2002
Manmiller, Jessica L.; Kumar, V. K.; Pekala, Ronald J. (2002). Hypnotizability, creative capacity, creativity styles, absorption and phenomenological experience. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Chicago.
“The study investigated relationships between creative capacity, styles of creativity, hypnotizability, and absorption. Participants were 429 students enrolled in Introduction to Psychology classes. Students first completed questionnaires pertaining to creative capacity, creativity styles, and absorption (Tellegen””s Absorption Scale). They were subsequently hypnotized using the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility and completed the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory. The pattern of results suggests that creative capacity is more closely related to absorption than hypnotizability. The support for P. G. Bowers” assertion that effortless experiencing while engaged in creative tasks and hypnotic tasks is a process that is common to both high creative and high hypnotizable subjects was weak. Hypnotizability was more strongly and negatively correlated with volitional control for suggestions experienced during hypnosis, than both absorption and creative capacity. Creativity styles of belief in unconscious processes, use of techniques, final product orientation (intrinsic/extrinsic) motivation, environmental control and behavioral self-regulation, and supersition were negatively correlated with volitional control (feeling of effortlessness experiencing) during hypnosis, but the correlations were small in magnitude” (Bulletin of Division 30, Psychological Hypnosis, Fall, 2002, Vol. 11, No. 3, P. 14).
2001
Gibbons, Don E. (2001). Experience as an art form: Hypnosis, hyperempiria, and the Best Me technique. San Jose CA: Authors Choice Press. (([available online:] http//www.iuniverse.com/bookstore/marketplace))
NOTES
The Best Me Technique is a procedure for constructing suggestions which incorporates many different dimensions of experience — beliefs, emotions, sensations, thoughts, motives, and expectations — for maximum involvement and effectiveness. Best Me suggestions may be used with either hyperempiria, an alert induction based on suggestions of mind expansion and increased alertness and sensitivity, or with more traditional forms of hypnotic induction.
Pekala, Ronald J.; Kumar, V. K. (2001). Operationalizing trance I: Rationale and research using a psychophenomenological approach. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 43 (3-4), 330-.
Reports an error in the article by R. J. Pekala and V. K. Kumar (see record 2000-00739-001). Two references were incorrectly printed: (1) Pekala, R. J., & Kumar, V. K. (1988). Phenomenological variations in attention across low, medium, and high hypnotically susceptible individuals. Imagination, Cognition, and Personality, 7, 303-314; (2) Forbes, E. J., & Pekala, R. J. (1996). Types of hypnotically (un)susceptible individuals as a function of phenomenological experience: A partial replication. Australian Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 24, , 92-109. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2002 APA, all rights reserved)
2000
Pekala, Ronald J.; Kumar, V. K. (2000). Operationalizing trance I: Rationale and research using a psychophenomenological approach. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 43 (2), 107-135.
Despite the popularity of the term “trance” among clinicians to describe the subjective effects associated with being hypnotized, heretofore there has been no means to operationalize that definition. The authors present a rationale and psychophenomenological method to operationalize the term “trance” in terms of: (a) hypnotic depth, a quantitative measure of subjective trance assessed via a predicted Harvard Group Scale score, derived from regression analysis; and (b) “trance typology profiles,” a qualitative differentiation of empirically derived (via cluster and discriminant analyses) categories of subjective trance experiences. The authors then discuss theoretical and clinical implications of this psychophenomenological approach for developing an operational definition of the concept of trance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2002 APA, all rights reserved)
1999
Cardena, Etzel (1999, August). The ways to study anomalous experience. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Boston, Massachusetts.
In recent years, introspective inquiry has become an essential venue to explore states of consciousness and anomalous experience. Many recent reviews have coincided that introspective techniques to examine “one”s own mental happenings,” rather than to determine the cause of one”s behavior, can be valid and reliable. Most limitations of introspective inquiry are also applicable to other content areas in psychology and include: forgetting, reconstruction errors/confabulation, verbal description difficulties, distortion through observation, substitution of inferences for observation, censorship, lack of independent verification, dissembling and social desirability, demand characteristics, and possible inaccessibility due to “state specific” memory. Careful attention to these potential pitfalls is warranted. Various methods (from the Greek etymology methodos for “way” or road) to study the contents of consciousness have been developed, including, phenomenological approaches, concurrent methods (thinking out loud, event recording, thought sampling, and depth ratings) and retrospective methods (diaries; interviews; content analysis; psychological tests; surveys and questionnaires; and case studies and life histories). Because every method has specific areas of application and limitations, an integration of various approaches should yield the most comprehensive view of anomalous experiences.
McConkey, Kevin M.; Wende, Vanessa; Barnier, Amanda J. (1999). Measuring change in the subjective experience of hypnosis. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 47 (1), 23-39.
The authors indexed the subjective experience of hypnosis through the use of a continuous behavioral measure of the strength of the participant’s experience at the tie of the suggestion. Specifically, subjects turned a dial to indicate changes in their experience of the suggested effect during that experience. Thirty-three high, 47 medium, and 28 low hypnotizable subjects were asked to use the dial during the suggestion, test, and cancellation phases of three hypnotic items: arm levitation, arm rigidity, and anosmia. The pattern of ratings differed according to the nature of the suggestion. Also, across the items, subjects who passed according to behavioral criteria experienced the suggested effect to a greater degree than those who failed. Notably, whereas the ratings of highs and mediums did not differ for any item, they differed from lows on all three items. The authors discuss the implications of these findings in terms of the potential for this method to provide insight into the experience of hypnosis.
1998
Eastwood, J. D.; Gaskovski, P.; Bowers, K. S. (1998). The folly of effort: Ironic effects in the mental control of pain. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 46 (1), 77-91.
During exposure to pain, participants who were engaged in hypnotic analgesia or stress inoculation provided pain reports every 5 s and 45 s, respectively. It was found that the frequency of pain reporting had a significant effect on participants’ level of experienced pain. This finding is discussed in the context of important methodological implications for laboratory investigations of analgesia. Furthermore, preliminary evidence was obtained suggesting that high hypnotizables in hypnotic analgesia remained relatively undisrupted by frequent pain reporting. Based on Wegner’s (1994) ironic process theory, it is argued that this pattern of results is inconsistent with theories of hypnosis that propose that hypnotized individuals intentionally engender responses while remaining unaware of their sustained, deliberate effort. The obtained pattern of results was, however, predicted from the dissociated control model of hypnosis (Bowers, 1990, 1992).
Kirsch, Irving; Milling, Leonard S.; Burgess, Cheryl (1998). Experiential scoring for the Waterloo-Stanford Group C Scale. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 46 (3), 269-279.
A scale is presented that assesses subjective experiences associated with the test suggestions contained in the Waterloo-Stanford Group C scale (WSGC), a group adaptation of the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale: Form [C] (SHSS:C). This scale, along with the standard behavioral scoring system of the WSGC, was given to 926 students at the University of Connecticut. Normative data from this sample indicate that the experiential scoring scale is both reliable and valid as a measure of suggestibility. It is suggested that it may be useful to supplement behavioral scoring with experiential scoring when the WSGC is used.
1997
Hillig, Justine A.; Holroyd, Jean (1997-98). Consciousness, attention, and hypnoidal effects during firewalking. Imagination, Cognition and Personality.
Subjective experiences of individuals who walked on hot coals during a firewalking ceremony were investigated. This study extended and partially
supported an investigation reported by Pekala and Ersek in this Journal [1]. Twenty-three participants completed retrospective questionnaire assessments concerning their subjective experiences while walking on hot coals. Results from twelve participants were compared with the participants’ own experiences during a baseline condition. The data suggested that attention during firewalking is significantly more “one-pointed” than during a baseline condition, and that consciousness may be characterized as more “hypnoidal” than during a baseline condition. Walking on hot coals was further characterized by trends toward reporting increased altered awareness, altered experience, and absorbed attention. Participants who developed a grater degree of blistering reported significantly greater hypnoidal effects during the firewalk than those who developed a lesser degree of blistering.
Weitzenhoffer, Andre M. (1997). Hypnotic susceptibility: A personal and historical note regarding the development and naming of the Stanford Scales. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 45 (2), 126-143.
Certain misleading, if not inaccurate, allegations that have been made regarding the foundations of the Stanford scales are corrected. No special meaning was intended when the scales were designated susceptibility scales. A retrospective examination, however, indicates that grounds existed for making certain differentiations. SHSS:C and RSPS:I and RSPS:II should more appropriately have been designated as suggestibility and depth scales. On the other hand, whereas SHSS:A and SHSS:B also assess depth of hypnosis, they include a feature that permits using the obtained depth as a measure of hypnotic capacity and a predictor of future hypnotic performance. The possibility of using the same measure, suggestibility, to assess hypnotic responsiveness in dissimilar contexts may have been partially responsible for the confusing variety of labels that have been attached to what in the past has appeared to many to be one and the same thing. Further confusion more recently has been introduced by researchers and clinicians who have used the term depth, previously and conventionally attached to assessments based on observed overt responses, in reference to now certain subjectively based assessments.
1996
Cardena, Etzel (1996). “Just floating on the sky:” A comparison of hypnotic and shamanic phenomena. In Quekelberghe, R. V.; Eigner, D. (Ed.), Yearbook of cross-cultural medicine and psychotherapy 1994 (pp. 85-98).
Despite the vastly different cultural contexts of hypnosis and shamanism, a comparison of the phenomenology of the two is warranted.
The author proposes that the two types of very hypnotizable individuals, one exhibiting vivid imagery and the other showing diminished memory and control, corresponds to the classical distinction between soul journey and spirit possession . Other cognitive traits, developmental histories and alternate experiences of hypnotic virtuosos and shamans imply other similarities. The resemblance between hypnotic and shamanic
phenomenology strongly suggests a universal disposition that is independent of culture. Western culture should acknowledge, respect and study the potentials and risks of this ability.
Kumar, V. K.; Pekala, Ronald J.; Cummings, James (1996). Trait factors, state effects, and hypnotizability. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 44 (3), 232-249.
This study examined the relationship of 15 trait (e.g., absorption, ego-permissiveness) and 21 phenomenological variables (assessed by the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory) with performance on the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A. Factor analyses suggested three trait factors (absorption-permissiveness, general sensation seeking, and social desirability) and five state factors (dissociated control state, positive affect, negative affect, attention to internal processes, and visual imagery). The factors correlated to hypnotizability were absorption-permissiveness, dissociated control, positive affect, and attention to internal processes. In predicting hypnotizability, the amount of variance accounted for by the trait factors was approximately 9%; an additional 22% was accounted for by state factors. The interactions did not account for any additional variance in predicting hypnotizability.
Pekala, Ronald J.; Forbes, Elizabeth J. (1996, August). Types of hypnotically (un)susceptible individuals as a function of phenomenological experience: Towards a typology of hypnotic types. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, Canada.
Nursing students (N = 194) experienced the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, in which was embedded a 2-min sitting quietly interval subsequent to the eye catalepsy item but prior to the ‘counting out’ sequence. After the Harvard Scale subjects completed the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) in reference to the sitting quietly interval embedded in the hypnotic induction ceremony. Participants were divided into low and high susceptible groups. K-means cluster analysis of the subjects’ responses to the PCI revealed three groups of subclusters for the high susceptibles. These results partially replicated two prior studies. Cluster analyses were then completed across all subjects, resulting in nine different cluster groups. These groups had different patterns of phenomenological experiences that cut across individual subjects’ actual Harvard Scale scores. Implications of the above for (a) working with clients who may not score that high on standard behavioral measures of hypnotizability (such as the Harvard), or (b) understand how hypnosis ‘works,’ were discussed. (ABSTRACT from Bulletin of Division 30, Psychological Hypnosis, Fall, 1996, Vol. 5, No. 3.)
1995
Gearan, Paul; Schoenberger, Nancy E.; Kirsch, Irving (1995). Modifying hypnotizability: A new component analysis. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 43 (1), 70-89.
The effects of the Carleton Skills Training Program (CSTP) on hypnotizability were compared to those of a modified training program in which instructions for physical enactment of the response were omitted. After training, subjects in the original CSTP reported an increase in the extent to which they intentionally enacted suggested behaviors. In contrast, subjects in the modified training program reported increased fantasy without voluntary physical enactment. Nevertheless, both training programs increased behavioral and subjective responsiveness to suggestion, and there were no significant differences in response enhancement between the two programs. Across conditions, increases in behavioral and subjective responses to suggestion were correlated with increased use of fantasy. In contrast, increases in enactment were correlated only with compliance. The modified training program is recommended as a means of enhancing suggestibility with less likelihood than the original CSTP of engendering compliance.
Repka, Renee J.; Nash, Michael R. (1995). Hypnotic responsivity of the deaf: The development of the University of Tennessee Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale for the Deaf. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 43 (3), 316-331.
The purpose of these two studies was to develop and test a measure that assesses the hypnotic responsivity of deaf individuals. The University of Tennessee Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale for the Deaf (UTHSS:D) is a signed, videotaped version of a standard hypnotic induction with 12 standard suggestions. Experiment 1 compared the behavioral and subjective hypnotic responsivity of deaf and hearing individuals using the UTHSS:D and the Field Depth Inventory (FDI), respectively. As compared to hearing subjects, deaf participants were found to be less responsive to hypnosis when assessed behaviorally (UTHSS:D) and equally responsive to hypnosis when assessed subjectively (FDI). Experiment 2 undertook a more comprehensive examination of the hypnotic responsivity of deaf individuals, using hearing individuals as controls. Three dimensions of hypnosis responsivity were assessed: behavioral (UTHSS:D), subjective (FDI), and interpersonal (Archaic Involvement Measure). Additionally, correlates of hypnotic responsivity (absorption, attitudes, expectations) were examined for the two groups. In Experiment 2, no significant differences were found between the deaf and hearing participant groups on any measures of hypnotic responsivity or on any measure of the correlates of hypnotic responsivity.
Woody, Erik Z. (1995, November). Trying, not trying, and trying not to try. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Antonio, TX.
NOTES
In the “classic suggestion effect” the behavior of a hypnotized person following a suggestion is experienced as nonvoluntary. So alterations of experience are important to understand. We can think of it as a misattribution: which cues lead subjects to misattribute their behavior, etc.
A different view is to see it as how information is processed (neodissociation theory). There are two views of dissociation to consider: 1. Behavior is voluntary, but that voluntariness is blocked from awareness. (The S is trying but doesn’t know it consciously.) This is a barrier model of dissociation. The S lacks information about self agency. Bowers calls it a theory of dissociated experience. 2. Underlying control of behavior is altered (not so governed by executive control) and the subject is correct when they say they are not trying. Bowers called this a theory of dissociated control.
A persistent problem is that these two theories of dissociation are incomplete sketches. But cognitive neuroscientists and experimental psychopathologists have recently become interested also, rapidly developing and independently developing the same two theories.
Bowers and I stated that the theory presented by Normal (Norman?) and Shallice is similar to dissociative control theory. When a response is habitual, a lower system called contention scheduling can do it; if response is more complex, a higher control supervisory system involving unique information like goals is available, modulating the lower control system. Volition and how it is experienced depends on the nature of the supervisory system. When it is not [or when it is?] modulating or monitoring the contention scheduling process, one experiences will.
Thus, hypnosis is in the grey zone where the supervisory system monitors without modulation of contention scheduling–a wide realm. Also, for high hypnotizables hypnosis may weaken the higher level control system associated with the subjective experience of will; this dissociates lower levels of control from higher levels of control. The lower levels cannot be modulated as well at will. This indicates changes of frontal functions.
In psychopathology, Chris Frit argues that schizophrenia can be thought of as disorders of volition: 1. Spontaneous self initiated willed actions are generated by a different route to action from unwilled actions. In schizophrenia there is impoverishment of self initiated action. The patient also shows perseverated action. In contrast, when directly instructed the patient can perform complex tasks. This is close to the dissociated control model of hypnosis. Laboratory procedures for studying perseverative acts in schizophrenia can be applied to hypnosis. (However the theory doesn’t explain the positive symptoms of schizophrenia.) 2. There is an internal monitor that keeps track of the self initiated aspects of actions (e.g. inner speech), which schizophrenics lack. Likewise delusions of control, due to a failure to track the self initiated aspect of these actions, resemble the dissociated experience aspect of hypnosis.
The Classic Suggestion Effect is a mild delusion of control. This is very different from the social psychological view. Nisbett & Wilson say people do not introspect about the sources of their behavior. In their view, believing that alien forces are controlling you is due to failure of a mechanism. It is an interesting alternative to social psychological misattribution models to explain the nonvoluntary experience.
Functional brain imaging of normal subjects indicates that willed actions involve different areas of brain than nonvoluntary actions. Current thinking is that what differentiates schizophrenics from normals is in how their separate brain regions interact with each other. (This view is consistent with the research of Crawford and others on brain areas involved in hypnosis.) 3. There is a unifying mechanism of meta-representation or second order representations (“mentalizing”) which are distinct from normal representations of reality. Consider the example of the suggestion to hallucinate a fly on the Harvard Form A Group Scale. The hypnotist wants me to believe that a fly is buzzing around me. If the second order representation is not there, only the first order representation is there: “a fly is buzzing around me.” This is in Frit’s theory’s term a dementalized experience. The “dementalized experience” is a bit like Sarbin’s believed in imagining. Low hypnotizables are plagued with meta-representation (“trying not to try”).
Frit’s work even suggests some parts of neodissociation theory may be a better representation of schizophrenia than of hypnosis.
Zamansky, Harold S.; Ruehle, Beth L. (1995). Making hypnosis happen: The involuntariness of the hypnotic experience. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 43 (4), 386-398.
The authors tested the hypothesis that hypnotized individuals do not truly experience their responses to suggestions as occurring involuntarily, but instead absorb themselves in imagery that is congruent with the suggestions while avoiding critical thoughts, or even simply comply with suggestions without genuinely experiencing their responses as nonvolitional. Participants were instructed to engage in thoughts and imagery that conflicted with the suggestions given, were urged to pay attention to their behavior, and were questioned regarding the perceived involuntariness of their responses. Simultaneously, electrodermal skin conductance responses provided a measure of the truthfulness of their reports. It was found that responses to all hypnotic suggestions were reported as being involuntary, in spite of the conflicting imagery and increased saliency, and that these reports were truthful. These findings provide disconfirming evidence for the sociocognitive theories of hypnosis.
1994
Varga, Katalin; Banyai, Eva; Gosi-Greguss, Anna C. (1994). Parallel application of the experiential analysis technique with subject and hypnotist: A new possibility for measuring interactional synchrony. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 42 (2), 130-139.
The Parallel Experiential Analysis Technique (PEAT), a new method for gathering data on the subjective experiences of both the hypnotist and the subject, is described. The PEAT is an interactional modification of the Experiential Analysis Technique (EAT). Procedural details and methodological observations resulting from the modification of the EAT are discussed. Suggestions on how to characterize the phenomenology of the hypnotic interaction and to determine the degree of interactional synchrony on the subjective level between the hypnotist and subject are made.
1993
Kronenberger, William G.; La Clave, Linda; Morrow, Catherine (1993, October). Assessment of the hypnotic state in the clinical setting: Development of the hypnotic state assessment questionnaire. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington Heights, IL.
NOTES
We do research, clinical work and teaching. In this setting students ask, how do I know when somebody is hypnotized? We wanted to give them a normative sense of what to expect. Supervisory issues arise–e.g. when student reports that a patient “looked very hypnotized.” We also wanted a measure that could track changes from one hypnotherapy session to another. We wanted quantification of hypnotic response (e.g. to use in medical charts).
We looked at self report measures, reviewed by Tart (number ratings) and hypnotizability scales; we reviewed articles, looked at what we teach, etc.. Criteria for the scale we developed were: 1. brief 2. unobtrusive (not introducing something different into the hypnosis process) 3. easy to use 4. have both behavioral and subjective components 5. clinically useful 6. apply to wide age range (we have patients ages 7-60) 7. apply to many different types of inductions (though there is no clinical scale that will apply to all types of inductions). We use a more permissive, relaxation induction ourselves.
We assessed observed behavior during hypnosis as well as immediately following hypnosis, and then asked patients questions about what the experience was like for them. From their responses we developed the Hypnotic State Assessment Questionnaire. The scale has 18 items, as follows: 1. Hypnotic State Observation (HSO) Items
Noise Factor (e.g. drumming fingers)
Noise
Spontaneous Verbalizations
Behavior Factor
Motoric behavior (spontaneous)
Focused attention (not moving eyes)
Rhythmical Breathing
Relaxed state/Lack of tension Each are coded 1-5 with behavioral anchors at 1, 3, and 5 2. Post Hypnotic Observations
Positive Experience Factor (rated Yes-No)
Smile
Spontaneously Verbalize Positive Experiences 3. Post Hypnotic Inquiry
Automaticity Factor
Thoughts/feelings happen by selves
Thoughts happen without trying to think
PHI Uniqueness/Relaxation Factor
Felt this way before (not hypnosis)
Interrater Reliabilities of Subscales are higher than .9 except for Waking (rubbing eyes and stretching). We studied the HSAQ in 50 patients with a variety of problems (anxiety, depression, eating problems, smoking, somataform problems).
Scores have a floor effect; HSAQ can’t determine very high depth from moderate depth, but we don’t know if that is clinically meaningful. The HSO behavior factor was significantly correlated with after-hypnosis observations and inquiry. The HSO behavior factors also significantly correlated with the patient’s ability to resist unexpected distractions, to comply with therapist requests, and to respond to post-hypnotic suggestions.
Nishith, Pallavi; Barabasz, Areed F.; Barabasz, Marianne (1993, October). Effects of Alprazolam and hypnosis: EEG spectral decomposition and transient experience. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington Heights, IL
NOTES
We wanted to test Hilgard’s neodissociation theory and Crawford’s and my ideas about theta reflecting processing dissociation where environmental stimuli are ignored.
Hypothesis: highs would show greater EEG theta in hypnosis than lows when exposed to a suggestion to recreate alprazolam (trade name Xanax) effects.
We demonstrated hypnosis to groups, discussed it, administered the Harvard, took highs and lows and then tested them with Stanford C; got 20/group, matched for age, gender, and handedness. Assigned 10/cell, in drug or placebo (double blind) conditions. Tested females to make sure they weren’t pregnant. Ingested the placebo or drug, waited 1 hour; took 5′ waking EEG while they were asked to focus on “feelings of relaxation brought on by the drug.” Interviewed them (see our chapter in Fromm & Nash book) to determine their transient mood states during the 5′ period, plus gave them POMS tension/anxiety questions.
Results of first study: analyzed for hypnotizability x placebo x drug condition. EEG Theta was reduced in hypnosis; hypnotic ability showed no effects. Highs maintained higher beta in alprazolam drug condition (vigilance).
Study 2 counterbalanced conditions: Waking Hypnosis Hypnosis with a suggestion to recreate alprazolam effects.
Used Ss who actually had taken Alprazolam participated in the experiment four days later; induction was a tape recorded version of the Stanford Clinical Scale. Suggestion: imagine taking a dose twice as high as you had before. EEG and transient experience data were collected as before. 2 x 3 Manova’s were computed. 1. Theta was higher for highs than lows at p<.01 for both the hypnosis and hypnosis with drug effects suggestion conditions. 2. Alpha - had the same findings as for theta. (and same results as in our Antarctica study). 3. Beta was significantly higher for both high and lows in waking vs hypnosis conditions at all but the T4 site where beta was highest in the two hypnosis conditions only for the highs. 4. POMS analysis: mean tension/anxiety scores were significantly lower for highs in both the alprazolam and hypnotic suggestion conditions.
Both highs and lows showed more theta in hypnotized than in waking conditions. Failure to find differences between groups differing in hypnotizability may be because highs were so good at creating the alprazolam effect that they may have desynchronized theta.
Pekala, Ronald J.; Ersek, Barrett (1993). Firewalking versus hypnosis: A preliminary study concerning consciousness, attention, and fire immunity. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 12, 207-229.
This study assessed the subjective effects associated with firewalking, and compared them with the subjective effects associated with hypnosis and a baseline condition (eyes closed sitting quietly). Twenty-seven subjects, who walked over hot coals during a firewalk ceremony, completed questionnaires about what they subjectively experienced during the firewalk. Their experiences were subsequently compared with those of subjects (n - 246) who experienced hypnosis and a baseline condition. The data suggested that firewalking, as assessed across all subjects, is characterized by high levels of volitional control and rationality, and a very absorbed attentional style wherein the mind is one-pointed, and consciousness is characterized by strong feelings of joy and high levels of internal dialogue. Firewalking was also found to be associated with significantly more joy, one-pointedness of thought, absorption, and internal dialogue than hypnosis or the baseline condition. In addition, a cluster analysis suggested two subgroups of firewalkers based on their subjective experiences of the firewalk. Interestingly, analyzing the attentional experiences among these firewalkers who got slightly burned, versus those who did not, revealed significant differences. A one-pointed and absorbed attentional focus may be the critical variable for the fire immunity observed in firewalking.
NOTES
About 500 people walked across coals, in 3-4 steps. At end of weekend, 71 said they would complete a questionnaire and it was mailed to them. Of those, 27 responded (25 of 26 in an average of 23 days). Hence, 5% of the population who walked responded to the questionnaire, and it was some time later. Three of 24 reported minor blisters. Those who didn't get burned reported less detachment, less of a feeling of being out of their bodies, and more thoughts than the firewalkers who got slightly burned.
Pekala has defined an altered state of consciousness as associated with the perception of being in an altered state of awareness (the _subjective sense_ of _altered state_ --SSAS [30]), and a change in the patterning or configuration of the subsystems or dimensions of consciousness. A discrete state of consciousness, as defined by Pekala, is associated with a significant pattern change but no perceived alteration in state of consciousness (no SSAS). An identity state of consciousness, on the other hand, is defined as having neither a significantly perceived alteration in state of awareness nor a perceived pattern change among dimensions of consciousness in reference to another state of consciousness. Since the PCI can measure both intensity and pattern effects, it can be used to assess for altered, discrete, and identity states of consciousness.
Using a cluster analysis they found that one group of 16 subjects reported the firewalk experience to be characterized by a significant alteration in awareness and experience (body image, time sense, etc.), and significant intensities of internal dialogue, positive and negative affect, and arousal, while a second group of six subjects reported little alteration in consciousness or experience, little losses in rationality or control, and less internal dialogue, positive and negative affect or arousal than the larger group.
Whereas hypnosis is usually associated with a loss in control (the classic suggestion effect), firewalking was found to be associated with increased control, a more aroused state, and more fear! Firewalking appears to be a more absorbed and one-pointed state than even hypnosis.
The nature of attentional experience is similar across firewalkers (DAQ results).
Both firewalking and hypnosis meet the criteria for altered states of consciousness (different pattern and different subjective experience), but they are not altered states in reference to each other; they are _discrete states of consciousness_ in reference to each other, because there is a significantly different patterning of PCI dimensions between the two conditions, but no significant SSAS. This suggests that the firewalk state is qualitatively different from the hypnotic state (as induced by the induction procedure to the Harvard Scale) and probably represents a different type of state of consciousness than hypnosis. Firewalkers obtained a lower mean hypnoidal state score than hypnosis subjects, so it does not appear that the fire immunity is due to being in a "hypnotized" state.
The fact that there appears to be two groups of successful firewalkers, one of which did not report much alteration in consciousness, calls into question the theorizing concerning the importance of alteration in state of consciousness as being etiologically related to successful firewalking. Since about 25 percent of the firewalkers clustered into what appears to be a nonaltered state of awareness, this suggests a sizable percentage of subjects who did not report any significant alteration in consciousness and experience.
Hence, what may be important is not an alteration in consciousness, but rather an alteration in attention. The cluster analysis revealed a relatively unitary attentional state across all subjects suggesting that attention was deployed in a rather similar manner across all subjects, that is, with very high absorption and one-pointedness. it was also the DAQ dimensions, and not the PCI dimensions, that successfully discriminated a trend between the blistered and nonblistered firewalkers. Hence, high levels of one-pointedness and absorption, that is, how attention is deployed during firewalking may be more critical (than an alteration in consciousness in general) for the fire immunity observed during firewalking.
Spanos, Nicholas P.; Burnley, M. C.; Cross, P. A. (1993). Response expectancies and interpretations as determinants of hypnotic responding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 1237-1242.
Subjects rated the extent to which they expected to respond to each of the suggestions on a hypnotizability scale both before and after the administration of the preliminary hypnotic-induction procedure. After the induction, subjects also rated the extent to which they planned to respond actively and passively to each suggestion. Contrary to strong versions of response-expectancy theory, the extent to which subjects planned to adopt an active interpretation predicted behavioral and subjective indexes of hypnotizability even after controlling for the effects of postinduction expectations. In addition, an active interpretation significantly predicted response to suggestion for which subjects held weak and uncertain expectations. The relationship between expectation and hypnotizability was found to be fan-shaped rather than linear. Implications are discussed.
Spinhoven, Philip; Vanderlinden, Johan; ter-Kuile, Moniek M.; Linseen, A. Corry G. (1993). Assessment of hypnotic processes and responsiveness in a clinical context. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 41 (3), 210-224.
The present study was designed to investigate in a clinical situation whether differences in measured hypnotizability validly reflect differences in hypnotic processes and to what extent factors deemed extraneous to hypnosis -- such as resistance -- influence hypnotic responding. To answer this question, Dutch versions of relevant scales had to first be developed. The factorial validity and reliability of a Dutch translation of the Resistance Toward Hypnosis Scale (DRHS) and a shortened Dutch version of the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (DPCI) were investigated in a sample of 205 psychiatric patients. The DRHS proved to be factorially valid and reliable, and two subscales, Trance and Reality Orientation, derived empirically from the DPCI showed good to satisfactory reliability. In a second study with a subsample of 99 psychiatric patients, hypnotizability as measured by the Stanford Hypnotic Clinical Scale for Adults was strongly and positively related to DPCI Trance scores and moderately and negatively related to DPCI Reality Orientation and DRHS Resistance scores. It is concluded that hypnotizability as measured in a clinical context under standard conditions is strongly related to hypnotic experiences over and above the moderate effects of resistance toward hypnosis and hypnotic suggestions. Standard hypnotizability assessments appear to be similar in their meaning in an experimental and clinical context.
Szabo, Csaba (1993). The phenomenology of the experiences and the depth of hypnosis: Comparison of direct and indirect induction techniques. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 41, 225-233.
The effect of two hypnotic induction styles on subjective experience was measured in an experiment in which 44 subjects participated in both traditional direct hypnosis, induced by the Stanford Hypnotic susceptibility Scale, Form A, and indirect hypnosis (presented in counterbalanced order), followed by 4 minutes of rest before dehypnosis. The depth of hypnosis was measured retrospectively by a subjective scale, and the structure of experiences was measured by the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory. Subjects were subsequently administered the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form B, so that awareness of their hypnotizability would not affect their subjective depth reports. No differences were found in a comparison of subjects' structure of experiences in direct and indirect hypnosis. In addition, low and medium hypnotizable subjects reported indirect hypnosis as deeper. This may reflect the possibility that while hypnotized different mechanisms come into play for subjects high in hypnotizability compared to those who are less hypnotizable.
1992
Kirsch, Irving (1992). The state of the altered state debate. Contemporary Hypnosis, 9, 1-6.
The question of whether hypnosis is an altered state of consciousness remains meaningful, despite declarations that it is a dead issue. Reports of its demise were based on a redefinition of the term 'state' which rendered the state hypothesis untestable. However, most state theorists use the term in its more conventional sense. Although these state hypotheses cannot be falsified, they can potentially be confirmed. They also have important implications, which make empirical data on the altered state issue as important now as they were 20 years ago.
Kirsch, Irving; Mobayed, C. P.; Council, J. R.; Kenny, D. A. (1992). Expert judgments of hypnosis from subjective state reports. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 101, 657-662.
Suggestibility was assessed in 60 student subjects after a traditional hypnotic induction, an alert induction, progressive relaxation training, or instruction in goal-directed imagery. Responsiveness to suggestion did not differ between groups. Subjects also generated open-ended reports of their states of awareness and of their experience of three hypnotic suggestions. A sample of these reports from 24 moderately to highly suggestible subjects was evaluated by 18 experts in the field of hypnosis. Expert ratings of subjects' open-ended reports indicated that (a) traditional hypnotic inductions produce a state of consciousness that is indistinguishable from nonhypnotic relaxation training, (b) the subjective experience of hypnotic suggestions after imagination training is indistinguishable from that after hypnotic inductions, and (c) suggestibility is unrelated to state of consciousness as assessed by experts.
Matthews, William J.; Isenberg, Gail L. (1992). Hypnotic inductions with deaf and hearing subjects - an initial comparison: A brief communication. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 40 (1), 7-11.
17 volunteer deaf Ss were compared with 18 volunteer hearing Ss on the Stanford Hypnotic Clinical Scale (SHCS) of Morgan and J. R. Hilgard (1975), and the Indirect Suggestion Scale (ISS) of Matthews and Mosher (1985) in a 2 x 2 ANOVA design. 5 dependent measures: (a) objective scale score; (b) self-report scale score; (c) S rapport with the hypnotist; (d) S resistance to the hypnotist; and (e) overall subjective rating of trance experience were employed to measure any differences between the 2 groups. For SHCS behavioral items, the two-way ANOVA failed to reveal any significant main effect or interaction differences between either group (deaf/hearing) or method of induction (direct/indirect). There was a significant main effect for deaf/hearing groups in level of resistance to the hypnotist. Deaf Ss reported feeling more resistant to the hypnotist than did hearing Ss. This may be due to the mode of communication or the fact that the hypnotist was hearing. Implications and limitations of the study are discussed.
Sheehan, Peter W. (1992). The phenomenology of hypnosis and the Experiential Analysis Technique. In Fromm, Erika; Nash, Michael R. (Ed.), Contemporary hypnosis research (pp. 364-389). New York: Guilford Press.
NOTES
The problem with behavioral assessment methods such as hypnotizability scales is that similar behavioral responses to hypnotic suggestions may occur for very different reasons. It is important to assess the phenomenological experience of hypnotic Ss. The Experience Analysis Technique (EAT) is a method for assessing the phenomenology of hypnosis. The EAT "consists of gathering the comments of hypnotic subjects about their hypnotic behavior and experience, as they view the video playback of their hypnotic sessions" (p. 372). The EAT draws its origins from Kagan's method of Interpersonal Process Recall [IPR], in which "counselors in training could review and react to, their contact with clients immediately after therapy sessions. An independent person, present at the review of the session, would inquire into the interaction between the counselor and client by stopping the tape and questioning the client about his or her underlying feelings and thoughts, so facilitating and clarifying the information being recalled" (p. 371). It is important that the interviewer be a different person than the hypnotist.
Hammer, Walker & Diment (1978) applied the IPR to hypnosis, using audiotape. Using the videotape EAT with hypnosis, Sheehan & McConkey (1982; Sheehan, McConkey & Cross, 1978) noted that hypnotic Ss might exhibit any of three different response styles, sometimes related to hypnotic task complexity: 1. Concentrative/cooperative style - S focuses on hypnotist's words, imagining a literal interpretation 2. Independent style - S interprets hypnotist's words in a way that is meaningful to them 3. Constructive style - S considers the communications "from a position of preparedness to process incoming stimuli in a schematic way, so as to structure or re-organize events according to the hypnotist's suggestions"
Some Ss who are high in susceptibility show greater flexibility in the use of cognitive styles than low susceptibility Ss.
Examples of the use of the EAT to evaluate several phenomena observed in experimental and clinical settings are provided: 'duality' during age regression, trance logic, posthypnotic amnesia, pseudomemories, and rapport.
The author reviews the concept of 'countering.' "Countering occurs when a S responds in accord with the wishes of the hypnotist when social influences to respond otherwise are also present in the situation. ... Counterers display a constructive (i.e. active and idiosyncratic) style of cognizing which enables them to make personal sense of the conflicting demands by preserving the integrity of each. ... Counterers, even though they demonstrate a higher degree of involvement with the hypnotist, fail reliably to score as highly on standard tests of susceptibility (e.g. the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C) as subjects who do not counter (Sheehan, 1980). This second finding points to differential effects of rapport on Ss which are not explicable in terms of level of hypnotic susceptibility or simple willingness to comply with anticipated, obvious suggestions. Techniques like the EAT, which are sensitively attuned to detect the personal commitment of subjects to the hypnotist, are needed to detect subtle processes of this kind" (pp. 385- 386).
The author evaluates different reporting techniques used to examine the phenomenological experience of hypnosis (the Chicago Paradigm of Fromm & Kahn, 1990; Shor's phenomenological method; the Field's Inventory Scale of Hypnotic Depth) and evaluates the effects of rapport with the E on the measurement of subjective response. He suggests various experimental controls (e.g. disguising the true aims of the experiment). A measure of rapport or psychodynamic transference to the hypnotist, the Archaic Involvement Measure (AIM) has been developed by Nash and Spinler (1989).
"Experience cannot simply be observed objectively; it may not be reported spontaneously by the experiencer; and it may not even be elicited through ordinary forms of interaction" (p. 388).
"What phenomenological research has shown over the last decade is that hypnotic experience is both multifaceted and complex. It has given us a view of the hypnotic subject as a person who participates actively in the hypnotic process, who is susceptible to the influence of motivations and expectations, and who employs a variety of cognitive strategies so as to manage and respond to multiple levels of communication received in the hypnotic setting. Standard techniques of assessment, especially those emphasizing the primacy of behavioral data and those offering structured choices, are not equipped to reveal the full meaning of hypnotic responsiveness" (p. 388).
"If an instrument of assessment assumes a unidimensional underlying process when there are multiple dimensions operating, then that instrument will be deficient in measuring experience by producing equivalent ratings for very different experiences, and thus will be deficient in measuring overall experience. Measurement of trance-depth poses just such a problem, and measurement of hypnotic experience in its full complexity even more so" (pp. 388-389).
1991
Brown, Jason W. (1991). Self and process: Brain states and the conscious present. New York: Springer-Verlag.
NOTES
Author, from the Department of Neurology at New York University Medical School, presents a theory about the genetic unfolding of mental content (mind) through stages, from mental state into consciousness or into behavior. He relates the genesis of mind to brain development but avoids assuming that there is a straightforward correlation between brain development (e.g. myelination) and cognitive development or perception. To some degree, the theory is based on subjective report data and psychological symptoms. The author discusses issues that bear on the phenomena of nonvoluntary responding and dissociation that are reported or described by hypnotized persons.
"The nature of the mental state will determine the relation between self and world, and thus the interpretation given to agency and choice. ... The crossing of the boundary from self to world is a shift from one level in mind to another" (pp. 10-11).
"... if we begin with mind as primary and seek to explain objects from inner states and private experience, the discontinuity between inner and outer evaporates: mind is everywhere, a universe. ... Whereas before we thought to perceive objects, now we understand that we think them" (p. 19).
"The concept of a stratified cognition is central to the notion of a mental state .... This entails an unfolding from depth to surface, not from one surface to the next, a direction crucial to agency and the causal or decisional properties of consciousness" (p. 52). By unfolding from depth to surface, he means from Core, through Subconscious, then Conscious Private Events, and finally Extra-Personal Space.
He goes on to provide a definition of mental states. "A mental state is the minimal state of a mind, an absolute unit from the standpoint of its spatial and temporal structure. ... The state also has to include the prehistory of the organism. ... The concept of a mental state implies a fundamental unit that has gestalt-like properties, in that specific contents-- words, thoughts, percepts--appear in the context of mind as a whole (p. 53).
"The entire multitiered system arborizes like a tree, with levels in each component linked to corresponding levels in other components. For example, an early (e.g., limbic) state in language (e.g., word meaning) is linked to an early stage in action (e.g., drive, proximal motility) and perception (e.g., hallucination, personal memory) .... In sum, a description of the spatial and temporal features of a _single_ unfolding series amounts to a description of the minimal unit of mind, the _absolute_ mental state" (p. 54).
The author's discussion of an individual's physical movement relates to the concept of nonvoluntary movement (or movement without awareness of volition) in hypnosis. "More precisely, levels in the brain state constitute the action structure. As it unfolds, this structure generates the conviction that a self-initiated act has occurred. This structure--the action representation--does not elaborate content in consciousness. ... As with the sensory-perceptual interface, the transition to movement occurs across an abrupt boundary. In some manner, perhaps through a translation of cognitive rhythms in the action to kinetic patterns in the movement, levels in the emerging act discharge into motor (physical) events" (p. 57).
"The self has the nature of a global image or early representation within which objects-to-be are embedded. ... The self is the accumulation of all the momentary cognitions developing in a brain configured by heredity and experience in a particular way (p. 70).
"The deposition of a holistic representation ... creates the deception of a self that stands behind and propagates events. The feeling of the self as an agent is reinforced by the forward thrust of the process and the deeper locus of the self in relation to surface objects. The self appears to be an instigator of acts and images when in fact it is given up in their formation. The self does not cause or initiate, it only anticipates (p. 70).
The foregoing notes cover only the first five chapters, less than half the book. Other chapters relevant to hypnosis would be those titled 'The Nature of Voluntary Action,' 'Psychology of Time Awareness,' 'From Will to Compassion,' and 'Mind and Brain.'
Glicksohn, Joseph; Mourad, Boaz; Pavell, Eyal (1991-92). Imagination, absorption and subjective time estimation. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 167-176.