is a developmental concept (a pattern of thought, feeling, and behavior). Mischel’s (1968) account of human functioning competed with trait theory, so “personality” concept became extraneous.
Defining personality in terms of one’s experiences or beliefs about oneself has lead to further problems, encouraged by the descriptive approach of DSM III (which depends on patient reports). Drew Weston distinguished between the self and self representation. One can’t argue that a computer programmed to describe itself is the same as it’s descriptions.
Personality can’t be reduced to person’s beliefs about themselves. A secondary personality cannot be reduced to bizarre experiences a person believes are due to a second personality. Clinicians do not accept as valid the beliefs of a paranoid schizophrenic; or of an anxious neurotic. With multiple personality disorder (MPD) the patient becomes the expert and the clinician the student.
William Smith’s 1986 SCEH paper: case study of patient who was convinced her problems were due to unresolved problems from a previous life. He didn’t challenge her system but still worked with her successfully, communicating respect without validating her belief.
Advocates of MPDs think the observation that it is associated with high hypnotizability indicates great dissociation; critics think the association indicates great suggestibility. There is a historical parallel: Mesmer probably didn’t suggest seizure-like episodes, but implicit suggestions for seizures were probably partially responsible. Mistaken attribution permitted Mesmer to see this as validation of his theory of animal magnetism.
Clinicians are not the only ones to “suggest” MPD syndrome. High profile cases are in the media. We should also remember Orne’s 1959 research showing that students who received false information a week earlier in lecture on hypnosis showed the behavior when they were hypnotized.
Janet’s disaggregation (dissociation) theory said hysterics and hypnotized people responded to ideas dissociated from the main stream of consciousness. So his contemporaries thought that spontaneous amnesia was a defining feature of hypnosis; yet it is not thought to be so in our era. The idea may have circulated in Janet’s time, by popular culture.
MPDs are always highly suggestible so can respond to circulating accounts in the media, and every account that reaches the media can influence these people.
We could abandon the diagnosis of MPD in favor of Spiegel’s “disorder of self integration.” It is less provocative, does not imply any clinical benefit in the benefits of seeking out more personalities. This might reduce the incidence of this disorder, or likelihood that a suggestible person would develop the disorder iatrogenically.
discontinuities in his or her sense of self. … The experience of behaving in an outwardly uncharacteristic manner requires only that subsystems of control are more or less directly activated by ideas and fantasies in a manner that effectively bypasses executive initiative and control” (pp. 168-169).
923, Bowers, 1992 NOTES: Tart allegedly taught ESP skills based on reinforcement, using a machine that projected display and gave feedback immediately, so the subjects could learn to anticipate the picture better. But the picture presented next was time-linked to the S’s response (so S could learn it).
1987 Behavioral and Brain Sciences review, with 2 target articles, makes one doubt strength of findings. ESP research doesn’t distinguish between description of an observation and it’s proposed cause.
MPD shares with ESP a tendency to predispose toward a certain explanation. Feeling like one has a separate personality leads to finding evidence for one. But an MPD account is wrong-headed because the diagnosis misconstrues a notion of personality, which is a developmental concept (a pattern of thought, feeling, and behavior). Mischel’s (1968) account of human functioning competed with trait theory, so “personality” concept became extraneous.
Defining personality in terms of one’s experiences or beliefs about oneself has lead to further problems, encouraged by the descriptive approach of DSM III (which depends on patient reports). Drew Weston distinguished between the self and self representation. One can’t argue that a computer programmed to describe itself is the same as it’s descriptions.
Personality can’t be reduced to person’s beliefs about themselves. A secondary personality cannot be reduced to bizarre experiences a person believes are due to a second personality. Clinicians do not accept as valid the beliefs of a paranoid schizophrenic; or of an anxious neurotic. With multiple personality disorder (MPD) the patient becomes the expert and the clinician the student.
William Smith’s 1986 SCEH paper: case study of patient who was convinced her problems were due to unresolved problems from a previous life. He didn’t challenge her system but still worked with her successfully, communicating respect without validating her belief.
Advocates of MPDs think the observation that it is associated with high hypnotizability indicates great dissociation; critics think the association indicates great suggestibility. There is a historical parallel: Mesmer probably didn’t suggest seizure-like episodes, but implicit suggestions for seizures were probably partially responsible. Mistaken attribution permitted Mesmer to see this as validation of his theory of animal magnetism.
Clinicians are not the only ones to “suggest” MPD syndrome. High profile cases are in the media. We should also remember Orne’s 1959 research showing that students who received false information a week earlier in lecture on hypnosis showed the behavior when they were hypnotized.
Janet’s disaggregation (dissociation) theory said hysterics and hypnotized people responded to ideas dissociated from the main stream of consciousness. So his contemporaries thought that spontaneous amnesia was a defining feature of hypnosis; yet it is not thought to be so in our era. The idea may have circulated in Janet’s time, by popular culture.
MPDs are always highly suggestible so can respond to circulating accounts in the media, and every account that reaches the media can influence these people.
We could abandon the diagnosis of MPD in favor of Spiegel’s “disorder of self integration.” It is less provocative, does not imply any clinical benefit in the benefits of seeking out more personalities. This might reduce the incidence of this disorder, or likelihood that a suggestible person would develop the disorder iatrogenically.
would develop the disorder iatrogenically.
1991
Brown, Jason W. (1991). Self and process: Brain states and the conscious present. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Author, from the Department of Neurology at New York University Medical School, presents a theory about the genetic unfolding of mental content (mind) through stages, from mental state into consciousness or into behavior. He relates the genesis of mind to brain development but avoids assuming that there is a straightforward correlation between brain development (e.g. myelination) and cognitive development or perception. To some degree, the theory is based on subjective report data and psychological symptoms. The author discusses issues that bear on the phenomena of nonvoluntary responding and dissociation that are reported or described by hypnotized persons.
“The nature of the mental state will determine the relation between self and world, and thus the interpretation given to agency and choice. … The crossing of the boundary from self to world is a shift from one level in mind to another” (pp. 10-11).
“… if we begin with mind as primary and seek to explain objects from inner states and private experience, the discontinuity between inner and outer evaporates: mind is everywhere, a universe. … Whereas before we thought to perceive objects, now we understand that we think them” (p. 19).
“The concept of a stratified cognition is central to the notion of a mental state …. This entails an unfolding from depth to surface, not from one surface to the next, a direction crucial to agency and the causal or decisional properties of consciousness” (p. 52). By unfolding from depth to surface, he means from Core, through Subconscious, then Conscious Private Events, and finally Extra-Personal Space.
He goes on to provide a definition of mental states. “A mental state is the minimal state of a mind, an absolute unit from the standpoint of its spatial and temporal structure. … The state also has to include the prehistory of the organism. … The concept of a mental state implies a fundamental unit that has gestalt-like properties, in that specific contents– words, thoughts, percepts–appear in the context of mind as a whole (p. 53).
“The entire multitiered system arborizes like a tree, with levels in each component linked to corresponding levels in other components. For example, an early (e.g., limbic) state in language (e.g., word meaning) is linked to an early stage in action (e.g., drive, proximal motility) and perception (e.g., hallucination, personal memory) …. In sum, a description of the spatial and temporal features of a _single_ unfolding series amounts to a description of the minimal unit of mind, the _absolute_ mental state” (p. 54).
The author’s discussion of an individual’s physical movement relates to the concept of nonvoluntary movement (or movement without awareness of volition) in hypnosis. “More precisely, levels in the brain state constitute the action structure. As it unfolds, this structure generates the conviction that a self-initiated act has occurred. This structure–the action representation–does not elaborate content in consciousness. … As with the sensory-perceptual interface, the transition to movement occurs across an abrupt boundary. In some manner, perhaps through a translation of cognitive rhythms in the action to kinetic patterns in the movement, levels in the emerging act discharge into motor (physical) events” (p. 57).
“The self has the nature of a global image or early representation within which objects-to-be are embedded. … The self is the accumulation of all the momentary cognitions developing in a brain configured by heredity and experience in a particular way (p. 70).
“The deposition of a holistic representation … creates the deception of a self that stands behind and propagates events. The feeling of the self as an agent is reinforced by the forward thrust of the process and the deeper locus of the self in relation to surface objects. The self appears to be an instigator of acts and images when in fact it is given up in their formation. The self does not cause or initiate, it only anticipates (p. 70).
The foregoing notes cover only the first five chapters, less than half the book. Other chapters relevant to hypnosis would be those titled ‘The Nature of Voluntary Action,’ ‘Psychology of Time Awareness,’ ‘From Will to Compassion,’ and ‘Mind and Brain.’
brain configured by heredity and experience in a particular way (p. 70).
“The deposition of a holistic representation … creates the deception of a self that stands behind and propagates events. The feeling of the self as an agent is reinforced by the forward thrust of the process and the deeper locus of the self in relation to surface objects. The self appears to be an instigator of acts and images when in fact it is given up in their formation. The self does not cause or initiate, it only anticipates (p. 70).
The foregoing notes cover only the first five chapters, less than half the book. Other chapters relevant to hypnosis would be those titled ‘The Nature of Voluntary Action,’ ‘Psychology of Time Awareness,’ ‘From Will to Compassion,’ and ‘Mind and Brain.’
Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown & Co
Material in this book is relevant to discussions about ‘nonvoluntary’ behavior and (un)conscious experiencing. It combines information from cognitive neuroscience with the philosophy of mind. The author presents a view that consciousness (the ‘mind’) is the consequence of the brain’s activities which give rise to illusions about their own properties. He presents the Multiple Drafts model of consciousness, which reformulates the concept of a ‘stream of consciousness.’ This provides a basis for consideration of concepts central to cognitive neuroscience and phenomena associated with hypnosis, e.g. experiential states and the nature of the self.
The author gives various examples of phenomenology and notes that although these examples are familiar to us, they are totally inaccessible to materialistic science; e.g. the way the sunset looks to someone. He treats people’s descriptions of what they experience as a record of speech acts. Thus, observing and interpreting speech acts, inferring from them the speaker’s inner states, is like a reader who is interpreting a work of fiction. He gives as examples of how one can scientifically study what does not ‘exist’ (a) literary theorists who describe fictional entities, (b) anthropologists who study cultural artifacts like gods and witches, and (c) physicists who study a center of gravity.
In Dennett’s theory, multitrack processes of interpretation of sensory inputs and elaboration of those inputs amounts to a kind of ‘editorial revision’ by the brain. For example in the phi phenomenon a red dot is displayed, followed by a green dot in a different location; the first spot seems to begin moving and then change color in the middle of its illusory passage toward the second location. He points out that awareness of the change in color must occur after seeing the green spot, but one consciously experiences a single spot first red, then red-turning-to-green, finally green. In an example that relates directly to the words used for his theory, he cites contemporary publishing practices, in which several different drafts of an article are in circulation even while the author is revising it. Deciding on some specific moment of brain processing as the moment of consciousness is arbitrary, according to his Multiple Drafts model.
“Visual stimuli evoke trains of events in the cortex that gradually yield discriminations of greater and greater specificity. At different times and different places, various ‘decisions’ or ‘judgments’ are made; more literally, parts of the brain are caused to go into states that discriminate different features, e.g., first mere onset of stimulus, then location, then shape, later color (in a different pathway), later still (apparent) motion, and eventually object recognition. These localized discriminative states transmit effects to other places, contributing to further discriminations, and so forth. The natural but naive question to ask is: ‘Where does it all come together’? The answer is: Nowhere. Some of these distributed contentful states soon die out, leaving no further traces. Others do leave traces, on subsequent verbal reports of experience and memory, on ‘semantic readiness’ and other varieties of perceptual set, on emotional state, behavioral proclivities, and so forth. Some of these effects–for instance, influences on subsequent verbal reports–are at least symptomatic of consciousness. But there is no one place in the brain through which all these causal trains must pass in order to deposit their content ‘in consciousness'” (pp. 134-135).
The author describes the evolution of the brain, along Darwinian lines, and introduces the idea of culture as a repository and transmission medium for innovations (including innovations of consciousness) as a medium of evolution. Through learning, we humans evolve an American or a Japanese brain. Once we have evolved the ‘entrance and exit pathways’ for language, they become ‘parasitized’ by _memes_ (entities that have evolved to thrive in such a niche).
Richard Dawkins coined the term _memes_ to describe the smallest idea elements that replicate themselves reliably (e.g. wheel, alphabet, wearing clothes, right triangle). “The transformation of a human brain by infestations of memes is a major alteration in the competence of that organ” (p. 209).
on ‘semantic readiness’ and other varieties of perceptual set, on emotional state, behavioral proclivities, and so forth. Some of these effects–for instance, influences on subsequent verbal reports–are at least symptomatic of consciousness. But there is no one place in the brain through which all these causal trains must pass in order to deposit their content ‘in consciousness'” (pp. 134-135).
The author describes the evolution of the brain, along Darwinian lines, and introduces the idea of culture as a repository and transmission medium for innovations (including innovations of consciousness) as a medium of evolution. Through learning, we humans evolve an American or a Japanese brain. Once we have evolved the ‘entrance and exit pathways’ for language, they become ‘parasitized’ by _memes_ (entities that have evolved to thrive in such a niche).
Richard Dawkins coined the term _memes_ to describe the smallest idea elements that replicate themselves reliably (e.g. wheel, alphabet, wearing clothes, right triangle). “The transformation of a human brain by infestations of memes is a major alteration in the competence of that organ” (p. 209).
Dennett discusses the similarities and dissimilarities of brains and computers. He suggests that human minds are like serial virtual machines implemented on parallel processing hardware. The stream of consciousness results from our rehearsal of brief experiences, to commit them to memory; language then permits us to describe to ourselves the process of thinking which leads to judgement and action.
The author’s discussion of how a verbal expression evolves and becomes manifest is related to how so-called intentional action occurs. [This relates to discussions of nonvoluntary actions in hypnosis.] We assume that because our actions make sense, they are the product of serial reasoning. However, there are multiple channels “in which specialist circuits try, in parallel pandemoniums, to do their various things … (pp. 253- 254). Bernard Baars has suggested “that consciousness is accomplished by a ‘distributed society of specialists that is equipped with a working memory, called a _global workspace_, whose contents can be broadcast to the system as a whole (p. 42)'” (p. 257). Dennett states that there is no line dividing the events that are definitely in consciousness from those that are outside consciousness. He urges scientists to forgo the concept of the ‘inner observer’ implied by Cartesian materialism.
Examples of perception that is unaccompanied by consciousness include blindsight (in which the subject does better than chance on visual tests but denies consciousness, and the denials are given credence by neurological evidence of brain damage) and hysterical blindness, which is given less credence because subjects often use the visually provided information in ways blindsight Ss do not. Other behaviors not controlled by conscious thought include blinking when things approach the eye, walking without falling over, regulating our body temperature, adjusting our metabolism, etc. “If I am trying to see a bird that I hear, and stare at the spot but do not distinguish the bird from its background, can I say that it is present in the background of my (visual) consciousness or not?” (p. 336).
The author maintains that if an event doesn’t linger and the person is unable to identify and reidentify the effect, it cannot be reported. But such reportability can be improved, as with training the palate of wine tasters. Often, however, we continue disregarding stimuli that impinge on us. There are minor oversights, such as our ‘blind spots’ or proof reading errors, and major oversights such as a brain-damaged patient’s hemi-neglect. In the Multiple Drafts theory, the Observer is replaced by ‘coalitions of specialists’ that are distributed around in the brain, distributed in both time and space.
Though discrimination or discernment happens, there is no one Discerner doing the work. However, Dennett takes the middle ground on the question of whether a self exists: it is simply a creation like the nest of the Bower bird, or the organized colony of termite ants. “So wonderful is the organization of a termite colony that it seemed to some observers that each termite colony had to have a soul (Marais, 1937). We now understand that its organization is simply the result of a million semi-independent little agents, each itself an automaton, doing its thing. So wonderful is the organization of a human self that to many observers it has seemed that each human being had a soul, too: a benevolent Dictator ruling from Headquarters” (p. 416). The sense of self is a creation, like a physicist’s center of gravity.
Thus, multiple personality disorder is viewed as a self that has gaps; and our sense of self might include different aspects from one year to the other. Hence, “selves are not independently existing soul-pearls, but artifacts of the social processes that create us, and, like other such artifacts, subject to sudden shifts in status. The only ‘momentum’ that accrues to the trajectory of a self, or a club, is the stability imparted to it by the web of beliefs that constitute it, and when those beliefs lapse, it lapses, either permanently or temporarily” (p. 423).
Finally, the author has an extensive discussion of the concepts of ‘qualia’ and of ‘epiphenomena’ and seems to have little use for either term in trying to understand Mind.
-ever, Dennett takes the middle ground on the question of whether a self exists: it is simply a creation like the nest of the Bower bird, or the organized colony of termite ants. “So wonderful is the organization of a termite colony that it seemed to some observers that each termite colony had to have a soul (Marais, 1937). We now understand that its organization is simply the result of a million semi-independent little agents, each itself an automaton, doing its thing. So wonderful is the organization of a human self that to many observers it has seemed that each human being had a soul, too: a benevolent Dictator ruling from Headquarters” (p. 416). The sense of self is a creation, like a physicist’s center of gravity.
Thus, multiple personality disorder is viewed as a self that has gaps; and our sense of self might include different aspects from one year to the other. Hence, “selves are not independently existing soul-pearls, but artifacts of the social processes that create us, and, like other such artifacts, subject to sudden shifts in status. The only ‘momentum’ that accrues to the trajectory of a self, or a club, is the stability imparted to it by the web of beliefs that constitute it, and when those beliefs lapse, it lapses, either permanently or temporarily” (p. 423).
Finally, the author has an extensive discussion of the concepts of ‘qualia’ and of ‘epiphenomena’ and seems to have little use for either term in trying to understand Mind.
Gibson, H. B. (1991). Can hypnosis compel people to commit harmful, immoral and criminal acts?: A review of the literature. Contemporary Hypnosis, 8, 129-140.
The literature relating to whether hypnosis can be used to compel people to perform acts that are dangerous, immoral or criminal is reviewed, some evidence over the past 200 years being discussed. Relevant real-life instances are cited as well as the laboratory studies of the twentieth century. Detailed criticisms of the latter are made, and it is shown that although no really conclusive findings have emerged, such research has strongly implied that hypnosis does not increase compliance. Four past criminal trials concerned with alleged rape and sexual assault are cited. It is concluded that whilst hypnosis may be one among a number of techniques used in sexual seduction, it is not reasonable to claim that rape has ever been effected by means of hypnosis alone.
Lynn, Steven Jay; Weekes, J. R.; Neufeld, U.; Ziuney, O.; Brentar, J.; Weiss, F. (1991). Interpersonal climate and hypnotizability level: Effects of hypnotic performance, rapport, and archaic involvement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 737-743.
Designed to extend research by McConkey and Sheehan, they tested 24 hypnotizable and 21 unhypnotizable Ss in high interpersonal/high rapport (including education about misconceptions about hypnosis, eye contact, and friendly self-disclosure) and low interpersonal/low rapport testing contexts. Overall, hypnotizable Ss were more responsive to hypnosis, rated the hypnotist more positively, and experienced greater involuntariness and archaic involvement than unhypnotizable subjects. However, results provide support for the hypothesis that low hypnotizable Ss are particularly sensitive to variations of the hypnotist’s interpersonal behavior. Only low hypnotizable Ss’ objective and subjective hypnotic performance on the SHSS, Form C, was
enhanced by hypnotist behavior designed to optimize rapport. Hypnotizable Ss’ behavior was stable across testing contexts.
Madrid, Antonio D.; Barnes, Susan v.d.H. (1991). A hypnotic protocol for eliciting physical changes through suggestions of biochemical responses. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 122-128.
We employed brief hypnotherapy to effect physical changes in patients suffering from medical disorders including allergies, rectal bleeding, systemic lupus, hyperemesis, headache, asthma, and chronic pain. We present, in language appropriate to the individual patient, considerations and suggestions to effect the release of healing biochemicals. Ideomotor signals indicated the patient’s awareness of the healing. We hypothesize that the technique triggered novel state-dependent memory, learning, and behavior.
They hypothesize that the technique they use triggers novel state-dependent memory, learning, and behavior (See for example Rossi, 1987, and Rossi & Cheek, 1988).
Hypnotic Protocol: “1. Tell the patient that he can heal himself by allowing his body to supply its own biochemicals needed to make him well. If a specific biochemical is known, such as cortisone or endorphins, name it. “2. Hypnotize the patient. Resistant or hard to hypnotize patients need not be deeply hypnotized because the patients, using this protocol, will automatically go into trance while accomplishing the next task of accessing and using ideomotor signals (Erickson, 1980; Rossi & Cheek, 1988). “3. Tell the patient that his index finger will automatically and involuntarily twitch and float when his body releases the biochemicals he needs. This ideomotor response (Rossi & Cheek, 1988) is the sole physical response required of the patient. Rossi hypothesizes that the ideomotor response correlates with biochemical changes (Rossi & Cheek, 1988). “4. Next, ask the patient to consider some things (as described below). Present the considerations one after another until one of them triggers the ideomotor response. “5. In some instances, ask the patient to practice on his own. Many patients who have dramatic emotional reactions during or at the completion of the task may not need to practice on their own” (p. 123).
They present several ‘considerations’ to the patient, one after the other, tailored to the patient’s specific case, until his finger twitches or floats, indicating a biochemical response. For example, the following ‘considerations’ have been used: “1. Psychodynamic: ‘Consider that you are not blamed for anything; that you are in fact perfect just the way you are; that you are loved by those you care about.’ ‘Consider that you can forgive whoever needs forgiving for hurting you.’ ‘Consider that there are no longer any threats; everything is better; everything is as it used to be.’ “2. Autosuggestion: ‘Tell your body to heal. It knows what to do; so ask it to do it.’ ‘Tell your adrenal glands to produce the steroids that your body needs.’ ‘Allow a glowing light to permeate that injured back, filling it with healing energy.’ “3. Incompatible responses: ‘Cover yourself with a cool breeze, cooling the injured leg.’ ‘Imagine your back getting slack and limp and relaxed.’ ‘Imagine your stomach lining becoming smooth and moving with easy, ocean-like waves.’ “4. Emotion calling: ‘Consider yourself feeling very happy with everything, for no reason at all.’ ‘Consider yourself getting angry at someone–your mother, your wife (husband), your boss, your lawyer.’ “5. Bargaining: ‘Tell yourself that you will heal if you agree to stay away from that job.’ ‘Tell yourself you will heal by allowing your right arm to begin to hurt when you are over- exerting yourself.’ ‘Tell yourself that you will heal in exchange for something else, not so serious, to replace this disease and to serve the same function'” (pp. 123-124).