We report an exploratory study that investigated the interaction of trait and task in determining duration judgment. High and low absorption subjects (determined by median split along the Absorption Scale) viewed a series of paired slides, and were required to relate to each pair in one of two tasks: A metaphor-production task, and a story-production one. These tasks were carried out for an objective interval of fifteen minutes, following which the subject was required to verbally estimate this duration, retrospectively. In addition, from the individual protocols we measured the average time till response and the average time of response. A significant interaction between absorption and task was obtained for the latter two variables. In addition, a main effect for task was found for the duration estimation. These and other results are assessed in terms of both a cognitive-timer model for time estimation and a contextualistic approach to temporal processing.

The authors used a model for subjective time estimation (STE) that involves a cognitive timer (or internal clock) that encodes temporal information. STE purportedly may be correlated with the amount of attention directed at the passage of time, and negatively correlated with attention paid to other kinds of tasks.
They used tasks that aroused Subjects’ imagination–a series of pairs of slides. One group was to produce a metaphor relating the two slides, while the other group was to produce a short story relating the two–theoretically an easier task.
The authors hypothesized that high absorption Ss would be more engrossed in the task than low absorption Ss, and therefore would underestimate the amount of time used for the task irrespective of task difficulty. For the low absorption Ss they predicted that time estimates for the more difficult metaphor task should be longer, because the task itself demanded more attention than the other task. (High absorption Ss would not exhibit such a difference.)
As another measure, Subjects were required to produce four short time intervals (4, 8, 16, and 32 seconds) to assess whether there might be a different rate of the cognitive timer for the two types of Ss, irrespective of nontemporal task involvement.
26 Ss were randomly allocated to one of two conditions (metaphor task or story task). Since this number of Ss is too small for an adequate evaluation of the interaction effect (absorption x task) of particular interest, the authors regard the experiment as exploratory only.
The results suggest that high absorption Ss view the tasks as easy and pleasant relative to the lows, and have larger STE values. Shorter time estimates are associated with the metaphor task than the story task, for both highs and lows–an unexpected finding. While highs take the same amount of time for metaphor production as for story production, lows take longer to produce a metaphor than a story (and of course, the metaphor is shorter in length!)
The high absorption Ss provided larger estimations of time for the task in which they produced a required number of seconds (4, 8, etc.), indicating a slower baseline rate of functioning of the cognitive timer.
The authors in their discussion find the results supportive of the cognitive timer model. They cite the finding that duration estimate was predicted from STE, task, and interaction of absorption with average time to response. (1) remembered duration was positively correlated with baseline functioning of the cognitive timer (STE) (2) remembered duration was negatively correlated with task difficulty (3) remembered duration was an interactive function of absorption and average time to response.

Kinnunen, Taru; Zamansky, Harold S.; Block, Martin L. (1991, August). Is the hypnotized subject lying?. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco.

To determine whether or not hypnotized subjects misrepresent or lie about their hypnotic experiences, electrodermal skin conductance responses were measured while groups of deeply hypnotized subjects and simulators responded to questions about their experiences to a series of suggestion. 89% of the responses of the hypnotic subjects met the criteria for truthfulness, while 65% of the responses of the simulators indicated deception. Differences between “reals” and simulators were highly significant. The relevance of the results for the nature and theory of hypnosis is discussed. (ABSTRACT from Bulletin of Division 30, Psychological Hypnosis, Provided by former Editor, James Council.)
Pekala, Ronald J. (1991). Hypnotic types: Evidence from a cluster analysis of phenomenal experience. Contemporary Hypnosis, 8, 95-104.
The phenomenological experiences of very-low and very-high, and low, medium and high susceptible individuals were cluster analyzed, attempting to determine if individuals of differing levels of hypnotic susceptibility report experiencing different types of phenomenological experience during hypnosis. Phenomenological experience was assessed by means of a self-report questionnaire called the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI); it allows for quantification of 12 dimensions of phenomenological experience. K-means cluster analysis yielded two relatively distinct clusters of individuals for both low/very-low and high/very-high susceptible individuals. These results suggest at least two types of very-low/low and very-high/high susceptible individuals as determined by their reported experiences during hypnosis.

The author notes that Sheehan and McConkey (1982) found three types of highs: concentrative, independent, and constructive. Spanos, Lush & Gwynn, 1989, found two groups of lows–one capable of learning hypnotic skills and the other less so.
In this study the author did two cluster analyses: (1) Harvard lows (0-1) and highs (11-12), and (2) all subjects divided into lows, mediums and highs, with cluster analyses performed _separately_ for these three groups.
In the first analysis, there were two groups of very low hypnotizable subjects distinguished on the basis of altered state of awareness and rationality; and two very high groups, distinguished on the basis of imagery and positive affect.
One group of very lows reported “little alteration in altered state and altered experience and almost complete volitional control, self-awareness, rationality and memory” (p. 98) and were called ‘classic very lows’ because they were like refractory subjects in their self reports. The other group of very lows reported “moderate alterations in altered state and altered experience, and major decrements in volitional control, self- awareness, rationality and memory” (p. 98) and were called ‘pseudo very lows’ because their reports were a little like medium or high hypnotizables.
One group of very high hypnotizables had “great alterations in state of consciousness and moderate altered experiences; a loss of control, self awareness, rationality and memory; and little vivid imagery” (p. 98) and were called ‘classic very highs’ because their reported experience was like that of somnambules. The other type of highs were called ‘fantasy very highs’ because they had “moderate alteration in consciousness and experience, a great deal of vivid imagery, moderate positive affect, and only mild-to-moderate losses in rationality and memory” (p. 100).
When low, medium, and high susceptible subjects’ PCIs had separate cluster analyses, the lows had three clusters: classic, dialoging, and pseudo lows. The dialoging group was between the other two in their experiencing yet reported a great deal of internal dialogue. Among the highs, the same two clusters appeared as for the very highs.
Among the mediums there were two groups: high mediums who reported a significant drop in volitional control, self-awareness, rationality, memory, and internal dialogue, and an alteration in state of awareness; and low mediums who had milder changes.
Comparing results to Sheehan and McConkey (1982), the classic highs may correspond to their concentrative type and the fantasy highs to their independent type, because the latter generated imagery without a request to do so.
Regarding the pseudo-lows, “it is intriguing that there appear to be some individuals who make little response on the behaviorally oriented Harvard Scale, and yet report some phenomenological alterations. Are they individuals for whom hypnosis may be somewhat more effective even though they are not that hypnotizable (as measured by the ‘direct’ Harvard Scale) or could they be Spanos’s (Spanos et al., 1989) ‘trainable’ low susceptibles?” (p. 102).
Richards, D. G. (1991). A study of the correlations between subjective psychic experiences and dissociative experiences. Dissociation, 19, 83-91.
Subjective psychic experiences, such as telepathy, clairvoyance, and out-of- body experiences, are often reported in conjunction with dissociative experiences. This study examined the relationship between the Dissociative Experiences Scale and a variety of psychic experiences in a nonclinical population with a high level of psychic experiences. The DES correlated moderately (.3 to .4) with most but not all of the experiences. The mean DES score was 17.2 (SD = 12.5), substantially above adult norms. Although psychic experiences are correlated with dissociation, they are not necessarily associated with pathology.
Sheehan, Peter W. (1991). Hypnosis, context, and commitment. In Lynn, S. J.; Rhue, J. W. (Ed.), Theories of hypnosis: Current models and perspectives (pp. 520-541). New York: Guilford Press.

“There are several different ways to classify the model that is expounded in this chapter. One may view it … as an individual-differences model of hypnosis, because it emphasizes the significance of intragroup differences in the pattern of hypnotic performance. Alternatively, one may view it as a phenomenologically based model…. Invariably, however, single categories fail to do justice to the nature of theories, and hence it is perhaps wisest to view this theory as a means of exploring particular hypotheses about hypnotic phenomena that focus primarily on the meaning of suggestion as perceived by susceptible subjects. This model focuses, in a way that most other theories do not, on the motivational implications of the cognitive involvement of the susceptible subject in the events of the hypnotic setting. It offers a variant of contextual theories of psychological functioning, but is experiential in its emphasis rather than simply behavioral” (p. 537).

Kirsch, Irving; Council, James R.; Wickless, Cynthia (1990). Subjective scoring for the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 38 (2), 112-124.

A scale is presented which assesses subjective experiences associated with the test suggestions contained in the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (HGSHS:A) of Shor and E. Orne (1962). This scale, along with the standard HGSHS:A self-scoring test booklet, was administered to 479 students at the University of Connecticut and 618 students at North Dakota State University, and normative data from these samples are reported. Correlational analyses indicated that the scale was both reliable and valid as a measure of hypnotic responsiveness. It is suggested that it may be useful to supplement behavioral scoring of hypnotizability with subjective scoring.

Pekala, Ronald J.; Forbes, Elizabeth J. (1990, Spring). Subjective effects of several stress management strategies: With reference to attention. Behavioural Medicine, 39-43.

This study assessed variations in reported attentional experience associated with several stress management techniques (hypnosis, progressive relaxation, deep abdominal breathing) and baseline (eyes closed) as a function of hypnotic susceptibility. Three hundred nursing students experienced the stress management conditions and afterward completed a self-report inventory, the Dimensions of Attention Questionnaire (DAQ), in reference to each condition. The DAQ quantifies 12 aspects of attentional experience in a reliable and valid manner. The results demonstrated that progressive relaxation, hypnosis, and deep abdominal breathing are characterized by differences in reported attentional experience that are further moderated by an individual’s hypnotic susceptibility. The clinical implications of these results are discussed.

“Significant main effects were found for conditions for perspicacity, absorption, and control, with progressive relaxation associated with increased perspicacity and absorption, but with decreased control vis-a-vis hypnosis.
“Significant main effects for groups were found for perspicacity, locus, direction of attention, absorption, control, and vigilance. … [Post-hoc comparisons] revealed that high susceptibles (vis-a-vis low susceptibles) reported increased perspicacity, absorption, a more inward-focused attention, more feelings of being out of their bodies, and decreased control and vigilance. High-mediums were also different from lows (in the same direction) for all of the above comparisons except for direction of attention. Low-mediums, along with lows, were different from highs for absorption and control.
“Significant interactions between conditions and groups were found for absorption, control, and vigilance. Whereas low susceptibles reported significantly increased absorption but significantly decreased control and vigilance during progressive relaxation than during hypnosis, high susceptibles reported no significant differences between relaxation and hypnosis for absorption, control, or vigilance” (p. 41).
The authors describe the differences found for deep abdominal breathing on p. 41.
“The interaction effects suggest that the experience of hypnosis and progressive relaxation are moderated by a person’s hypnotic susceptibility–low susceptibles experience significantly greater absorption, but decreased control and vigilance during progressive relaxation than during hypnosis, although there are no such differences for high susceptibles. This suggests that progressive relaxation may be a ‘better’ procedure than hypnosis to use with low susceptibles, at least if one wants to increase absorption and decrease vigilance and control” (p. 42).
The authors also note that “deep abdominal breathing is associated with increased ‘calmness of mind,’ in reference to a baseline condition, as demonstrated by increased attentional detachment and equanimity, and decreased vigilance and density (the ‘amount’ of thoughts going through one’s mind)” (p. 42).
Richards, D. G. (1990). Hypnotic susceptibility and subjective psychic experiences. Journal of Parapsychology, 54, 35-51. (Abstracted in American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 34, 145-146)
Some studies have shown a correlation between hypnotic susceptibility and self-reports of psychic experiences. This study used a population reporting a very high level of psychic experiences and correlated the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility with psychic experiences as measured by two scales. The mean Harvard score (6.31) was approximately the same as published norms, suggesting that the population was not unusual in terms of hypnotic susceptibility. Studies of people with large numbers of psychic experiences who have low hypnotic susceptibility may aid in understanding other factors that are involved.

Spanos, Nicholas P.; Warnock, Sean; de Groot, Hans P. (1990). Cognitive skill training, confirming sensory stimuli, and responsiveness to suggestions in subjects unselected for hypnotizability. Journal of Research in Personality, 24, 133-144.

Subjects unselected for hypnotizability were administered cognitive skill training which taught them to actively generate hypnotic responses or expectancy enhancing procedures that provided them with sensory stimuli aimed at confirming the false belief that they had successfully experienced suggested effects. Subjects were tested for suggestibility / hypnotizability at the end of their experimental treatment session and again in two follow-up posttests. Skill trained subjects exhibited significantly higher scores than subjects in all other treatments on the behavioral and subjective dimensions of the three suggestibility / hypnotizability tests. Subjects who received confirming stimuli showed higher behavioral scores than no treatment controls only on the behavioral dimension of the first suggestibility test, and no differences from controls on the subjective dimensions of any of theory tests. Theoretical implications are discussed.

Weekes, John R.; Lynn, Steven Jay (1990). Hypnotic suggestion type, and subjective experience – the order-effects hypothesis revisited: A brief communication. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 38, 95-100.

In a replication and extension of Field, Evans, and Orne’s (1965) research, no support was found for the hypothesis that suggestion order is related to hypnotic responding. Confirming earlier findings, subjects were no more responsive to suggestions ordered from easy-to-difficult than they were to suggestions ordered from difficult-to- easy. Measures of subjective involvement in suggestions, involuntariness, and archaic involvement with the hypnotist were no more sensitive to order effects, nor were order effects more apparent with subjects who received direct versus indirect suggestions. Confirming earlier research, direct suggestions did facilitate suggestion-related involuntariness and response to the hypnotic amnesia item after cancellation, whereas indirect suggestions enhanced fears of negative appraisal by the hypnotist. Thus, authoritative suggestions enhance responding to a cognitive-delusional item relative to more permissive suggestions. Finally, female subjects were more involved in suggestions than were males, particularly in response to more difficult tests items.

Bryant, Richard A.; McConkey, Kevin M. (1989). Hypnotic blindness: A behavioral and experiential analysis. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 98, 71-77.

“This research examined the influence of visual information on a decision task that subjects were administered during hypnotically suggested blindness. Real, hypnotizable subjects and simulating, unhypnotizable subjects were tested in two experiments. Experiment 1 focused on behavioral responses, and Exper. 2 focused on experiential reactions. In both experiments, the findings indicated that the behavioral responses of reals were influenced by visual info. despite their reported blindness. The behavioral responses of reals and simulators were essentially similar. The experiential data in Experiment 2 provided information about the phenomenal nature of subjects’ reported blindness. The experiential reactions of reals and simulators were essentially different. The research is discussed in terms of the issues that need to be considered in the development of a model of hypnotic blindness” (p. 71).

Bryant, Richard A.; McConkey, Kevin M. (1989). Hypnotic emotions and physical sensations: A real-simulating analysis. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 37, 305-319.

Real hypnotizable Ss and simulating unhypnotizable Ss were administered a suggestion for either happiness, emotional neutrality, or sadness. The emotion was assessed through subjective and behavioral measures taken once before, twice during, and once after the emotion. Findings indicated that emotionally congruent changes occurred in both self-report and performance measures. Ss’ physical sensations during the emotion were assessed on a 34-item self-report scale. It was demonstrated that Ss in the happy versus sad conditions reported different physical sensations; in particular, they reported different facial sensations. The responses of real hypnotizable subjects, however, were essentially paralleled by those of simulating unhypnotizable subjects. Therefore, the possibility exists that hypnotized subjects may have been responding on the basis of social demands. The findings are discussed in terms of the effects of the emotion suggestions, and the implications of real and simulating Ss displaying similar affective responses.

Used the real-simulating model in an attempt to eliminate the possibility that hypnotized Subjects in previous studies may have been responding to the demand characteristics of the situation. Used both subjective and behavioral measures. Self-report happiness and sadness, of emotion intensity; behavioral performance measure of speech rate, indexed by counting speed (which has been shown to distinguish between happiness and sadness). Used 34-item self-report Physical Sensations Scale based on Pennebaker, J. W. The psychology of physical symptoms. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982.
They cite Weiss, et al (1987) who focused on the onset latency, and the fluctuation of muscular contraction associated with facial expression indicated a difference between posthypnotically cued and simulated emotions of anxiety and pleasure.

Kihlstrom, John F.; Register, Patricia A.; Hoyt, Irene P.; Albright, Jeanne Sumi; Grigorian, Ellen M.; Heindel, William C.; Morrison, Charles R. (1989). Dispositional correlates of hypnosis: A phenomenological approach. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 37, 249-263.

Attempted to construct and validate a questionnaire measure of hypnotic- like experiences based on Shor’s (1979) 8-dimension phenomenological analysis of hypnosis. Separate item pools were developed to measure each disposition: Trance, Nonconscious Involvement, Archaic Involvement, Drowsiness, Relaxation, Vividness of Imagery, Absorption, and Access to the Unconscious. Based on preliminary testing (total Number – 856), a final questionnaire was produced containing 5 items measuring normal, everyday experiences in each domain. Results from a standardization sample (Number – 468) showed that each of the subscales, except for Archaic Involvement, possessed satisfactory levels of internal consistency and test-retest reliability. Factor analysis indicated that 6 subscales loaded highly on a common factor similar to the absorption construct (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), while items pertaining to Relaxation and Archaic Involvement formed separate factors. Validation testing on 4 samples receiving the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (HGSHS:A) of Shor and E. Orne (1962) (total Number = 1855) showed that the Absorption and Trance dimensions correlated most strongly with HGSHS:A; the correlations with Drowsiness, Relaxation, and Nonconscious Involvement approached 0. The scales derived form Shor’s analysis, however, did not improve the prediction of hypnotizability over that obtained with the absorption scale (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974).

Kumar, V. K.; Pekala, Ronald J. (1989). Variations in phenomenological experience as a function of hypnosis and hypnotic susceptibility: A replication. British Journal of Experimental and Clinical Hypnosis, 6, 17-22.

Phenomenological experiences associated with a baseline (eyes closed/open) condition and an hypnotic induction were compared across individuals of differing hypnotic susceptibility. The results indicated individuals of differing hypnotic susceptibility reported different intensities of phenomenological experience during the baseline condition. The induction further augmented intensity differences for low, medium and high susceptible subjects, but more so for high than for low subjects. These results replicate earlier research, are not inconsistent with trait and situational interpretations of hypnotic susceptibility and highlight the importance of the interaction between these factors on the resulting hypnotic experience reported by the subject.

Lynn, Steven J.; Rhue, Judith W.; Weekes, John R. (1989). Hypnosis and experienced nonvolition: A social-cognitive integrative model. In Spanos, N.P.; Chaves, J.F. (Ed.), Hypnosis: The cognitive-behavioral perspective (pp. 78-109). Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.

The authors present a model to account for the subjective experience of nonvolition. The model rests on four observations: (1) nonvoluntary responses “have all of the properties of behavior that is typically defined as voluntary” (p. 108); (2) “hypnotizable subjects can resist suggestions when resistance is defined as consistent with the role of a ‘good’ hypnotized subject” (p. 108); (3) “Hypnotic behaviors are neither reflexive/automatic … nor manifestations of innate stimulus-response connections” (p. 108); (4) “Hypnotic performances consume attentional resources … in a manner comparable to nonhypnotic performances” (p. 108). They continue, “At the same time, many of the cognitive operations and affective reactions that accompany hypnotic responding are not readily accessible to consciousness” (pp. 108-109).

Matheson, George; Shu, Karen L.; Bart, Catherine (1989). A validation study of a short-form hypnotic-experience questionnaire and its relationship to hypnotizability. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 32, 17-26.

Investigated the validity of a 16-item scale inquiring about hypnotic experience, drawn from the Hypnotic Experience Questionnaire developed by Kelly (1985) to measure components of hypnotic experience. We administered the HEQ-S and the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility: Form A (HGSHS:A) to 198 students. Factor analysis of the scale produced three stable principal components accounting for 70% of the data variance: Dissociation/Altered State (DAS), Rapport (RAP), and Relaxation (REL). Subscales representing these three factors and a composite measure, “General Depth,” were constructed. Subscale correlations with HGSHS:A scores were highest for the DAS subscale (.69) and lowest for REL (.41). Applications of the HEQ-S in clinical and research use are considered.
Using the phenomenological studies and theories of J. R. Hilgard (1979) and Shor (1962), Kelly (1985) constructed the Hypnotic Experience Questionnaire (HEQ), a 47- item scale designed to demonstrate the existence of five factors of the hypnotic experience. These factors included dissociation/altered state, relaxation, rapport, visual imagery, and a negatively correlated factor of cognitive rumination measuring the amount of anxious self-reflective, and interfering thought. A composite scale, General Depth, was also derived to provide a summary measure of the subjective quality of the hypnotic experience. The HEQ was developed as a research instrument.
The HEQ-S was administered immediately after Ss completed the Harvard response record. Items were responded to on a 5-point Likert scale ranging form one (No, none or not at all) to 5 (Yes, a great deal, or almost completely).
Pekala, Ronald J.; Bieber, Stephen L. (1989-90). Operationalizing pattern approaches to consciousness: An analysis of phenomenological patterns of consciousness among individuals of differing susceptibility. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 9 (4), 303-320. Keywords: arousal, attention, cognition, consciousness, emotion/mood, hypnotizability, imagery, memory, nonvolition/automatism, self, state, subjective experience
Pattern differences in subjective experience, as assessed by a self-report inventory, the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI), were compared across low, low-medium, high-medium, and high hypnotically susceptible individuals during hypnosis and eyes-closed. A hierarchical factor analytic approach was utilized that allowed for the determination of pattern differences among PCI dimensions as a function of hypnotic susceptibility. The factor analyses found that the four suspectibility (sic) groups were ‘pattern equivalent’ during eyes-closed, partially pattern dissimilar during hypnosis, and partially pattern dissimilar when comparing hypnosis against eyes-closed. The nature of these results support previous analyses (1) which compared pattern structure differences as a function of correlational matrices. The results suggest the complementarity of Bieber’s (2) and Pekala’s (3) approaches for assessing pattern differences in consciousness and are congruent with the theorizing of Tart (4), Izard (5), and the PDP researchers on the importance of pattern structure changes in understanding states of consciousness.

Pekala, Ronald J.; Kumar, V. K. (1989). Phenomenological patterns of consciousness during hypnosis: Relevance to cognition and individual differences. Australian Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 17 (1), 1-20.

Relationships among phenomenological subsystems of consciousness associated with a baseline condition and an hypnotic induction condition were compared across individuals of differing hypnotic susceptibility. Phenomenological experience on 12 subsystems of consciousness was quantified by means of the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) and the relationships between dimensions were statistically assessed. The results replicated previous findings and suggested that hypnosis has differential effects upon the reported organization of phenomenological structures of consciousness across subjects of differing susceptibility. The data from the previous and present studies were pooled and the combined data were reanalyzed. The results provided further support for the differential pattern structure across low and high susceptibles during hypnosis. Furthermore, differences in pattern structure were augmented when comparing very low versus very high susceptible individuals.

Van Denberg, Eric J.; Kurtz, Richard M. (1989). Changes in body attitude as a function of posthypnotic suggestions. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 37, 15-30.

Hypothesized that highly hypnotizable subjects who remained amnesic for posthypnotic suggestions to improve body attitude would show greater changes than subjects who were not amnesic. Subjects given simulating instructions were used as a comparison group to assess experimental demands. 48 females were screened with the Harvard and assigned to one of 4 conditions: (a) high hypnotizable with amnesia suggestions, (b) high hypnotizable without suggested amnesia, (c) low hypnotizable simulator with amnesia, and (d) low hypnotizable simulator without suggested amnesia. A fifth group was formed of those high hypnotizable subjects who remembered the suggestion despite instructions to the contrary. The Body Attitude Scale (Kurtz, 1966) was administered prior to and 3 days after the experimental suggestions. Results generally demonstrated that high hypnotizable amnesic subjects manifested the greatest attitudinal and phenomenological changes as a result of the posthypnotic suggestion, although conclusions were tempered by performance of simulating subjects. The implications for hypnosis research and clinical practice are discussed.

“The hypothesis that hypnotized subjects would report greater positive changes in affect, self-esteem, and social functioning than simulators was tested using a brief structured questionnaire. An analysis of Subjects responses to the questionnaire while with the ‘blind’ research assistant (simulators in role) revealed number significant differences between groups (N = 48) on six of the seven questions. … An analysis of Subjects’ responses to the questionnaire while being debriefed by the primary investigator (simulators out of role) revealed significant differences among groups (N = 48) on three of the seven questions. … High hypnotizable subjects with maintained amnesia demonstrated a strong tendency to be the most responsive of all groups of subjects on the first and second assessment. In contrast, the high hypnotizable Ss for whom amnesia ‘broke down’ reported the fewest phenomenological changes of any of the five groups during the first assessment, and comparatively few during the second assessment. Also of note is that once out of their role, simulators in both conditions dramatically reduced their reporting of positive change” (pp. 23-24).
“Moreover, a closer examination of the data demonstrated that phenomenological and behavioral differences in the groups did appear at several points during the experiment. For example, the 10 high hypnotizable subjects told to explicitly remember the suggestion did so, while 3 of the 10 simulators in this condition claimed to have forgotten it. On debriefing, these Subjects reported they did this because they believed ‘really hypnotized subjects wouldn’t be able to remember anything, even if they were told they could.’ Further, no simulator in the amnesia condition reported they could recall the suggestion, in contrast to the high hypnotizable subjects, 44% of whom said they did remember it. With regard to phenomenological differences, simulators stated during debriefing with the primary investigator that they intentionally faked changes on BAS, and that they experienced no true effects from the suggestion for positive body attitude change. In contrast, high hypnotizability amnesic subjects reported global, pervasive changes in their mood and self-esteem that went beyond specific alterations in attitudes toward their appearance. By comparison, high hypnotizable subjects told to remember the suggestion reported greatly increased self-absorption and acute awareness of the suggestion, ‘sort of like a broken record in my head'” (pp. 25-26).
“As shown by the present study, amnesia maintenance can be quite problematic. Of 18 high hypnotizable subjects for whom amnesia was suggested, only 10 remained fully amnesic for the suggestion after 3 days. In addition, those 8 subjects for whom amnesia ‘broke down’ showed minimal shifts on BAS, or in reports of phenomenological changes. Such frequent amnesia failure has been reported by other researchers, although the effectiveness of the suggestion is not always so compromised” (p. 26).

Cardena, Etzel (1988, November). The phenomenology of quiescent and physically active deep hypnosis. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Asheville, NC.

Twelve highly susceptible undergraduate students participated in three conditions (lying down on a bed, pedaling a stationary bicycle at a comfortable rate, and having a motor do the pedaling at an approximately constant, comfortable rate) in deep hypnosis and non-hypnosis conditions. They were asked for their expectations about deep hypnotic experience, exposed to a number of traditional hypnotic phenomena before the deep hypnosis and comparison sessions, and given the opportunity to explore their own ways of inducing and deepening their state.
Even without cues or suggestions, participants gave comparable reports of their experiences at light, medium and deep hypnosis. The first one consisted mostly of relaxation and other changes in body sensations. Medium hypnosis was characterized by having complex imaginal experiences. Very deep hypnosis involved experiences of light, emptiness, and other phenomena associated with spiritual experiences.

Council, James R.; Greyson, Bruce; Huff, Kenneth D. (1988, November). Reports of paranormal experiences as a function of imaginative and hypnotic ability. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Asheville, NC.

Wilson and Barber (1983) have suggested that some excellent hypnotic subjects (“fantasy prone” persons) may be more likely to report paranormal experiences than the rest of the population. Council and Greyson (1985), studying a sample of subjects who had reported near-death experiences (NDEs), found a significant relationship between fantasy-proneness and NDEs, and a much stronger relationship between fantasy- proneness and reports of paranormal experiences in general. This paper presents new data from the study of NDE reporters and a replication and extension of those findings with a sample not selected for NDEs. These data indicate a strong association between fantasy- proneness and reports of paranormal experiences. Hypnotic susceptibility bears a weaker relationship with such reports that appears dependent upon variance shared with measures of fantasy-proneness. Other data from these studies suggests that both imaginative ability and reports of paranormal experiences may be related to a history of stressful or traumatic childhood experiences.
Kluft, R. P. (1988). The phenomenology and treatment of extremely complex multiple personality disorder. Dissociation, 1, 47-58.
Contemporary reports indicate that the average number of personalities in recently reported patients with MPD is larger than that reported in the older literature. A minority of these recent patients demonstrate extreme complexity. A group of 26 patients with 26 or more personalities and under observation for a minimum of 3 years was studied. Their presentations, the reasons that appeared to underlie their complexity, and their courses of treatment are reviewed. Findings indicate that this group of patients is diverse, with some proving readily treatable, and others proving quite refractory. Observations that appear constructive for the treatment of such patients are offered. The concept of personality is discussed and an alternative description is explored. The usefulness of the paradigms and metaphors of splitting and division as heuristics for the understanding of MPD is challenged, and a paradigm/metaphor of redoubling and reconfiguration is offered for further study.

Kumar, V. K.; Pekala, Ronald J. (1988). Hypnotizability, absorption, and individual differences in phenomenological experience. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 36, 80-88.

The phenomenological effects associated with a baseline condition of eyes- closed and a hypnotic induction condition were compared across individuals of differing absorption capacity and hypnotizability. The results indicated that individuals of differing absorption capacity and hypnotizability reported different intensities of phenomenological experience during the baseline eyes-closed condition. The induction further augmented intensity differences for low, medium, and high absorption and hypnotizable Ss, but more so for high (and medium) than low hypnotizable Ss. The results support both a trait and state interpretation of hypnotizability, and highlight the importance of the interaction between these factors on the resulting hypnotic experience of S.
NOTES: Based on a review of relevant literature, the authors predicted that (1) during hypnosis and a baseline condition (eyes-closed), high absorption and high hypnotizable Ss will report the phenomenological effects at greater intensity relative to low absorption and low hypnotizable Ss, respectively; (2) hypnotic induction will be associated with increased absorption; greater alterations in awareness and experience; and decreased volitional control, rationality, and memory; (3) phenomenological intensity differences (hypnosis compared to eyes-closed) will be significantly greater for high than for low hypnotizable Ss.
They used the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) developed by Pekala (1982), which is a 53 item self-report instrument that is completed retrospectively in reference to a preceding stimulus condition. The PCI measures the following dimensions and subdimensions: internal dialogue; self-awareness; state of awareness; imagery (amount, vividness); positive affect (joy, sexual excitement, love); negative affect (anger, fear, sadness); altered experience (time sense, body image, perception, unusual meanings); attention (absorption, direction); memory; rationality; volitional control; and arousal.
The 217 Ss were administered the Tellegen Absorption Scale, then sat quietly with eyes closed for four minutes, then completed the PCI, Form 1, relative to that 4-minute period. They were administered a slightly shortened version of the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (HGSHS:A); before the posthypnotic suggestion and amnesia suggestion they experienced another 4-minute silent period during which they were told to ‘continue to experience the state you are in right now.’ After the HGSHS:A they completed PCI, Form 2, in reference to the silent period during the HGSHS:A, before they completed the 11-point questionnaire on the HGSHS:A.
Subjects who did not have reliable PCI response forms were removed from the sample, leaving 173 Ss who were divided into high, medium, and low Absorption groups, and high, medium, and low hypnotizability groups. The statistical analysis employed MANOVA on intensity scores for first the major PCI dimensions and then the 14 subdimensions using Conditions (eyes closed, hypnosis) and Groups. There were significant main and interaction effects. Subsequent ANOVAs for each (sub)dimension, Conditions by Hypnotizability Groups (2 x 3) were then performed.
Hypnosis “was associated with significantly less positive affect (joy, sexual excitement, love); negative affect (anger, sadness); visual imagery (amount, vividness); self-awareness, internal dialogue, rationality, volitional control, and memory; and significantly more altered experience (time sense, perception) and altered state of awareness.
“Significant main effects for Hypnotizability Groups were found for positive affect (joy, love); altered experience (body image, time sense, perception, meaning); attention (direction, absorption); self-awareness; altered state of awareness; rationality; volitional control; and memory.
“Post-hoc comparisons for the eyes-closed condition revealed that high relative to low, hypnotizables reported significantly greater alterations in body image, time sense, meaning, and altered state of awareness. Medium hypnotizable Ss, compared to low hypnotizables, reported significantly increased alterations in body image and state of awareness.
“Post-hoc comparisons for the hypnotic induction condition revealed that high, viz-a-viz low, hypnotizables reported significantly increased absorbed attention; greater altered experience (body image, time sense, perception, meaning); and increased alterations in state of awareness. High hypnotizables also reported significantly less imagery vividness, self-awareness, rationality, volitional control, and memory. Medium hypnotizable Ss, vis-a-vis low hypnotizables, reported significantly more altered experience (body image, time sense, perception, meaning); absorbed attention; and altered state of awareness; and significantly less imagery vividness, self-awareness, rationality, volitional control, and memory. High hypnotizable Ss, relative to medium hypnotizables, reported significantly more altered experience (perception, meaning) and absorption, and significantly less rationality, volitional control, and memory.
“Concerning the significant interactions (alpha = .01), graphs of the means indicated significant ordinal interactions between Conditions and Hypnotizability Groups for altered experience (perception), imagery (vividness), self-awareness, altered state of awareness, rationality, volitional control, and memory. For all of the PCI (sub)dimensions, the hypnotic induction condition (compared to eyes-closed) was associated with a significantly greater increase in altered experience (perception), and altered state of awareness; and a significantly greater decrease in imagery (vividness), rationality, volitional control, and memory for the high (and medium) hypnotizable groups relative to the low hypnotizable group.
“Significant disordinal interactions were found for absorption and unusual meanings. Whereas high hypnotizable Ss reported a more absorbed attentional focus and more unusual meaning during hypnosis, low hypnotizable Ss reported being less absorbed (or more distracted) during the induction than eyes-closed. Low hypnotizables reported more unusual meanings in reference to eyes closed” (pp. 84-85).
Correlations among the major PCI dimensions, absorption, and hypnotizability differ between the two conditions. In hypnosis, the hypnotizability correlations that reached the .001 level were: –Self Awareness -.55 –State of Awareness .60 –Altered Experience .56 –Inward Absorbed Attention .44 –Rationality -.41 –Volitional control -.65 –Memory -.41 –Arousal -.28
In the eyes closed condition, the only PCI variables that Hypnotizability correlated with, at the .001 level, were: –Positive Affect .26 –Altered Experience .32
MANOVAs and ANOVAs were computed for Absorption groups in a similar fashion. Main effects but not interaction effects were significant. Results are not abstracted here.
In their Discussion, the authors note that “The three hypotheses were supported by the results. Several of the absorption group comparisons obtained in previous research (Pekala et al., 1985) involving alterations in subjective experience (body image, perception, meaning); state of awareness; and volitional control were replicated in the present research” (p. 85).

Nash, Michael R.; Lynn, Steven Jay; Stanley, Scott; Carlson, Victor (1987). Subjectively complete hypnotic deafness and auditory priming. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 35 (1), 32-40.

The present study examined the cognitive and attentional mechanisms by which auditory information is maintained out of awareness during complete hypnotic deafness. Adopting a methodology from recent work on subliminally presented pattern- masked words and dichotic listening, the study tested whether spoken words presented during complete hypnotic deafness affect lexical decisions concerning subsequently presented word choices. The response of 9 hypnotized and 15 simulating Ss to spoken stimulus words presented following hypnotic deafness instructions was compared to the response of 20 baseline control Ss who never were exposed to the stimulus words. While the response pattern of hypnosis Ss appeared different from that of baseline control Ss, hypnotic Ss showed no evidence of the priming effect found in subliminal perception and dichotic listening studies. Simulator response deviated significantly from hypnotized and baseline control responses.

10 highs capable of hypnotic deafness, screened by Harvard Group and Stanford Profile Scales (Means 11.0 and 24.7, respectively) and 15 lows (means 1.7 and 1.7, respectively) participated in the study; the low hypnotizables being in the simulation group. For the experimental session, a different E administered a standard hypnotic induction and the deafness suggestion, testing for deafness by snapping fingers near S’s ear and making loud requests for motor responses.
An experimental trial consisted of tapping an S on the hand, saying the stimulus word out loud, and visually presenting four words for the S to read out loud and circle one. “Of the 18 main experimental trials, the four-word array consisted of two words which were related to the stimulus (one word which was semantically related to the spoken stimulus word and one word which was phonetically related), and two neutral unrelated words” (p. 34). For example, if the spoken word were ‘dream,’ the word array might include ‘cream, tennis, sell, sleep.’ There also were “3 phonetically unrelated trials (whose arrays consisted of one phonetically related choice and 3 unrelated choices) and 2 stimulus word-unrelated trials (whose arrays consisted of the stimulus word and 3 unrelated choices) … [and] 7 dummy trials with 4 unrelated choices only” (p. 34). Ss rated their degree of deafness on a 10-point scale after hypnosis was terminated.
Possible sources of bias were examined by having 20 control Ss respond to blank tachistoscopic slides with the instructions that they were participating in a study of ‘subliminal perception.’ Another 22 Ss were asked to identify the semantically and phonetically related words from the word array, which for the most part they did successfully.
All Ss rated themselves as ’10’ on the deafness scale, indicating total deafness. The principal results are seen in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1 Mean Number of Related and Unrelated Responses (Percentage of Responses) for all S Groups on the 18 Mean Experimental Trials
Response Category S Group N Related Unrelated Total
Hypnotized 9 7.22 10.78 18
(40.13%) (59.88$) (100%)
Simulating 15 12.13 5.87 18
(67.43%) (32.61%) (100%)
Baseline 19 8.79 9.21 18 Controls (48.82%) (51.17%) (100%)
Table 2 Mean Number of Phonetic and Semantic Responses within the Related Response Category on the 18 Main Experimental Trials
Related Responses S Group Phonetic Semantic Hypnotized 1.78 5.44
(9.89%) (30.24%) Simulating 7.07 5.07
(39.27%) (28.16%) Baseline 4.21 4.58 Controls (23.38%) (25.44%)
Hypnotized Ss were significantly different from simulators (Table 1) in number of related responses. Simulators gave significantly more related responses than baseline controls. Simulators also gave more phonetically related words than either the hypnotized or baseline Ss (Table 2); there was no difference between groups on semantically related words. (Authors performed other useful and detailed analyses.)
In their Discussion section, the authors note that they did not obtain the expected results of hypnotized Ss producing more related responses than baseline Ss. “In fact, internal analyses of hypnotized and baseline responses revealed that the pattern of choices for hypnotic deaf Ss was opposite to the direction predicted by subception. Hypnotic Ss appeared to avoid phonetically related word choices, even for items on which baseline control Ss scored above chance. …
“This kind of non-baseline performance by hypnotic Ss can be accounted for by either a strategic enactment conceptualization of hypnosis (Spanos, 1982; Wagstaff, 1981) or Hilgard’s (1979) neo-dissociation theory. Spanos might emphasize the hypnotic S’s active strivings to meet the hypnotist’s perceived expectations. … Neo-dissociation theory might stress the mechanisms by which processing of auditory inputs are maintained outside of awareness via a dissociative barrier.
” … Given the tendency for simulating Ss to ‘overplay’ hypnotic phenomena (Levitt & Chapman, 1979), one might have expected simulators to pointedly avoid related responses, thus producing a lower frequency of related words than either the hypnotic Ss or the baseline controls (in effect being more deaf than the deaf). Just the opposite occurred. One possible explanation for this behavior presents itself: In their work with posthypnotic suggestion and the ‘disappearing hypnotist’ … M. T. Orne and others found that simulating Ss may be more alert and responsive to demand cues than are hypnotic Ss. In the present study, the authors’ original hypothesis was that hypnotic Ss might reveal a subception effect by above-chance responding on related word choices. If we assume that this expectation was somehow communicated to Ss by some subtle aspect of the experimental procedure, then it is conceivable that simulating Ss were able to detect and act upon these cues, while hypnotized Ss remained relatively unattuned to such subtleties.
“In sum, the priming effect noted in the subliminal perception research does not appear to be a feature of complete hypnotic deafness, at least as measured in this study. The behavior of simulating Ss in the present study should be another caution to researchers that differences between hypnotized and simulating Ss may reflect simulation effects in addition to, or instead of, hypnotic effects” (pp. 37-38).

Pekala, Ronald J.; Kumar, V. K. (1987-88). Phenomenological variations in attention across low, medium, and high susceptible subjects. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 7 (4), 303-314.

Phenomenological aspects of attention were assessed across 434 subjects in reference to baseline conditions of eyes-open or closed sitting quietly and an hypnotic induction condition. An attention questionnaire, assessing twelve dimensions of attention, was constructed and subjects completed it retrospectively in reference to the baseline condition and hypnosis. Reliability analyses indicated acceptable reliability for most dimensions. Regression and correlational analyses suggested adequate validity. Comparisons between baseline and hypnosis indicated significant phenomenological intensity differences between stimulus conditions on many attention dimensions. Comparisons among low, medium, and high susceptibles in reference to baseline and hypnosis also yielded many significant intensity differences. In addition, significant interactions between conditions and groups for many of the attention dimensions suggest that hypnosis, in comparison to the baseline conditions, potentiated intensity differences in attention for high, vis-a-vis low (and medium), susceptible subjects.

Roth, P. A. (1987). Meaning and method in the social sciences: A case for methodological pluralism. Ithica NY: Cornell University Press.

Cited by Wulff, in Cardena, Lynn, & Krippner, 2002 (p. 430). Wulff states, “we may look forward to a genuinely pluralistic mode of inquiry — what Roth (1987) called _methodological pluralism_ — according to which no point of view is finally privileged over any other, but each is entertained as a potential source of insight. Rather than anchoring ourselves in a particular theory or method, then, we would take our grounding in the phenomena themselves, which are far more likely to yield their secrets to a pluralistic approach” (p. 430 in Cardena et al., 2000).

Laurence, Jean-Roch; Nadon, Robert (1986). Reports of hypnotic depth: Are they more than mere words?. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 34, 215-233.

The empirical work relating hypnotizability, the hypnotic situation, and the reports of hypnotic depth is reviewed and evaluated. Asking Ss to assess their hypnotic depth is a complex task involving the interaction of experiential, cognitive, and contextual variables. Accordingly, future experimental work should take into account this multidimensionality; phenomenological, situational, cognitive, and motivational factors implicated in verbal reports should be explored in terms of their respective relationships with both hypnotizability and self-ratings of hypnotic depth. More sophistication in the experimental inquiries of hypnotic depth is required in order to further our understanding of the cognitive and affective structures underlying the hypnotic experience.
In past years, hypnotic susceptibility and hypnotic depth were regarded as the same thing, and depth was inferred from responses to test suggestions on hypnotizability scales (e.g. Davis & Husband, 1931; LeCron, 1953).
There has been little investigation of the relationship between Subjects’ subjective experiences and reported “depth.” Research suggests that “hypnotic depth reports are usually significantly higher for Ss who have undergone a hypnotic treatment than for those who have received task-motivation (Ham & Spanos, 1974; Spanos & Barber, 1968; Spanos, Stam, D’Eon, Pawlak, & Radtke-Bodorik, 1980); imagination-control; or relaxation-control instructions (Connors & Sheehan, 1978; Gilbert & Barber, 1972; Spanos & Barber, 1968; Spanos, Radtke-Bodorik, & Stam, 1980, Experiment 2)” (pp. 217-218). Others have found that changes in inward experiencing (e.g. feelings of unreality, a sense of disappearance of body parts) could not be attributed simply to sitting quietly with the eyes closed (Barber & Calverley, 1979). [A footnote on p. 218 indicates some studies didn’t find this difference between a hypnosis group and a task-motivation control group.]
When Ss are asked to estimate subjective depth after having experienced hypnotizability test items, they are likely to infer depth from whether or not they passed the items (and indeed, early scales promoted that assumption). Reports of subjective depth taken before rather than after the test items still correlate with overall hypnotizability score, though not to as high a degree (E. R. Hilgard & Tart, 1966; Tart, 1970). Although usually depth estimates correlate with hypnotizability in the .50 to .75 range (Perry & Laurence, 1980), the correlations were obtained in the hypnotic context, and Ss may use their own behaviors as one determinant of their estimated depth.
From another line of study it is observed that Ss’ subjective depth may be at variance with behavioral performance on hypnosis scales (Bowers, 1981). High hypnotizables judge their own depth from their performance on cognitive items (e.g. amnesia, hallucinations) while mediums and lows judge their own performance based on their responses to motor items and challenge items (Kihlstrom, 1981). In one experiment on amnesia, it appeared that Ss did not judge their own depth by how well they did on the amnesia task (Spanos, Stam, D’Eon, Pawlak, and Radtke-Bodorik, 1980). “M. T. Orne (1966, 1980) has emphasized that although it is necessary to operationalize S’s responses to hypnotic suggestions, behavioral concomitants are only valid if they accurately reflect subjective alterations in an individual’s experience” (p. 221).
“The social-psychological approach (see Barber, 1969; Radtke & Spanos, 1981, 1982; Spanos, 1982; Wagstaff, 1981) rejects the notion of hypnotic depth as an indicator of a unique state. These authors argue that the reports of having been hypnotized reflect attributions made by Ss when confronted with a hypnotic context. … Bem (1972) and Kelley (1972) have emphasized the idea that the more ambiguous an experience is, the more a person is likely to base his or her judgment primarily on available external information” (p. 222). In this case, defining the situation as involving “hypnosis” is one of the most potent predictors of Ss’ reports of subjective experience (Spanos, Radtke- Bodorik, and Stam, 1980). Other variables that influence subjective depth estimates are the wording of the hypnotizability scale, expectancy, and information provided directly or indirectly. Oh the other hand, McCord (1961) found that his patients had widely disparate expectations for how they thought they would feel when hypnotized, so expectancy as a predictor would not necessarily determine specific experience.
Direct experimental work on predicting response to hypnosis test items from expectancies (Council, Kirsch, Vickery, & Carlson, 1983; Kirsch, Council, & Vickery, 1984) suggests that expectations may predict test response when people are given a cognitive skill type of induction, but not when given a ‘typical trance’ type of induction. Also, another study from that laboratory (Council & Kirsch, 1983) established that only when expectancies are assessed after an induction (but before the test items) do they effectively predict hypnotic behaviors. The present authors express the view that these results are difficult to account for on the basis of social psychology theories that weight heavily the role of expectancy in generating hypnotic response.
When Ss are permitted to use several different descriptors for their experience (being hypnotized, experiencing the effects, being absorbed, and responding to the suggestions), most Ss rated their own experiences as nonhypnotic (Radtke & Spanos, 1982). This was particularly true for medium hypnotizable Ss. Thus, unidimensional scales purporting to measure “depth” actually force Ss to interpret their multi-aspect experience in terms of the investigator’s frame of reference, in this case “hypnotic depth.” Nevertheless, the highly hypnotizable Ss were the least likely to be swayed from their self description of being “deep” when offered alternative ways of describing their experience. This is concordant with results reported earlier by Barber et al. (1968).
“The attribution literature may provide clues as to why most highly hypnotizability Ss retain their high ratings of experienced depth when confronted with situational manipulations. Self-perception theory strictly applies when Ss’ experiences are ambiguous, forcing them to fall back on contextual factors to make self-appraisals. The relationship between expectancies, absorption, effect of scale wording, and hypnotizability scores suggest, however, that high hypnotizable Ss do not rely heavily on contextual factors when assessing their levels of hypnotic depth. Most of these Ss maintain their reports of altered experiences, even when situational determinants are changed (Harackiewicz, 1979; Kihlstrom, 1984; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973). Thus, the hypnotizability by depth scale interaction found by Radtke and Spanos (1981) may suggest that experiences reported by high hypnotizable S are _not_ inherently ambiguous. Accordingly, self-perception theory may not apply to them” (pp.226-227).
In their Discussion, the authors state, “Several studies have attempted to relate personal, real-life events to the experience of hypnosis. A number of studies (e.g., As, 1963; Field, 1965; Shor et al., 1962; Wilson & Barber, 1982) have shown that absorption, tolerance of unusual experiences, automaticity, compulsion, and trust are related to the capacity to be hypnotized. Other studies (Bowers & Brenneman, 1981; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974; Van Nuys, 1973) have shown that certain variants of attention are also related to hypnotizability. Extensive work by J. R. Hilgard (1970, 1979) has shown that patterns of personal development relate to hypnotizability in adult life. If appears then that hypnotizable individuals bring a host of experiences and abilities with them to the hypnotic context. It makes intuitive sense which is supported by the available empirical data, that a complex interaction among these experiences and abilities, the hypnotic context, and hypnotic responsiveness is implicated in Ss’ assessments of their hypnotic depth. Studies are needed in which all of these potential determinants of hypnotic depth reports are taken into account. Only then will a clearer picture of their respective importance emerge” (p. 228).

Laurence, Jean-Roch; Nadon, Robert; Nogrady, Heather; Perry, Campbell (1986). Duality, dissociation, and memory creation in highly hypnotizability subjects. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 34, 295-310.

The present paper reports an initial attempt to create a pseudomemory in a group of highly hypnotizable individuals. It was found that for approximately 50% of Ss tested, recall of a specific event was modified when Ss integrated hypnotically suggested material which then posthypnotically was believed to be veridical. This modification in a previously reported memory was linked to a particular cognitive style found in high hypnotizable Ss, namely dual cognitive functioning. Ss reporting duality in hypnotic age regression, and, to a lesser extent, the hidden observer effect, were found to be the most prone to accept a suggested memory as real. These findings suggest the need to emphasize the importance of a cognitive-phenomenological approach to hypnosis and hypnotizability.

Mitchell, George P.; Lundy, Richard M. (1986). The effects of relaxation and imagery inductions on responses to suggestions. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 34, 98-109.

Theoretical attempts to understand the meaning and importance of induction procedures in producing hypnotic phenomena suggest that 2 critical components, relaxation and imagery, should be isolated and their relative effect on hypnotic responding studied. Objectively and subjectively scored responses to 12 hypnotic suggestions, which had followed relaxation, imaginal, or combined inductions, were obtained from 59 Ss, divided into 3 levels of hypnotizability. Regardless of hypnotizability level, the combined induction led to a greater subjective report of hypnotic response than did either the relaxation or the imagery inductions; and the relaxation led to a greater subjective report than the imagery induction. It may follow that the subjective experience of hypnosis is facilitated by inductions which include relaxation. The inductions were equally effective in producing objectively measured behavioral responses. There were no significant interactions found between induction type and hypnotizability level.