A dream that occurred in natural sleep was used as the starting point for exploration in hypnosis, e.g. suggesting that the patient was seated in a movie theater and would see an element that had been in the dream, projected on the movie screen; then would see substitute pictures which had for him the same meaning as that element. “… as in the dream, commitments to reality [in hypnosis] are minimized and there are evidences of the archaic drive-oriented primary process and a loss of distance form the fantasy so that it becomes a transitory hallucinatory experience. In addition, the censorship function is reduced but not eliminated so that this case study is highlighted by the defensive symbolic substitutions provoked by the persistent demands of the therapist” (pp. 64-65).


Daniel, Sheryll (1999). The healthy patient: Empowering women in their encounters with the health care system. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 42 (2), 108-114.

Many women’s expectancies when they assume the role of patient include the experiences of regression, helplessness, passivity and fear. This paper describes techniques for interrupting this negative set and for facilitating the development of a self-efficacious state in which the woman experiences herself as an active and informed participant in her encounters with medical personnel.

Rosenbaum, Robert & Dyckman, John (1996). No self? No problem! Actualizing empty self in psychotherapy . In Hoyt , Michael F. (Ed.), Constructive therapies (2, pp. 238-274). New York NY: Guilford.

In this book chapter, Rosenbaum and Dyckman (1996) argue that self has no permanently fixed, defining, thing-like characteristics (p. 270). They thus dispute the classical notion–commensurate with the position of philosophical realism –that the self is a substance, with fixed qualities and measurable qualities. The authors refer to this classical self as a full self, contained inside the skin and delimited by its participation in linear time. Instead, they propose an empty self, not to be construed as a void, but as a fluid, connected, relational self that overflows the traditional boundaries of the skin and is open to greater possibilities for change. To support their view of an empty self, the authors include several case examples of working with hypnosis and strategic/narrative therapy with clients experiencing a variety of psychological and physical symptoms. The authors further contend that self is not unitary, but the product of multiple drafts (p. 248)[Editor note: See Dennett, 1991, in this database]. In the narrative-constructivist tradition, they argue, if we speak in terms of multiple contextual selves for us all…[then, people diagnosed with MPD/DID] are not so different from the rest of us (p. 249). The chapter draws from western & Buddhist philosophy, strategic/systemic and narrative therapies, Ericksonian hypnosis, and, cognitive science theories regarding memory, consciousness, embodiment, and language, to support their alternative view of, and treatment for, the self.

Kirmayer, Laurence J. (1992). Social constructions of hypnosis. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 40 (4), 276-300.

Both clinical and experimental views of hypnosis are social constructions that reflect the biases and interests of practitioners and scientists. Each perspective offers useful metaphors for hypnosis. Underlying clinical uses of the term hypnosis are states of mind associated with imaginative reverie and automatic behavior based on procedural knowledge. Social discourse and narratives shape hypnotic experience, but they are themselves influenced by mechanisms of attention and automaticity. Study of hypnosis must proceed on both social and psychological fronts to account for the experience and clinical efficacy of hypnosis.

“In accord with Coe, Sarbin, and other social-psychological theorists, I will argue that hypnosis, like all higher mental phenomena, is fundamentally social in nature. To accept this, however, does not obviate the role of distinctive processes of attention, imagery, and imagination. Hypnosis is a socially constructed context and ritual for evoking imaginative enactment and involuntary of “automatic” modes of experience and behavior. Contemporary social-psychological theorists have failed to sufficiently explore the nature of enactment. A satisfactory account of hypnosis must go much deeper into the cognitive and social construction of experience; only then can involuntary behavior be properly distinguished from self-deception and self-authorship from cultural construction” (p. 277).

Kunzendorf, Robert; Carrabino, Carlene; Capone, Daniel (1992-93). ‘Safe’ fantasy: The self-conscious boundary between wishing and willing. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 12, 177-188.

This experiment tested the hypothesis that a fantasy will impel people to ‘act out’ only if they fail to distinguish the fantasy from the anticipated reality. In the experiment, one task obtained a baseline measure of how long subjects could resist eating popcorn, then measured how long subjects could resist popcorn while fantasizing its taste. Another task instructed subjects to merge three circular images with three circular percepts of equal vividness, then presented subjects unexpectedly with only two of the three circular percepts. Some subjects thought that there were three circular percepts during the merger, and for these subjects, the length of resistance to popcorn was significantly shorter during the popcorn fantasy. But for subjects who self-consciously differentiated the two real circles from the three merging images, the normal ‘boundary’ between wishful fantasy and willful eating was intact.

This research investigated whether people can fantasize without acting out. The authors place the study in the context of theories proposed by Freud and William James. Kunzendorf’s source monitoring theory of self-consciousness suggests that “self- consciousness _that one is imaging_ is the phenomenal consequence of neurally monitoring the central source of one’s imaged sensations, and self-consciousness _that one is perceiving_ is the subjective quality of neurally monitoring the peripheral source of one’s perceived sensations” (p. 178).
The ability to carry out source monitoring varies. Those who have difficulty monitoring whether they are imaging or perceiving may also have trouble distinguishing wishful fantasy from anticipatory imagery, and therefore they might act on it.
This research “identified subjects with poor source monitoring–nondiscerners of reality–and investigated the effect of fantasy on their impulse control” (p. 179).

Subjects sat in front of a computer monitor for all tests; they completed Eysenck’s seventh impulsivity questionnaire for measures of impulsivity, venturesomeness, and empathy, Marks’ Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ).
The study used a test in which subjects maintained in mental imagery a red, green, and yellow filled circle that had been on screen, with eyes closed; were instructed to open eyes and merge their 3 imaginary circles with the 3 on the screen (but when they opened eyes only 2 were there), and they were then asked questions about how many circles they saw when they opened their eyes.
Then they were given a taste of popcorn, told to resist eating any more (but could press a key to receive a little if they couldn’t resist), and then were told to resist by imagining that they were eating popcorn.
Those who discerned the two real circles while imaging a third circle of equal vividness (the Discerners), could resist eating popcorn for 137 sec in the baseline condition and 132 sec in the fantasy condition. Those who could not discern two real circles while imagining a third (Nondiscerners) could resist eating popcorn for 127 sec in the baseline treatment but only 95 sec in the fantasy treatment.
Discerners could identify the missing circle as the red one, whereas nondiscerners could not do so with any certainty; there was no effect of “image vividness”.
“Vivid imagers” whose imagery matched real yellow circles of greater illuminance, exhibited more vivid imagery on the VVIQ as well.
In their Discussion, the authors suggest that “fantasy impels people to ‘act out’ only if they fail to distinguish fantasized sensations from perceived sensations. … [the theory] is applicable to sexual fantasy and aggressive fantasy as well. This theory– Kunzendorf’s ‘source monitoring’ theory of self-consciousness–implies that fantasies of the sensory consequences of a behavior should not lead to the behavior, so long as the fantasies are self-consciously known to be imaginal and are not expected to be perceptual… But for people who cannot self-consciously distinguish between wishful images of pure fantasy and anticipatory images of perceptual reality, between wishing and willing, fantasies of gastronomical, sexual, or aggressive sensations are implicitly unsafe.
“Indeed, as Baars notes, ‘the issue of voluntary control is at the very core of human psychopathology’ [31, p. 254]. But recently, Baars’ and others’ theories of volition have emphasized the computer-metaphoric distinction between conscious ‘willful’ behavior and unconscious ‘automatic’ action [31, 39-40], and have neglected James’ distinction between conscious willing and conscious wishing. Decades ago, when pre- computational theorists like Janet used the term ‘automatism’ to describe psychopathological behavior, they meant that an abnormally behaving patient was _consciously ‘possessed’ by a fantasy_–a wishful image, a hypnotic suggestion, or a fantasized personality [41]. In reemphasizing the phenomena of wishing, willing, and possession by fantasies, the present article redefines the latter phenomenon as possession by ‘unmonitored’ fantasies, which are distinguishable from anticipatory images impelling action” (pp. 184-185).
Stanton, Harry E. (1992). Brief therapy and the diagnostic trance: Three case studies. Contemporary Hypnosis, 9, 130-135.

He reviews very brief hypnotherapy, then writes, “A systematic way of encouraging people in the use of their inner resources to solve problems, the ‘diagnostic trance’, has been outlined by Havens and Walters (1989). People sit quietly, eyes closed, physically relaxed, concentrating upon the unpleasant sensations or feelings associated with their problem. By turning inward in order to focus upon these internal events, they tend to drift into a trance state.
“While mentally observing these unpleasant sensations, they describe, in a somewhat detached manner, the thoughts and images which are present in their minds. They make no effort to control these in any way, simply allowing associated memories to surface quite spontaneously. Usually they reveal a pattern of thinking, a series of images, or even a specific memory which is creating the problem. Sometimes these are in the form of visual images of previously forgotten incidents, usually of a traumatic nature. On other occasions thy may take the form of a voice repeating a particular negative statement.
“Once people have been able to identify the source or sources of their unpleasant feelings, they attempt to find a thought or image which is sufficiently powerful to remove or displace the negative material. On many occasions, people find that they have the inner resources needed to solve their problem but, until given the opportunity provided by the diagnostic trance, they were unaware that they possessed these resources. However, the diagnostic trance procedure appears to encourage the spontaneous emergence of creative solutions” (p. 131).
Of the 103 patients with whom he used the procedure, “approximately 70% reported that it had helped them resolve the specific problem for which they had sought therapeutic assistance. … In addition to being effective, the diagnostic trance is enjoyable, even when used to process past experience of an unpleasant nature. In its simplicity lies its strength. Patients find it easy to learn and, once they have gained confidence in its value as a problem-solving tool, often teach it to family members and friends” (p. 134).

Kunzendorf, Robert G.; Beltz, Susan McLaughlin; Tymowicz, Gina (1991-92). Self-awareness in autistic subjects and deeply hypnotized subjects: Dissociation of self-concept versus self-consciousness. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 11, 129-141.

By refining past tests of self-awareness in mirrors, current testing demonstrates that autistic subjects’ percepts are dissociated from self-concept, whereas hypnotized subjects’ sensations are dissociated from self-consciousness. In the current test of self-concept, subjects could not _directly_ see a line inside the box on their lap, but subjects could see the line _indirectly_ in a televised mirror image. When instructed to touch the line, autistic subjects reached towards the televised line, whereas nonautistic subjects reached towards the actual line occluded inside the box. This first result suggests that the autistic subject’s visual percept of the televised line is dissociated from its spatial relationship to the subject’s self-concept. In the current test of self-consciousness, subjects were told to use a televised mirror-image to move their hands together until touching, but were not told that they were actually seeing a pre-recorded tape of their hands struggling unsuccessfully to touch. When queried, hypnotized subjects denied that their tactually joined hands were touching, whereas nonhypnotized subjects confirmed that their hands were touching. This latter result suggests that the hypnotized subject’s hand-touching sensations are dissociated from the immediate and incontrovertible self-consciousness _that one is perceiving the hands touching (not imaging them touching)_.

Sapp, Marty (1991, August). The effects of hypnosis in reducing anxiety and stress in adults with neurogenic impairment. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco.

A repeated measures design was utilized to investigate the effects of hypnosis in reducing anxiety and stress in 16 adults with neurogenic impairment. Seven sessions were used to measure the efficacy of hypnosis. Session one was used to obtain a baseline level of anxiety and stress and to initiate hypnosis. Sessions three and six were used to obtain repeated measures of these emotions. Sessions two, four, and five were the treatment sessions. Session seven was used to conduct a four week follow-up on the effects of hypnosis. Levels of anxiety were measured by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, while stress was measured by the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory. The results indicated a statistically significant decrease in anxiety and stress. Hypnosis also significantly increased levels of self-esteem. Finally, follow-up data demonstrated that the treatment gains were maintained.

Hypnotizability was not related to treatment outcome. The average Barber Susceptibility Scale score was 3, which indicates that the subjects were fairly low in hypnotizability level.

Fischer, Donald G.; Elnitsky, Sherry (1990). A factor analytic study of two scales measuring dissociation. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 32, 201-207.

The present study was designed to investigate the construct validity of dissociation. We administered the PAS and the DES to 507 male (48%) and female (52%) undergraduate students. Factor analysis on each scale separately showed that neither the PAS nor the DES adequately measures the three dimensions hypothesized to underlie dissociative experience. For both scales, a single factor emerged as replicable and reliable. Use of the scales, in their present form, therefore, should be limited to a single dimension representing disturbances in affect-control in the case of the PAS and disturbances in cognition-control if the DES is used at least with normal populations. Analysis of the combined items showed that the scales are measuring conceptually different but statistically correlated dimensions of dissociation. Further development of both scales is desirable, and further research should investigate the effect of different response formats on the internal structure of the scales.

The stated purpose of this study was to investigate the internal structure of the Perceptual Alterations Scale (PAS) and the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) using a large sample from a normal population.
“Sanders (1986) conceived of dissociation as a personality trait that is characterized by modification of connections between affect, cognition, and perception of voluntary control over behavior, as well as modifications in the subjective experience of affect, voluntary control, and perception. She chose items from the MMPI to represent this trait. Bernstein and Putnam (1986), utilizing the DSM-III definition of dissociation, constructed items from information derived from interviews with patients and clinicians to represent a number of different types of dissociative experiences” (0. 202).
“The PAS (Sanders, 1986) is a 27-item scale; subjects respond by checking one of the following categories using a 4-point Likert format: never, sometimes, frequently, almost always. The items related to modifications of regulatory control, changes in self- monitoring, concealment from self and others, and modifications of sensory, perceptual, and affective experiences.
“The DES (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) contains 28 items. Subjects indicate the percentage of time they experience the feelings or behavior described by the items on a 10- point scale. The items related to the experience of disturbances in identity, memory, awareness and cognition, and feelings of derealization or depersonalization” (pp. 202- 203).
Results were as follows. The one-factor solution for the PAS accounted for 18.5% of the total variance.; 11 of the 28 items did not load significantly on the factor. The one-factor solution for the DES accounted for 26.3% of the total variance; 7 of the 28 items did not load significantly on the factor.
“The 3-factor solution obtained by Sanders (1986) for the PAS was not replicated. An obvious reason for the different is that principal factor extraction was used in the present study, whereas principal components extraction was utilized by Sanders. … Even when principal components analysis is performed on the present data, however, there are difficulties with the 3-factor solution” (pp. 204-205).
“All of the criteria suggest that a single factor best represents the latent structure of dissociative experience as measured by the PAS and DES. Although the total amount of variance accounted for is low, the one-factor solutions for both scales are interpretable, replicable, and have high internal consistency. The items for the PAS appear to represent primarily the affect and control dimensions, whereas those for the DES represent the cognitive dimension” (pp. 205-206).
“Overall, both scales contain similar items, although the DES has more items relating to disturbances in memory and altered perception of time (i.e., cognition), whereas the PAS has more items reflecting specific disturbances in identity and control. It appears, therefore, that the scales are measuring conceptually separate but statistically correlated dimensions of dissociation” (p. 206).

Kunzendorf, Robert G.; Jesses, Michael; Dupille, Leonard; Butler, William (1990-91). Subliminal activation of intrapsychic conflicts: Subconscious realms of mind vs subconscious processes of mentation. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 10, 117-128.

Cognitive-state monitoring theory asserts that people perceive subliminal stimulation without self-consciously monitoring its external innervation (as opposed to central innervation). Thus monitoring theory predicts that subconsciously perceived discord, in the absence of any ‘external location’ cues, should be misinterpreted as centrally generated discord and should disrupt self-generated behavior. Consistent with this prediction, mathematical problem-solving in the current experiment was disrupted after mathematically competitive males repeatedly heard the subliminal message IT’S WRONG TO CRUSH DADDY stereophonically localized in the middle of their heads–but not after they repeatedly heard this subliminal ‘Oedipal’ message binaurally localized on one side of their heads. A subliminal message binaurally localized on one side of the self should not interfere with problem-solving behavior _because, even though the message’s external innervation is not self-consciously ‘monitored,’ its external location is inferable from subconscious cues._
Monitoring theory asserts that subliminal [perceptions] of ‘unmonitored’ messages are unaccompanied by any self-consciousness that one is perceiving them (rather than imaging them), and that subliminal or ‘unmonitored’ messages of distress are mistaken for self-generated distress.
Disruption by the ‘internal’ subliminal word WRONG seems to us consistent with the fact that disruption was limited to mathematically competent males.
Indeed, ‘repression’ itself is a mode of processing fearful information: a mode in which subjects suspend their self-awareness that they are perceiving fearful stimulation, as research by Kunzendorf and McLaughlin has demonstrated. This selective suspension of monitoring provides immediate relief from fearful stimuli, Freudian or otherwise, but it does so at the risk of turning self-conscious fear into subconscious anxiety (into consciously lingering fear without a self consciously perceived source). No subconscious realm full of lurking fears is implicated in this ‘unmonitored’ mode of self-protection. All that is implicated is an unconscious storehouse of potentially fearful memories–potentially fearful but sensationless memories, which can be ‘suppressed’ from conscious sensory representation or ‘constructed’ into conscious memory images or ‘subconsciously represented’ as unself-consciously imaged sensations.

Macfarlane, F. K.; Duckworth, M. (1990). The use of hypnosis in speech therapy: A questionnaire study. British Journal of Disorders of Communication, 25, 227-246.

Reports results of a survey of speech therapists trained in the use of hypnosis. The majority use hypnosis in treating voice or fluency disorders to achieve relaxation and encourage self-esteem and also in the treatment of acquired neurological disorders. Respondents were less inclined to use hypnosis with children. Problems encountered in the use of hypnosis are explored.

Pekala, Ronald J.; Bieber, Stephen L. (1989-90). Operationalizing pattern approaches to consciousness: An analysis of phenomenological patterns of consciousness among individuals of differing susceptibility. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 9 (4), 303-320.

Pattern differences in subjective experience, as assessed by a self-report inventory, the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI), were compared across low, low-medium, high-medium, and high hypnotically susceptible individuals during hypnosis and eyes-closed. A hierarchical factor analytic approach was utilized that allowed for the determination of pattern differences among PCI dimensions as a function of hypnotic susceptibility. The factor analyses found that the four suspectibility (sic) groups were ‘pattern equivalent’ during eyes-closed, partially pattern dissimilar during hypnosis, and partially pattern dissimilar when comparing hypnosis against eyes-closed. The nature of these results support previous analyses (1) which compared pattern structure differences as a function of correlational matrices. The results suggest the complementarity of Bieber’s (2) and Pekala’s (3) approaches for assessing pattern differences in consciousness and are congruent with the theorizing of Tart (4), Izard (5), and the PDP researchers on the importance of pattern structure changes in understanding states of consciousness.

Pekala, Ronald J.; Kumar, V. K. (1989). Phenomenological patterns of consciousness during hypnosis: Relevance to cognition and individual differences. Australian Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 17 (1), 1-20.

Relationships among phenomenological subsystems of consciousness associated with a baseline condition and an hypnotic induction condition were compared across individuals of differing hypnotic susceptibility. Phenomenological experience on 12 subsystems of consciousness was quantified by means of the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) and the relationships between dimensions were statistically assessed. The results replicated previous findings and suggested that hypnosis has differential effects upon the reported organization of phenomenological structures of consciousness across subjects of differing susceptibility. The data from the previous and present studies were pooled and the combined data were reanalyzed. The results provided further support for the differential pattern structure across low and high susceptibles during hypnosis. Furthermore, differences in pattern structure were augmented when comparing very low versus very high susceptible individuals.

Nissen, Mary Jo; Ross, James L.; Willingham, Daniel B.; MacKenzie, Thomas B.; Schacter, Daniel L. (1988). Memory and awareness in a patient with multiple personality disorder. Brain and Cognition, 8, 117-134.

We studied an individual with multiple personality disorder in whom each of several personalities claimed to have no direct awareness of the others and to be unable to consciously remember the experiences of other personalities. A broad selection of implicit and explicit memory tests was used to determine the extent to which one personality had access to knowledge acquired by another and the circumstances in which that knowledge would be expressed. The implicit assessment of memory was a necessary but not sufficient condition for demonstrating interpersonality access. The degree of compartmentalization of knowledge in this patient depended largely on whether the interpretation of presented information was likely to differ across personalities.

Baker, Elgan L.; Nash, Michael R. (1987). Applications of hypnosis in the treatment of anorexia nervosa. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 29, 185-193.

Historic and current reports in the literature involving applications of hypnosis with anorectic patients are reviewed and integrated to explicate core aspects of hypnotic interventions in treating anorexia nervosa. A comprehensive hypnotherapeutic approach is delineated which emphasizes the use of hypnotic strategies to reduce tension, enhance self-control, support increased and realistic body awareness, alter distorted body image, and foster appropriate autonomy and individuation. Preliminary data are also reviewed which support the clinical efficacy of this approach.

Kissin, Benjamin (1986). Conscious and unconscious programs in the brain. (1 ). New York: Plenum Press.

Hypnosis is discussed in terms of inhibition/excitation mechanisms in the central nervous system, with both feedback and feedforward controls and lateralizing controls. The author employs a concept of engrams (neural representations of an idea, represented throughout the neocortex) to discuss sensation and perception as well as conscious and unconscious processes. Sensory information is processed serially with encoding of information mostly on the conscious level (but sometimes, less efficiently, on the unconscious level); and it also is processed in parallel. Parallel processing operates almost entirely at the unconscious level and is basic to perception.
Associative phenomena are explained in terms of overlapping engrams, so that two ‘related hypercomplex engrams’ could be assumed to have at least one simple engram in common. With Premack, he describes three types of engrams: veridical (primary sensory data perceived), abstract (formalized representations of concepts like line drawings of dog or house; Premack’s iconic representations), and symbolic (more complex entities that encompass an entire class of objects, actions, or ideas and may have artificial symbols such as words).
With Neiser he suggests that thinking (verbal and nonverbal) involves logical sequential processing of cognitive engrams of external (environmental), internal (visceral),and intracerebral (ideational) origin. Evoked response investigations shed light on the nature of such engrams, their distribution in brain tissue. John, Bartlett, Slumokochi, & Kleiman (1973) found that an error in choice discrimination learning (cats learning colors) is accompanied by the cortical evoked potential of the stimulus associated with that (erroneous) behavior, not the evoked potential of the true stimulus. In other words, ERPs represented the idea, not the actual visual stimulus provided to the cat.
Emotional/motivational influences are part of every cognition (R. S. Lazarus’s position). Interaction of motivational-emotional and cognitive engrams seems to occur primarily in the inferior temporal lobe and the entorhinal cortex. The interaction involves the upper rhinencephalon, the amygdaloid-hippocampal complex, the septal region, the cingulate gyrus, and the inferior and medial aspects of temporal lobe of the cortex. He also explains classical and operant conditioning (on pp. 75-76) in terms of the association of engrams.
The author’s position is that consciousness is the subjective equivalent of brain activity in the ‘alerting’ and ‘awareness’ systems. Awareness of the environment (‘general, vague’) appears to involve the limbic area (thalamus and basal ganglia), while more specific awareness of the self entails a system stretching from the basal ganglia through the parietal lobe (posterior aspect).
Normal alert consciousness involves the noradrenergic reticular activating system, as well as associated excitation of the general awareness system in the involved thalamic- basal gangliar nuclei and the self-awareness system in the posterior inferior parietal lobe system. Altered states of consciousness characterized by a relaxed hazy sense of the world involves thalamic activation of the self-awareness system. Dreaming involves activation from cholinergic cells in the pons. “Impaired general awareness occurs with lesions of the thalamic-basal gangliar centers while impaired self-awareness occurs with lesions in the posterior inferior parietal lobes. Finally, in certain physiological states such as sleep, hypnosis, and so on, the entire awareness system–the thalamic-basal gangliar and posterior inferior parietal nuclei–may be activated by different activation systems, such as the cholinergic in the pons or the dopaminergic in the thalamus, to produce different states of consciousness” (p. 82).
Consciousness is described as having seven dimensions: alertness, attention, arousal (heart rate, GSR), activation (EEG, evoked potential), affect, and the two awarenesses. The seven are related, so that changes in any one usually are correlated with changes in others (though dissociation among the seven also can be demonstrated). Motivational-emotional arousal produces electrophysiological activation of the brain, which is translated epiphenomenally into alertness and awareness; awareness is focused through attention onto the cognitively and motivationally significant events in the internal and external environments to determine the final sequence of drive-oriented behavioral responses. The EEG is useful for diagnosing different states of consciousness: beta and gamma waves alertness, stemming from locus coeruleus and reticular activating system delta (2-4/sec) waves coma alpha synchronized relaxing influences stemming from thalamus; low level of awareness as in twilight sleep or hypnagogic states theta, delta inactivity due to less stimulus from locus coeruleus reticular activating system influences; associated with increased inhibitory thalamic and septal- hippocampal impulses radiating upward to the cortex. In some altered states of consciousness there is theta-wave activity,indicating influences from the inhibitory septal-hippocampal circuit. The reticular activating system (RAS) and thalamus interact in complex ways. The RAS is essential to maintain consciousness, but if destroyed stepwise (in animal research) a low-grade type of consciousness can be maintained by thalamus and basal ganglia. The thalamus has two kinds of influence: it inhibits the cortex, as in sleep; and stimulates the cortex in the form of activating alpha waves. “The median thalamus is also related in a feedforward-feedback circuit with the inhibitory septal-hippocampal complex which generates theta-wave activity, thus accounting for the close association between alpha and theta wave activity in sleep and in other altered states of consciousness” (p. 86).
Thus there are two different activating systems originating in the lower brain stem: the norepinephrine locus coeruleus system that is associated with normal behavior, and the cholinergic FTG neurone system of REM sleep. The relationship of the latter to consciousness, awareness, self awareness, etc. is unknown, since the only time that it is readily observed is during REM sleep. The author reports that altered states of consciousness (e.g. hypnosis, fugue, alpha state) resemble Stage 1 sleep, rather than REM sleep, physiologically, with the central locus of activation in the medial thalamus rather than the RAS and locus coeruleus.
“It appears then that consciousness may be driven by one or another of three different activation centers: the norepinephrine RAS (emanating from the locus coeruleus), the cholinergic FTG cell system in the pons, and the dopaminergic alpha rhythm system radiating upward from the thalamus (Fig. 6-2). Brain activation by each of these centers is associated with a different state of awareness” (p. 91). The relative contribution from each center determines qualitative aspects of awareness.
The author refers to Mesulam and Geschwind (1978) who traced the self- awareness system from amygdala/hippocampus/midbrain to the inferior parietal lobe where they converge with the body’s proprioceptive neural tracts. What results is “a sense of self that was not necessarily present in the sense of general awareness stemming from the median thalamic-basal gangliar complex” (p. 97).
The thalamic-basal gangliar complex is both a center for emotional reception and a relay station for somatosensory events. Both somatic sensory reception and somatosensory elements of emotion are also represented in the parietal lobe. “Affective and somatosensory stimuli, which are constant and persistent even though we are unaware of them most of the time, produce the sense of one’s body which is the most basic element in the ‘sense of self.’… It is most probable that a major component of the sense of self is produced by the constant barrage of affective and somatosensory stimuli converging from all parts of the body; the majority of these stimuli may not reach consciousness most of the time but they must register a sense of feeling in the thalamus and parietal cortex even though the individual may be unconscious of it” (p. 100).
The author presumes that most of the incoming stimuli that define self are unconscious. “Whether sense-of-self stimuli are unconscious because of constant habituation … or whether they are unconscious because they are transmitted predominantly to the right hemisphere …, it appears that the major components of the self- concept are unconscious rather than conscious” (p. 102).
“Even the acutely self-aware component of the self-concept, by definition conscious, varies markedly in different altered states of consciousness. The conscious awareness of oneself in the alert condition is different from (1) that in the twilight state, (2) that in dreams, (3) that in hypnosis, (4) that under the influence of alcohol, (5) that under the influence of other sedatives, (6) that under the influence of stimulants, and (7) that under the influence of hallucinogens. In that sense the acute sense of self is a function of the momentary chemical and physiological state of the brain” (p. 102).
” … the decision-making apparatus of the brain is lodged largely in a consortium of neocortical centers including the prefrontal lobes (integration), the posterior inferior lobes (motivation and emotion), the anterior and posterior associational areas (cognition), the posterior inferior parietal lobes (self-awareness), the left-hemispheric language centers (language), and the precentral frontal lobe motor area (motor). Within the context of this integrated cortical complex, self-awareness functions are somewhat stronger on the right hemisphere while language and decisional activities are somewhat stronger on the left” (pp. 102-103).

The Chapter titled “Attention as directed consciousness” is relevant for investigations of hypnosis but is not included in these notes.
Markus, Hazel; Nurius, Paula (1986). Possible selves. American Psychologist, 41 (9), 954-969.

The concept of possible selves is introduced to complement current conceptions of self-knowledge. Possible selves represent individuals’ ideas of what they might become, what they would like to become, and what they are afraid of becoming, and thus provide a conceptual link between cognition and motivation. Possible selves are the cognitive components of hopes, fears, goals, and threats, and they give the specific self- relevant form, meaning, organization, and direction to these dynamics. Possible selves are important, first, because they function as incentives for future behavior (i.e., they are selves to be approached or avoided) and second, because they provide an evaluative and interpretive context for the current view of self. A discussion of the nature and function of possible selves is followed by an exploration of their role in addressing several persistent problems, including the stability and malleability of the self, the unity of the self, self- distortion, and the relationship between the self-concept and behavior

Kelly, Paul James (1985, November). The relationship between hypnotic ability and hypnotic experience (Dissertation). Dissertation Abstracts International, 46 (5), 1690-B.

“This study investigated the relationship between four types of hypnotic experience and hypnotic ability. The types of experiences were: dissociation, the experience of involuntariness, altered state effects, such as perceptual alterations and diminished reality sense rapport, transference-like involvement with the hypnotist, and relaxation. A 47-item scale, the Hypnotic Experience Questionnaire was developed to measure types of hypnotic experience. It was given to 484 subjects and then to a subsample of 272 students. When the scale was factored, four stable factors emerged: Nonconscious/Trance, Rapport, Relaxation, and Cognitive Rumination. A Group Profile Scale was also developed to measure students and when it was factor analyzed four factors were extracted: Hallucinations and Fantasies, Amnesias and Post-Hypnotic Compulsions, Motor Inhibition, and Direct Motor Suggestion. “Two statistical approaches were used to investigate the connections between hypnotic ability and hypnotic experience . Canonical analysis was used to identify the main relationships between hypnotic ability and hypnotic experience and factor analysis was used to explore the relationship among measures of hypnotizability and hypnotic experience. Two canonical variates from the canonical analysis were significant. The first variate was characterized by a dissociative-imaginative involvement process, and the second variate tapped a rapport-social compliance process. “When 25 variables, representing components of hypnotic ability and hypnotic experience, were factored, five factors were extracted. Imaginative Involvement, Ideomotor Response, Rapport, Cognitive Inhibition, and Relaxation. The results of the factor analysis suggested that dissociative experience and altered state experience are related to hypnotic ability but rapport and relaxation are not. “The results of study, taken as a whole, suggest that relaxation and rapport may happen in the hypnotic situation, but neither experience is related to the condition of being hypnotized in any essential way. The results suggest that the hypnotic condition is characterized by dissociative experience, altered state experience, and by successful performance on hypnotic ability tasks. From a theoretical point of view, the results strongly supported Hilgard’s theory, partially supported Shor’s theory, and failed to support Edmonston’s theory” (p. 1690).

Handelsman, Mitchell M. (1984). Self-hypnosis as a facilitator of self-efficacy: A case example. Psychotherapy, 21 (4), 550-553.
his article presents the four-session treatment of Elaine, using self- hypnosis to facilitate the mourning process. It is argued that self-hypnosis– rather than enhancing imagery– increases self-efficacy, a person’s feeling that he/she can perform behaviors that lead to desired outcomes. Elaine’s sense of self-efficacy was increased by allowing her to choose scenes from her life to be explored in the context of the use of imagery. Elaine imagined events surrounding her father’s death, and “rewrote history” in an attempt to permit herself the direct expression of emotions.

Kelly, Paul James (1984, December). The relationship between hypnotic ability and hypnotic experience. Newsletter of Division 30, Psychological Hypnosis, of the American Psychological Association, 5.

This study investigated the relationship between four types of hypnotic experience and hypnotic ability. The types of experience were: dissociation, the experience of involuntariness; altered state effects, such as perceptual alterations and diminished reality sense; rapport, transference-like involvement with the hypnotist; and relaxation. A sample of 230 students was given the HGSHS:A, a group version of the SHSS:C, and the Hypnotic Experience Questionnaire (Kelly, 1984), a 47-item multidimensional scale of hypnotic experience. Items were taken from these tests to form 11 hypnotic ability variables (Positive Hallucinations, Dreams and Regressions, Post- Hypnotic Compulsions, Amnesia (HGSHS:A), Amnesia (SHSS:C), Arm Rigidity, Arm Immobilization, Other Motor Inhibitions, Head Falling, Moving Hands Together, and Hand Lowering). Fourteen hypnotic experience variables were also formed (Generalized Dissociative Effects, Dissociative Inhibition, Trance, Unawareness, Transference-like Involvement, Trust, Friendliness, Physical Relaxation, Mental Relaxation, Imagery Presence, Imagery Vividness, Imagery Detail, Self Consciousness, and Analytic Thoughts). The 25 variables were intercorrelated and factored with principal axis factoring. Five factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted and rotated to varimax criteria. These factors, which accounted for 54.4 percent of the variance, were called: Imaginative Involvement, Ideomotor Response, Rapport, Cognitive Inhibition, and Relaxation. Hypnotic ability variables loaded significantly on three of the factors (Imaginative Involvement, Ideomotor Response, and Cognitive Inhibition) and these three factors also tapped some aspect of altered state experience and/or dissociative experience. It was concluded therefore that dissociative experience and altered state experience are related to hypnotic ability. The remaining two factors, Rapport and Relaxation, showed significant loadings only for rapport variables and relaxation variables, respectively. Neither of these two factors were related to any of the traditional measures of hypnotic ability or to the experience of dissociative effects or altered state effects. The results of this study suggest that rapport and relaxation may happen in the hypnotic situation but neither experience is related to the condition of being hypnotized in any essential way. The hypnotic condition is characterized by dissociative experience, altered state experience, and by successful performance on hypnotic ability tasks. The results also raise questions about Edmonston’s (1981) theory that relaxation is the essence of hypnotic responsiveness. The finding that the experience of relaxation is unrelated to hypnotic ability is more congruent with Hilgard’s (1977) view that relaxation is a nonhypnotic process.

This is an abstract of an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Waterloo, 1984. It won the American Psychological Association Division 30 award for Best Student Paper at the 1984 APA Convention.

Nash, Michael R.; Lynn, Steven Jay; Stanley, Scott (1984). The direct hypnotic suggestion of altered mind/body perception. American Journal of
Clinical Hypnosis, 27, 95-102.

Attentional and emotional shifts are examined following a hypnotically suggested out-of-body experience (OBE). Two hypotheses were testes: 1) that the OBE is maintained by blocking the perception of body-relevant stimulation at a sensory level; 2) that a hypnotically produced OBE is an emotionally neutral or even pleasant experience. Fourteen hypnotic subjects and 15 simulating Ss were administered a standardized induction followed by suggestions for an OBE. Geometric figures were then presented to the body but not to the “awareness.” Although hypnotic Ss reported that they could not see the information, they still correctly “guess” the identity of the figures beyond chance levels. Thus, body-relevant information was obviously not blocked at a sensory level, but was kept out of awareness by some other mechanism. In addition, a significantly greater number of hypnotized than simulating Ss reported the OBE to be troubling and unpleasant, despite explicit suggestions for a positive experience. The potentially disturbing nature of OBEs and ways to minimize risk of negative affect are discussed.

Pekala, Ronald J.; Kumar, V. K. (1984). Predicting hypnotic susceptibility by a self-report phenomenological state instrument. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 114-121.

In an attempt to predict hypnotic susceptibility (as measured by the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, HGSHS) the phenomenological experiences of an hypnotic induction (HI) procedure and a baseline comparison condition (eyes closed, EC, sitting quietly) were assessed. After each experience the subjects (n=217) completed the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI), a self-report phenomenological state instrument, dealing with that condition. Step-wise multiple regression and discriminant analyses were then performed on data using the subject’s HGSHS score as the dependent variable and the PCI (sub)dimensions as the independent variables. Regression analyses that held up under cross-validation during HI suggest that the PCI may be an appropriate instrument for predicting susceptibility. The possible clinical usefulness of this approach is discussed.

Erickson, Milton H. (1980). Innovative hypnotherapy. New York, NY: Irvington Publishers, Inc..

This fourth volume of four has 9 sections, with chapters as follows. I. General Introductions to Hypnotherapy
1. The applications of hypnosis to psychiatry
2. Hypnosis in medicine
3. Hypnotic techniques for the therapy of acute psychiatric disturbances in war
4. Hypnotic psychotherapy
5. Hypnosis in general practice
6. Hypnosis: Its renascence as a treatment modality
7. Hypnotic approaches to therapy II. Indirect Approaches to Symptom Resolution
8. A clinical note on indirect hypnotic therapy
9. The hypnotic and hypnotherapeutic investigation and determination of symptom- function
10. Experimental hypnotherapy in Tourette’s Disease
11. Hypnotherapy: The patient’s right to both success and failure
12. Successful hypnotherapy that failed
13. Visual hallucination as a rehearsal for symptom resolution III. Utilization Approaches to Hypnotherapy
14. Special techniques of brief hypnotherapy
15. Pediatric hypnotherapy
16. The utilization of patient behavior in the hypnotherapy of obesity: Three case reports
17. Hypnosis and examination panics
18. Experiential knowledge of hypnotic phenomena employed for hypnotherapy
19. The burden of responsibility in effective psychotherapy
20. The use of symptoms as an integral part of hypnotherapy
21. Hypnosis in obstetrics: Utilizing experimental learnings
22. A therapeutic double bind utilizing resistance
23. Utilizing the patient’s own personality and ideas: ‘Doing it his own way’ IV. Hypnotherapeutic Approaches to Pain
24. An introduction to the study and application of hypnosis for pain control
25. The therapy of a psychosomatic headache
26. Migraine headache in a resistant patient
27. Hypnosis in painful terminal illness
28. The interspersal hypnotic technique for symptom correction and pain control
29. Hypnotic training for transforming the experience of chronic pain V. Hypnotherapeutic Approaches in Rehabilitation
30. Hypnotically oriented psychotherapy in organic brain damage
31. Hypnotically oriented psychotherapy in organic brain disease: An addendum
32. An application of implications of Lashley’s researches in a circumscribed arteriosclerotic brain condition
33. Experimental hypnotherapy in a speech problem: A case report
34. Provocation as a means of motivating recovery from a cerebrovascular accident VI. Hypnotherapy with Psychotics
35. Hypnotherapy with a psychotic